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INTRODUCTION
The last decade of' the nineteenth century witnessed the climax
I
I
II
~
of industrial change in the United States. It was closely" paralleled
by political and social upheaval which evidenced the growing demands
for empire and led to the Spanish American War. These domestic dis-
contents go far to explain the nature of American diplomacy in the
years before the war, and also the secular revivalism which supported
the "Holy" War of l898. 1t Democratic idealism was the ideology of the
I
constantly expanding industrial econolll7 of the post Civil War years.
It generated the rationalization for a vigorous advocacy of American
imperialism.1
This desire was buttressed by the common perversions of Social
Darwinism and the Gospel of Wealth, which lent a faulty logic to the
extension of an "informal empire. ,,2 But the missionary zeal of American
policy makers was an outgrowth of their conflicting economic desires
and fears.! Expansionists demanded military strength. Some of their
arguments were strategically valid, but to bolster their influence
theT applied their doctrines to the economic and idealistic aspirations
lLouis M. Hacker, "The Holy War of 1898, It American MerCUl7
(New York), m (November, 1930), 316-326.
2The phrase is from an article by H. S. Ferns, "Britain I s
Informal Empire in Argentina, 1806-1916, It Past and Present (London),
Number 4 (November, 1953), 60-15.
of other Americans. Thus the national interest, far from transcending
current problems, was defined and 1nterp~ted in response to them. As
the basic economic crisis of the country came to endanger their politi-
cal, economic, and social control of society, conservative American
leadership defined "national interest lf in terms of foreign expansion.
That expansion began as commercial penetration and culminated with
military occupation)
3The basic character of the 1890' s May be reviewed in the
following literature: E. P. Brown and Sheba Hopkins, liThe Cause of
Wage Rates in Five Countries," Oxford Economic Papers, New Series
(OXford), II (June, 1950), 226-96; C. Hoftman, tiThe Depression of the
Nineties, n Journal of Economic History (New York), XVI (June, 1956),
131-64; Simon S. Kuznetz, IlForeign Economic Relations of the United
states and Their Impact Upon the Domestic Economy, It Economic Change
(1955), 303-11; J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of
Free Trade," The Economic History-Review (London) 2nd series, VI
(August, 1953), 1-15; Richard C. Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in
American Thought, 1860..1915 (Philadelphia, 1953). Samuel Reznick,
"Unemployment, Unrest and Relief During the Depression of 1893-97, It
JournaJ. of Political EConomz (Chicago), LXI (August, 1953), 324-45;
Albert T. Volwiler, "The Early Empire Days of the United states,"
The Ohio Aluumu.s (Athens), XXXII (January, 1954), 8-11; B. Weber and
S. J. Hatfield Jones, "The Variatioos in the .Rate of Economic Growth
in the United states, 1869-1939," OXford Economic Papers, New Series,
VI (June, 1954), 101-31. See also Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self
Interest in American Foreign Relations (Chicago, 1953); Charles A.
Beard, A Foreign Policy for .America (New York, 1940), 10; James P.
'Warburg, Foreip Policy Begins at Home (New York, 1944).
For a classic example of the desire to couple missionary activ-
itywith economic gain see John W. Foster's characterization of
American policy in the Orient as a Ifrecord of a hundred years of
honourable intercourse with that region !jhic'!!7 will be a safe guide
for the conduct of affairs. Its task will be well done if it shall
aid in giving the world a .freer marke~ and to the inhabitants of the
world a Christian civilization. II John W. Foster, American DiplomaCZ
in the Orient (New York, 1903), 438.
Albert K. Weinberg, l1anifest DestinY' (Baltimore, 1935), 382-
412; Alfred T. Mahan, The Interests of America in Sea Power, Present
and Future (Boston, 1898), 18, 280; E. V. D. Robinson, ('War Economics
ii
,J
T
The Populist Party became the political instrument of agrarian
demands for economic expansion. The party was an outgrowth of the
rapid industrialization of the United States, and strengthened its
position as agrarian interests battled for control of the major politi-
cal parties in states heavily influenced by eastern financial and
political power. By contrast, southern and western agrarian leaders
and mining spokeSlllen controlled the Populist Party. Thus the entire
program of PopuliSlll bespoke the efforts of the minority groups within
the Populist Party to promote their own particular economic well being.
Earlier agrarian protest movements had originated in the mid-
west while that area could still be classed as frontier, but as the
frontier advanced, and the character of production in the middle 'West
turned from grain to dairy farming and manufacturing, that- section of
the United states slowly became reconciled to the changing nature of
the economy, and its locus of power. Even within what some authors
have termed the agrarian Itradical lt movement a spirit of restraint
marked middle western sentiments.4 .
in History and Theory, ,t Political Science Quarterly (New York, XV
(December, 19(0), 581-626; John W. Masland, UMissionary Influence upon
American Far Eastern Policy, It Pacific Historical Quarterly (Los Angeles),
XI (September, 1941), 279-296.
4Theodore F. Saloutos, liThe Agrarian Problem and Nineteenth
Century Industrialism, It Agricultural History (Chicago, Baltimore), xxrn
(July, 1948), 156-174; see also the numerous Populist Parly platforms
for the commercial nature of these expansionist demands. This writer
cannot agree with Ray A. Billington who in spite of the close correla-
tion of the third party strength with grain and cotton areas of the
iii
The basic ai:m. of improving their economic status underlaid the
Populist Party's position on foreign affairs. Commercial, political,
~
~ and agrarian interests intensified their drive for world-wide markets
~
i1
e' after 1880, during a time when the fear of surplus productivity haunted
American businessmen. Farmers of the southern and Gre.nger states at
first attempted to solve their economic troubles in more localized
efforts to halt the exploitation practices of a depressed and over-
capitalized railroad system, and attempted also to preserve their
natural resources against depletion by eastern interests. But such
efforts failed, and the farmers finally turned to the government for
a redistribution of wealth. They gained support from utopian reformers
I
and that portion of labor which had not yet adapted itself to business
practices. Meanwhile, the earlier attempts of commercial interests to
extend their domination matured as the industrial leadership of the
/
United States comments that "only Republican domination of the West
accounted for that section's imperialism. " Ray A. Billington, tiThe
Origins of Middle Western Isolationism," Political Science Quarterly,
LX (March, 1945), 49.
"By 1879 the North Central states had become the great cereal
surplus producing region of the world and by 1889 Kansas replaced
Iowa as the heart of the cereal belt. II Louis B. Schmidt, "The Westward
Movement of the Wheat Growing Industry in the United States, II Iowa
Journal of History and Politics (Iowa City), XVIII (July, 1920"Y";'396-
412; William G. Carleton, Itlsolationism and the Middle West, II
Mississippi Valley Historical Review (cedar Rapids), XXXIII (December,
1946), 377-90. Carleton notes that middle western senators were .
"compelledIl to support expansionist· demands II or pay the political
penalty. II Mody C. Boatright, "The Myth of Frontier Individualism, II
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly (Austin), XXII (June, 1941),
14-32.
iv
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1country gained political power. 5
511They were called radical in their day. In many respects they
were not so radical as the corporate monopolies to which they were
opposed, the truest embodiment of the social and economic order••••
Their radicalism consisted largely in their use of government and public
policy as a means to their ends. II Alfred W. Griswold, Farming and
Democrac (New York, 1948), 145; Solon J. Buck, The rarian Orusade
New Haven, 1921); W"einberg, Manifest Destiny (Baltimore, 193 , 3
But Populists contemplated no important changes in the struc-
ture of government. Only in the sense that they wished to become a
powerful vested interest, and as such would attempt to manipulate govern-
ment for their own immediate purposes does the term "radical" apply.
Of particular interest are the following: Oharles S. Oampbell,
Special Business Int~rests and the Open Door (New Haven, 1951); United
States Oongress, Labor and Oapital. Report of the Senate Oonnnittee on
Education and Labor. IV Vols. (Washington, 1885). The fifth volume of
the series was not printed. Volume four of the report provides detailed
infonnation on the developing of southern industries and their needs.
Mary W. Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian D~plomacy, 1815-1915
(Washington, 1916); Lawanda F. Cox, "Tenancy in the United States, 1865-
19oo,'t Agricultural History, XVIII (January, 1944), 97-101; Sylvester K.
Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii (Harrisburg, 1945), 154, in which
both Bradstreets and The American Manufacturer are quoted as calling
for commercial expansion. "Business groups generally saw overseas trade
as the critical factor••••" Herbert Guttman, correspondence with the
author, April 17, 1955. Mr. Guttman's citations cover the period 1875-
1878, and include evidence that 1fTilliam Evarts took the arguments of
American expansionists quite seriously. In 1878 five states claimed
over 100 organizations, but little regional organization was apparent.
See Illinois, Kansas, Iowa, New York, and Ohio in' James T. Adams (ed.),
List of Agricultural Societies and Farmers Clubs. United States
Department of Ag~~cult~e,Report No. 12 (Washington, 1876), 1-63.
James G. Blaine and William Frye proposed an international silver
standard for the stimulation of trade intennittently after 1880.
Alice F. Tyler, The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine (Minneapolis,
1930), 166, 174, notes 15, 16, 17. -----.
Benjamin Harrison, speech at El Paso, Texas, April 21, 1892.
Harrison's public speeches held a note of desperation. The dilemma he
faced in attempting to keep his "businessman's administration" acceptable
to workers and fanners newly conscious of their position as social
classes complicated Republican efforts to break the political and
economic lockout in the South by aligning Bourbon interests. Harrison's
solution to a major social crisis in the United States reveals his
preference for conformity to principles rather than adjustment to poli-
tical facts. Thus, in the spirit of enlightenment, Harrison pointed
v
/
LCommercial. interests formed the nucleus of a new business elite
in the years following the Civil War, and they met little effective
opposition prior to 1890. The American radicalism which might have
opposed them remained predominantly agrarian and Whiggish in nature,
in its middle class stability and respect for a higher natural law,
and in its rationalized faith in social contract, which evidenced a
strong tradition of classical liberal thought.6
to the training of the public school system as a force that needed sup-
port in order to unite the populace and stabilize the democratic process.
But his appeals for votes were couched in economic arguments varied to
suit his audience, and his remarks stressed a policy of commercial
expansion. See for eXBmi>le, Charles Hedges, The Speeches of Benjamin
Harrison (New York, 1892), 334, 383. Harrison and Blaine held the same
hopes about a "tough" foreign policy as early as 1884, when Harrison
derided "over-conscientious businessmen who fear that their money
getting will be disturbed. • •• No one ever accused J-ir. Blaine of
being a fool. tt Quoted in Lewis Wallace and Murat Halstead, The Life
and Public Service of Benjamin Harrison (n. p., 1892), 303.
ThOJ!l8,S Bayard also laid a firm foundation for American over-
seas expansion. While Germany attempted to secure Samoa for herself
"Mr. Bayard strenuOllsly objected to the predominant control of any one
power. • •• Congress made an appropriation of half a million dollars
for the protection of American interests. • •• Secretary Bayard's
plan was adopted in principle•••• It Foster, American Diplomacy, 391.
See also Charles C. Tansill, The Forei n Polic of Thomas F. Sa d
(New York, 1940); Stevens, American meion in Hawaii, ; James 11.
Klotsche ~ liThe United Front Populists, n Wisconsin Magazine of History
(Madison), IX (June, 1937), 378-89; John B. sanbourn, "Some Political
Aspects of Homestead Legislation, If American Historical Review (Durham),
VI (October, 1900), 19-32.
6John C. Appell, "American Labor and the Annexation of Hawaii:
A study in Logic and Economic Unrest," Pacific Historical Review, XXIII
(February, 1954), 1-18; liThe Unionization of the Florida Cigar Makers
and the Coming of the l'iar with Spain, n Hi1aniC American Historical
Review (Los Angeles), XXXVI (February, 195 ), 39-49. see also the
invitation issued by Thomas F. Bayard for the Pan American Conference
of 1889, called to consider, among other resolutions, "the
LInherited attitudes and acquired grievances became manifest in
periodic rebellion during periods of economic depression. The radicals
evidenced both a desire and an eagerness to share in the coming wealth
of the new industrial society. But federal and private leadership
adoption of a common sUver coin. • • • n Thomas F. Bayard, quoted in
Gantelbaum (ed.), The Evolution of Our Latin-American Policy, A
Documentary Record (New York, 1950), 53. Benjamin Harrison and James
G. Blaine, 1892-93. Memoirs of the American Philosophical Societ;r,
XIV (Philadelphia, 1940), 243, 121; Donald M. Dozier, "Benjamin
Harrison and the Presidential Campaign of 1892, II American Historical
Review, LIV (October, 1948), 47-77 reviews the forces which led to
Harrison's defeat. Yet Harrison was conscious of popular desires.
IfI1any things, for public and private reasons, cannot be unfolded until
the real makers of history cut the wrappings and the actors are dead. It
Harrison's memo on his relationship with Blaine, May 22, 1893, in
Volwiler, Correspondence, 349. See also Robert Seager II, ttTen Years
Before Mahan: The Unofficial Case for the New Navy, 1880-1890,"
MiSSiSSi,i Valley Historical Review (December, 1953), 419-512; Arthur
w. Dunn, rom Harrison to Harding, I (New York and London, 1922), 97.
Certainly the possibilities inherent in his solution to the economic
muddle of the nineties should have been evident to William Windan,
Harrison's first Secretar,y of the Treasury. Harrison thoroug~ dis-
agreed with his Secretary of State and Treasury and directed his own
administration on a conservative course despite the Congressional
stampede to diminish the treasur,y reserve. The combination of log
rolling and reduced revenues (which came about through the enactment
of the tariff of 1890) placed the Republican Administration in such a
precarious position that plates for the issue of bonds were already
printed when the Democrats came to control in 1892. For Windom's
financial plans see Alfred D. Noyes, Thirty Years of American Finance
(New York, 1898), 142.
I am indebted to my thesis adviser, Dr. W. A. Williams, for the
observation of similarity between liberald of many generations, made at
a time when the writer's concentration dwelt, perhaps too keenly, on
their differences. The development, however, has been my own. Also
helpful to an understanding of the tenets of the liberal and conserva-
tive tradition have been John E. Acton, Essays on Freedom and Power
(Meridian Book edition, New York, 1955), Russell J. Kirk, The Conserva-
tive Mind, From Burke to Santayana. (New York, 1953), and a work concern-
ing an earlier period of American history which proved nonetheless
stimulating, Clinton L. Rossiter, The First .American Revolution (New
York, 1953).
vii
pushed industrial development to the exclusion of agricultural interests
wherever possible. And the generally depressed state of farm prices
during the years of the "long depression" brought no returns to agricul-
ture comparable with those made by industry. In consequence the advo-
cates of the Pendleton Plan, Greenbackers, and National Grange provided
a continuity with the sUverites of the nineties. The continuity,
however, could be broken; the program and attitudes of agrarian liberal-
iSII1 were transformed to slogans at the hands of men who sought to
satisfy the craving for participation in government with the lure of
economic gain.
Some economic gains could be made. But the political returns
to the industrialist wing of both major American political parties
were disappointing. Their original scheme com.bined an international
silver standard with high tariff walls. Consequently supporters of the
IvlcKinley Act anticipated an acceleration of industrial activity. But
the Democrats, in search of a campaign issue, promoted the interpreta-
tion that high tariff inevitably caused economic miseries. Their
strategy was successful. In the off-year elections of 1890 they swept
into control of Congress. The Harrison Administration, coneemed with
its own attempts to support economic and ideological expansion in the
Western hemisphere and elsewhere, and bedeviled by the problems of
preventing a party split and containing the growing domestic unrest,
could only stress the necessity for "commerce based upon a stable
social order. 1t This was the conservative answer to those rebels who,
viii
,.,..,- """"If.
-it
having espoused the cause of silver" became increasingJJ active in
Oongress.
Under increasing social tensions" however" the Republican
cabinet was reported, as of 1892, to favor war against Ohile.
Attempts to secure naval outposts in the Oaribbean, and to coerce
Canada, at least into commercial union, met with little success. The
treaty of Hawaiian annexation languished in Congress. III am sure that
war would prove of no advantage," concluded James G. Blaine in a note
to President Harrison. Then Blaine, thinking better of his conclusion"
struck it from his letter. War, however" remained at best a negative
solution to political problems, and the President chose to blame his
subsequent political defeat on current labor difficulties. The com-
mercial and military expansion of the United States which marked the
administration of Benjamin Harrison proved timid when contrasted with
the Democratic Administration which succeeded it.
Despite political rivalries, the diplomatic objectives of the
Cleveland and Harrison Administrations were the same. The effective
leadership of both parties resorted to the use of force to further
American economic expansion. Though there are indications that Bome
Democrats favored expansion by· means of diplClllacy rather than military
coercion" Democratic policies were limited by the financial and politi-
cal problems of a conservative administration.
Thus the earJJ resurrection and settlement of the IllJ:ora and
La Abra claims stimulated the revival of a favorable balance in American
ix.
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foreign trade, and brought relief to the national treasury. Likewise,
the policy of limiting official intervention of the United States in
Cuba must be considered in conjunction with the Venezuelan controversy
and the financial problems of 1895. But gunboat diplomacy continued to
support penetration into South America. Finally, the limited efforts
toward intervention should not be confused with the Cleveland Administra-
tion's active efforts to effect the ~ facto commercial annexation of
Cuba and the Hawaiian Islands. The withdrawal of the Hawaiian Treaty
from Congress was in full accord with the administration's view of
expanding commercial interests, and such an interpretation in no way
threatened American economic supremacy in the islands. The bipartisan-
ship of Republican and Democratic actitities became evident in Richard
Olney's prompt and efficient protection of the economic penetration of
the islands by American interests. 7
7pa rs Belat to the Forei n Relations of the United States
(hereinafter cited as For. ReI. fo lowed by year and page , 1 9, 23,
432, ibid., 1895, 1170, 1174.
-rt is here suggested that the usual interpretation of Walter
Gresham' s diplomacy as the result of his benevolent idealism is insuf-
ficient, or at least incomplete. Gresham and Grover Cleveland were close
friends; given that friendship and a similar attitude as to the nature
of American interests, Olney and Cleveland shared an expansionist view-
point with Gresham. In view of the intimacy of Cleveland and Olney in
later years, and Cleveland's reflections on their policies, it seems
reasonable to conclude that both Cleveland and Olney favored commercial
penetration as an alternative to annexation. See Matilda S. Gresham,
The Life of Walter Q. Gresham, II (New York, 1919), 738-776, 785; Theo-
dore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, December 26, 1896, in Elting E.
Morrison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, 1951),
249; James, Olnel, 243, 158; James A. Barnes, "The Gold Standard Demo-
crats and Party Conflict, II Mississippi Valley Historical Reviei!, XVII
.X
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Continuity of policy also linked the Cleveland and McKinley
Administrations. The preference for granting recognition only to stable
governments, a tendency which was strengthened under Harrison, became
more clearly associated with commercial penetration. Curiously, stable
governments seemed to be those which agitated for, or were involved in,
economic development by the United States.
In a similar way, the interpretation of neutrality d.eveloped
by Harrison and Cleveland matured in William McKinley's justification
of the Spanish-American War. The Republican sponsorship of the inter-
national arbitration treaty of 1897 completed the Democratic interpreta-
tion of the 14:onroe Doctrine, and provided an easy transition to later
Republican diplomacy, as the provisions of the treaty elevated national
honor to a recognized position for disagreement between nations. Its
compromise foreshadowed and aided the development of policies pursued
by Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. The economic coopera-
tion of the Open Door notes the intervention by the United States to
adjust South American governmental affairs became accepted policy.
And John Sherman found it convenient to re-emphasize a continuity of
(December, 1930), 441; For. ReI., 1895, 365-450; 1933, to Richard Olney,
February 16, 1898, 494, and January 16, 1898, 492; Allen F. Nevins
(ed.), The Letters of Grover Cleveland, 1850-1908 (Boston and New York,
1933); Richard Olney, ItInternational Isolation of the United States,lt
Atlantic l'1onthly (Boston), LXXXI (limy, 1898), 577-88, and George H.
Knowle s (ed.), lIGrover Cleveland and Imperialism," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XXXVII (June, 1950), 303-304. See also Gresham's
attempt to "demand ll concessions for foreign landholders. For. ReI.,
1895, 1236. Henry \\ihite urged annexation of Cuba upon Olney. Henry
James, Richard Olney and His Public Service (Boston, 1923), 243.
xi
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policy in his support of Richard Olney's decisions.8
8John Hay assured the British Foreign Office that there would
be no change of policies. Hay to Olney, July 3, 1896, James, Olney,
248; James 1. Laughlin and H. Parker Willis, Reciprocity (New York,
1933), 311-414; Nelson W. Blake, "The Olney-Pauncefote Treaty of 1897,"
American Historical Review (January, 1897), 228-243; John W. Burgess,
"The Recent Pseudo-Monroism, II Political Science Quarterly, XI (March,
1896), 44-67; John B. Moore, liThe l'lonroe Doctrine, It ibid., 129. Richard
Olney's careful defense of executive power rested on the fear that his
own interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine would be used against the
Executive in the struggle over Cuban belligerency. England's attempt
to settle the Venezuelan controversy through arbitration was opposed
by Olney, who successfully dodged arbitration for all but selected
issues. Anglo-phobia also played its share in the treaty's death.
Among those most rabid for its defeat were two leaders of the jingo
and silver forces, Senators Morgan of Alabama and Jones of Nevada.
See the New York Times, January 23, 1897. The escape clause of
Congressional consent could not accomplish the passage of the treaty,
nor could it quell Senatorial opposition. Based in agrarian fears
of economic restriction and the general desire for an isthmian canal,
Senate opposition carried the treaty to defeat. The McKinley Adm:i.n-
istration revived the treaty, possibly to stimulate the growth of
Anglo-American friendship, but as it finally passed Congress, it con-
stituted little but a good will agreement. W. Stull Holt, Treaties
Defeated by the Senate, Times, January 2, 1897, 160; Richard Olney
to Sir Julian Pauncefote, April 11, 1896, For. ReI., 1896, 225. For
Shennan's support of Olney see the correspondence regarding the
Cerruti claims, For. ReI., 1897, 245-267, particular~ the letters of
Senior Renzifo to Olney, March 3, 1897, and to John Shennan, l~y 15,
1897; James, Olney, 169-70.
The American position on arbitration of outstanding disputes
backslid even f'urther during the McKinley Administration, when the
Czar of Russia, hoping, perhaps, to gain from the settlement after the
Spanish-American War, offered the Hague Conference to his competitors
in the far east as a vehicle for the settlement of outstanding dis-
putes among nations. But upon accepting the Czar's invitation to the
Conference, the United States made it clear that its rights of settle-
ment with Spain must remain outside the area of mediation. For. ReI.,
1898, 543.
xii
LThe renewal of the Republican program of reciprocity also
reflected and fostered expansionist activities. Appeals to the Monroe
Doctrine were fused with humanitarianism in order to justify economic
gain, as when ~tlillia1ll. McKinley aimed at the "settled purpose of open-
ing trade ll and a Itshort and decisive war." But special interests con-
stantly hampered the diplomacy of expansion. Only as time and political
maneuvers harmonized these factions did American imperialism become the
basis for social and industrial peace. Then the dissention which
remained concerned only the method of maintaining an empire, not its
nature or establishment.
Grover Cleveland failed in diplomacy because of the silver
heresy; William l'1cKinley succeeded through adroit manipulation of the
tariff, monetary policy, and foreign expansion in diverting Democracy
and the remnants of the Peoples' Party as he established an empire.9
9ThomasA. Bailey, liThe United states and Hawaii During the
Spanish-Jl..merican War," .American Historical Review, XXXVI (October,
1930), 552-560. It is, of course, impossible to name an exact date,
or event from which a change, or acceleration toward aggression may be
marked in public sentiment. Yet certain witnesses have borne testimony
to an increasing tempo of jingo sentiment. The activities of Christian
Socialists were most bitterly attacked in 1894. And the well-known
cler~an, Lyman Abbott, was expelled from the pastorate of his church
for liberal political activities." In the October 28 issue of the
New York Times Stephen Crane reported that "Howells Fears Realists 11ust
Wait." The thoughts of the American realist, William Dean Howells, and
his interviewer are remarkable:
"Mr. Howells," said the other man suddenly, "Have you observed
a change in the literary pulse of the country within the last
few months? Last winter, for instance, it seemed that realism
was about to capture things, but then recently I have thought
that I saw coming a sort of counterwave, a flood of the other--
a reaction, in fact. Trivial, temporary, perhaps, but a
xiii
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As an instrument of expansion, the tariff served both
Republicans and Democrats. Harrison and Blaine deliberately aimed
at commercial penetration of Europe and South America through tariff
manipulation. They justified their policies in terms of national
honor and political necessity; but such were the major benefits to
American production, that their policy were desired by industry.
The producer whose power and efficiency enables him to control
his domestic market, and can also undersell foreigners, has no fear of
reciprocity, indeed, it gets his products into new markets. Conse-
quently, two policies, the emphasis on reciprocity arrangements which
would import the needed raw materials for industry, and avoidance,
wherever possible, of importing manufactured goods, found favor with
industry. High tariffs and recovery f'rom the panic of 1893 did much
reaction, certainly.1f Mr-. Howells dropped his hands in a
gesture of emphatic assent, ''What you say is true. I have
seen it coming. • • • I suppose we shall have to wait."
Grover Cleveland, from the White House, also watched, and waited.
James C. Dombowski, The Early Days of Christian Socialism in America
(New York, 1930), 10, 172; Times, November 1, l894~ Stephen Crane,
Stories and Tales (New York, 1955, Vintage Edition), 163-66; A. F.
Nevins, Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage (New York, 1933), 535;
Hans J. Morgenthau, ltThe Mainsprings of' American Foreign Policy: The
National Interest vs. Moral Abstraction, II American Political Science
Review (Baltimore), XXXXIV (December, 1950), 833-854; Thomas I. Cook
or· and 11alcom M. Moo!! J "Foreign PolicyJ the Rea.lism of Idealism, n American
Political Science Quarterly, XXXXVI (June, 1952), 342-56, for varying
interpretations of motivation; William S. McKinley, Speeches and
Addresses, March 1st, l897-May 30, 1900 (New York, 1908), October 30,
1897, to the Connnercial Club in Cincinnati, 781, 743. Edward F.
Atkins, Sixty Years in Cuba (Cambridge, 1926). Ida H. Tarbell, The
Tariff in Our Times (New York, 1915), 141.
xiv
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to consolidate and stabilize American manufacturers' position in the
hOlUe market. In spite of the financial stringency which confronted
the administration and the conflicts between special interests which
hampered diplomacy, the principle of reciprocity could be effectively
employed by expansionists .10
10As a general rule, reciprocity does not change the character of
foreign trade. The type of "tropical reciprocity" employed gave a
natural advantage to manufacturers. The whole problem of the reci-
procity treaties and tariff policy is well reviewed in Laughlin and
Willis, Reciprocity. Brazil, for example, imported little American
flour after expiration of its reciprocity treaty, and American
exporters keen~ felt the loss of Brazilian markets. After 1894 exports
to Brazil showed a slow increase. Free entry of sugar from Hawaii, to
cit~ another example, would result in America monopolizing the crop.
The effect in the islands was to draw most of the sugar plantations
into .American ownership. This resulted in the domestic political
quarrels between the islanders and .American interests which climaxed
in the Hawaiian revolution. The Havermeyer interests which combined
with Atkins and Company of Cuba in 1889, objected strenuously that the
loss of sugar bounty combined with low profits would ruin their hold-
ings. Cane sugar was "fighting for its life, It as it faced the addi-
tional competition of domestic beet sugar, thus aggravating the
southern refiners' problem. Grover Cleveland remained unsympathetic,
though John Cars1ile, his Secretary- of the Treasury, put forth some
effort to adjust the tariff schedule of 1894.
Thus the effect of Cleveland's policy was to keep Hawaii in the
commercial orbit, and add to the revenues paid by Cuban sugar interests,
who were also the principal source of Spanish duties. But even with
reduction to a "flat 40 per cent rate on refined sugar" the effect of
the later Dingley revision was to almost double the percentage of
revenue on Cuban sugars, as prices declined steadily throughout the
nineties. Edward Atkins finally' resorted to revolutionary activities
in Cuba, hoping to gain autonomy for the island, and thus eliminate
Spanish trade restrictions and revenues. Within the United States,
meanwhile, Cleveland desperately clung to all available income, and,
while Cars1i1e attempted to adjust the sugar schedule, Atkins noted that
his influence on American diplomacy was "exaggerated. It
Under the Cleveland Administration, Atkins reported regularly to
the State Department on conditions in the islands, and received an intro-
duction to the succeeding administration from Charles Francis Adams. In
April of 1897, when Atkins, then a business partner of J. D. Morgan,
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But discontent manifested itself once more in the Cuban rebel-
lion and in the struggle over recognition of Ctlban belligerency. Only
upon the election of a Republican Administration did the pressure for
intervention in Cuba quiet temporarily. The cooperation of the Execu-
tive and Congress resulted in the prompt passage of the Dingley tariff,
and with the assurance that sound. financial policies would be maintained,
the issue of Cuban intervention again rose to prominence.ll
Tariff policy also deepened the sectional animosities between
the South and the West. The traditionally protectionist midwest
erupted quickly into conflict with southern free trade forces,
appeared in Washington to fight for the autonomy of the island, he was
told that intervention in Cuba would mean annexation of the island. In
the course of his lobbyist activities, Atkins appealed to Nelson Aldrich.
Aldrich' 6 attitude in turn, enraged Sidney B. Elkins, who insisted that
"You aSSUill.e to 1mow about the tariff, but your knowledge is limited • • •
you don't know about the broad commercial considerations•••• It Rage
might well have been Elkins' reaction, for Aldrich proposed to "create
a balanced system. Equalize ••• the conditions in competition with
similar industries in competing countries. II Quoted in Nathaniel W.
Stephenson, The Life of Nelson W. Aldrich (New York, 1930), 82. See
also Frank G. Taussig, "The Tariff Act of 1894," Political Science
Quarterly, IV (December, 1894), 606; Richard D.Weigle, "Sugar and
Hawaiian Revolution," Pacific Historical .Review, XVI (February, 1947),
41-58; Lincoln Hutchenson, liThe Results of Reciprocity with Brazil, II
Political Science Quarter;r, XVIII (June, 1903), 228; Barnes, Carslile,
474; Edward A. Atkins, Sixty Years in Cuba (Cambridge, 1926), 281, 171,
156, 57, 120; Taussig, Free Trade, The Tariff, and Reciprocity (New
York, 1920), 309.
~, From Harrison to Harding, I, 224. Joseph E. Wisan,
The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press, 1895-1898 (New
York, 1934), 99.
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particularly when the tariff revision of 1894 hindered southern expan-
sion. On the Pacific Coast, meanwhile, the hope of silver monetization
and an increased Oriental trade, coupled with fear of cheap Oriental
competition, served to defeat the free trade torces. Political alleg-
iance further complicated the conflict over poliey. The New South as
an industria1 econom;,y might well be attracted to the party of protec-
tion, and it was the constant effort of eastern Republicans to effect
an alliance with Bourbon Democracy. But the Venezuelan note came too
late to prevent the Democratic Barty schism, and Republican industrial-
ists successfully interpreted the struggle of 1896 as one for prosperity
rather than monetization of sUver. Yet Democratic attempts to make the
South and West "flop together" almost succeeded. Within this framework
the efforts of both maj or parties to win Populist support by blaming
the other for hard times served to increase expansionist strength.12
12The farmers became particularly conoerned because India's
rivalry in the international exchange put them at a disadvantage in
wheat and cotton sales. Their argument had great effeot as the issue
of free silver coinage gained momentum. It ran as follows:
"Our prices for wheat and cotton are regulated largely by
the European market. India and the United States compete for
that market. other things being equal, the market is ours.
If Asiatic bills of exchange fall below par, the East Indian
has the advantage ••• free coinage would bring it to par."
Congressional Record, Vol. 23, pt. 4, 3663 (hereinafter cited as Coni-
Rec. followed by volume, part and page). See also American Bimetallic
League, Facts About Silver (Washington, 1891), 37; William J. Bryan,
October, 1891, quoted in Barnes, Garsli1e, 433; Chauncy M. DePew, ~
Memories of Eighty Years (New York, 1,24), 150; Wisan, The Cuban Crisis
as Reflected in the New York Press, 37.
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Professional jingoism contributed mch, of course, to the furor
over American expansion. .An active and rabid newspaper press excited the
public temper to the point where it became politically impossible for
the Republicans to avoid intervention in Cuba. Opportunism triggered
the mechanics of acquisition, and the policies of the McKinley Adminis-
tration. Henr,y Cabot Lodge, Theodore Roosevelt, and Alfred Thayer Mahan
meanwhile anticipated, and helped create, popular desires. The forma-
tion of American foreign policy thus paralleled the physical expansion
of the American frontier. l3
The protestations of concern, and demands for partition made
by other powers were handled by formalizing John W. Foster's earlier
informal open door policy in China. Japan and Germany found their
more obvious attempts to gain foothold in Hawaii, Samoa, and the
Phillipines defeated by a combination of !! facto control, mutually
shared jealousies, and Anglo-American sympathy. In such a manner the
13Marcus W. Wilkerson, Public Opinion and the Spanish American
~ (Baton Rouge, 1932). No large-scaJ.e study of the activities of the
small group of American diplomats, senators, and civil servants who
did so much to promote war with Spain has yet been written. The
biographical material available on these men is often incomplete.· But
for the relationship of Brooks Adams to the imperialists see William A.
Williams, I1Brooks Adams, and .American Expansion, It New England Quarterly
(Brunswick), XXV (June, 1952), 217-32. An address of Adams' before the
American Economic Association also deserves attention. see the "Mean-
ing of the Recent Expansion of Foreign Trade in the United States,lt
American Economic Association, patrs and ProceediI!gs (New York, 1899),
80-96; William A. Williams, "The ontier Thesis and American Foreign
Policy, It Pacific Historical Review, XXIV (November, 1955), 379-95; Lee
Benson, tiThe Historical Background of Turner' B Frontier Essay,"
,yricultural History, XXV (April, 1951), 59-04.
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diplomacy of the Spanish-American War led to the markets of Asia.14
The Spanish-American War strengthened the annexationists, and
made present policy of their cautious desires to acquire territorial
as well as commercial control of the Pacific. Such worried thought and
limited vision as were exhibited ill fit the pattern of conquest. The
American dream of worldwide democratic institutions conflicted, appar-
ently, with constitutional government and vested interests. The
interests, however, ,could be reconciled, and Cleveland's South American
policy became the logical extension of Blaine's earlier intervention,
14Thomas A. Bailey, "Japan's Protest Against the Annexation of
Hawaii," Journal of Modern Histoq (Chicago) (March, 1931), Q.o-5l; ~.,
"Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay, tI American Historical Review (October,
1939), 59-81; James K. Eyre, "Japan and American J..nnexation of the
Philippines," Pacific Historical ReView, XI (March, 1942), 539-62;
Harold ~1. Bradley, "Observations Upon American Policy in the
Philippines,," ibid., XI (March, 1942), 43; Thoma.s A. Bailey, "Russia and
American Acquisition of the Philippines, It Mississippi Valley Historical
Review, XXVIII (March, 1942), 539-62; John D. Bick£ord, "The Contemplated
Anglo-German Alliance, 1890-1901," Political Science Quarterly, XLI
(March, 1927), 1-57; Alfred Vagts, "Hopes and Fears of an American-German
War 1870-1915, It Political Science Quarterly, LIV (December, 1939), 523;
Dana G. Munro, "American Commercial Interests in Manchuria, II Annals of
the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia)"
XXXIX (January, 1912), 154-68. For the growth and shifting emphasis of
American trade to the orient see James C• .Malin, An Interpretation of
Recent .A.rlerican History (New York and London, 1926), 61. The per cent
of increase between 1890 and 1900 doubled the total of American foreign
trade in Asia. and more than tripled it in Africa:
Area 1890 1900
Asia 2.30 4.60
South America 4.,2 2.79
Africa .,4 1.79
The export of the gross national product of the United States
increased steadily from 12.48 per cent in 1881 to 23.14 per cent in 1895.
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as well as that of Benjamin Harrison. The constitution, too, proved
itself adaptable to the democracy of the expansionists. And so most of
the critics were silenced. And an election year loomed ahead. Since
desire remained stronger than conscience, the votes of 1900 were not
cast upon the issue of imperialism. Constant variants on a policy of
expansion brought a .climax to tensions which had mounted since the
end of the Civil War.1,
Studies of the Populist Party have acknowledged, even stressed,
its economic basis, but little effort has been made to trace the
economic activities which led to the decline of Populism. It is
generally assumed that the collapse of the movement was nearly complete
after 1896. But a necessary distinction between the Populist Party
and the Silverites must be made. Truly, silver was "the cowbird of
the reform movement," but after Mark Hanna successfully reinterpreted
prosperity to the farmers in 1896, there remained the problem of pro-
viding, the promised returns. Populists and their political
l'Thomas A. Bailey, "Was the Presidential Election of 1900 a
Mandate on Imperialism?1I Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXIV
(June, 1937), 43-52; ibid., "The United States and Hawaii During the
Spanish-American War,1I'"'1iiierican Historical Review, XXVI (April, 1931),
552-60; Joseph W. Ellison, "The Partition of Samoa," ibid., VIII
(September, 1939), 2'9-281; Leslie W. Walker, IIGuam's Seizure by the
United States in 1898, It Pacific Historical Review, nv (November, 1945),
1-13; John C. Appel, It.American Labor and the Annexation of Hawaii: A
Study in Logic and Economic Unrest," ibid. (February, 1954), 1-18; Fred
H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-
1900," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII (September, 1935),
211-30.
-representatives did not suddenly vanish from. the national scene.16
A combination of factors suppressed Populism. New gold dis-
coveries stimulated international trade, and the United States adopted
a funded curreney as the alternative to international bimetallism.
The Spanish-American War distracted reformers and professional
patriots. Certainly no student of the period will attach final
responsibility to anyone of these causes ta the exclusion of others.
Nor are certain key individuals to be held solelT responsible for the
collapse of the reform movement. The years 1890-1900 marked a major
16rhe definitive work on the party remains John D. Hicks,
'!he POtulist Revolt; A History of the Farmers' llliance and the People's
Party Minneapolis, 1931). One is inclined to doubt the acceptability
of the thesis present by such historians as Hicks that the gold dis-
coveries played a significant part in the alleviation of domestic dis-
contents. Any fair amount of research into the period of the nineties
reveals an almost pathetic eagerness on the part of conservatives of
both major American political parties to stabilize American domestic
politics. Extended use of instruments of credit to quiet the rapid
liquidation of foreign assets remained impossible until 1897, but as
investment outlets became problematical in late 1897 and 1898 it does
not appear that a new gold supply became a crucial factor in American
domestic recovery. There is, in addition, the consideration as to
whether the new gold, becamed.DIllediate4r available as circulating
medium within the econOOlT in such quantity and tor such purposes as
to appreciably affect the per capita ratio of circulating specie.
See the accompanying bibliography of this thesis for various state
studies on Populism; H. D. Lloyd, quoted in Caro Lloyd, Henrr Demorest
Lloy!!, I (New York, 1912), 264. The 55th Congress held the argest
number of Populist Senators and representatives yet to appear in
national legislative rolls, the majority of them from vestem and
midcUewestern states. See also Joseph A. Schumpeter, "Money and the
Social Product, II International Econam1c Papers (New York, 1956), 192-94
198, 199.
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conSOlidatio,Of commercial leadership and American politics, and so
the older/onservative tradition was brushed aside. Populists accepted
the new order and traded their identity as a party for a program of
imperialism. The thesis of this study, then, is that the foreign
policy adopted by the Populists in the years 1892-1898 led them back
to the folds of the Republican and Democratic parties.11
l7ltWheat grOlfers were dependent for about 30-hO per cent of
their gross annual income upon the export market, cotton growers for
about 70 per cent, pork and. pork products for about 15-23 per cent."
Richard C. Hofstadter, The e of Reform (New York, 1955), 52, note 5.
In reference to legis ators, the term "Populist r, as used in
this thesis will refer to members of the Populist party. Thus it will
exclude Republicans and Democrats favorable to. the principles of
Populism, unless they held political office by virtue of fusion with
Populism, considered themselves Populists rather than Democrat or
RepUblican, and were accepted as Populists by other third party legis-
lators on that basis.
xxii
1T
CHAPTER I
A PROBLEM OF POLICY, 1891-1893
t'Why Mr. Chairman, we are driven from the markets of
the whole world!"
Jerry Simpson
Foreign poliey remained a mystery to most Populists. The
provincial environment of farmers, who comprised the bulk of the
party, and an almost superstitious distrust of activities which took
place outside their immediate observation, limited their understanding
of the objectives of diplomacy. So they seized upon explanations,
often erroneous or incomplete, which seemed valid in the light of past
experience. Only a few intellectuals became Populists, and these
either bolted in violent disgtlst or turned part,.. acti'Vit1es to their
own political advantage, finally convinced that statesmanship must
give way to popular passion. And for many reformers who joined the
party with hopes of effecting social changes in America, Populism
became a transient allianoe. These people had no immediate interest
in foreign affairs.l
The Populists considered themselves to be reformers of the
American party syStem. They chose, therefore, to publicize the
~or example, William V. Allen directed the party toward
fusion with the Democrats, while Henry Demarest Lloyd and Eugene V.
Debs became Socialists. Tom Watson "reverted to demogogy_
democratic basis of their movement. In the early years of its
existence, Populism embraced Democrats and Republicans, Westerners and
Southemers, white and colored, laborites, socialists, single taxers,
free-traders, and protectionists. But conservative farming interests
dominated later machinery and program of the party. Contemporary
observers of the movement often labeled Populist radicals, but the
western and southern agrarians who bolted both major political parties
to follow the leaders of Populism. might more accurately be termed
conservative, even reactionar.r, in their domestic policies.2
To advooates of industrialism and its accampanying changes in
post Civil War American society, the Populist seemed radical because
he hurled his challenge at the Gilded Age with demands for specific
political and economic rewards which might regain for agrarians some
semblanoe of equality with the new industrial society. The farmers
openly acknowledged their role as a vested interest. Economic gain
became the basis upon which their political representatives von
elections, and it provided the grist for their contentions. Christian
Protestant morality, national honor, and class consciousness helped
to mold their opinions of current issues. The farmers' grievances,
both fancied and real, fostered their highly critical attitudes toward
2J • Martin Klotsche, "The United Front Populists, It WisconsiD
Magazine of History (Madison), XX (June, 1931), 318-89. An excellent
example of contemporary reaction to Populism is Frank C. McVey, "The
Populist Movement," American Economic Association, Economic Studies
(New York), I (April. 1896), 133-209.
2
-3
both major political parties. International relations became important
because the farmers worried about crop markets.3
While the world market remained relatively stable, dODlSstic
staple crop prices tumbled throughout the eighteen seventies and eighties.
A 1I8rked centralization of agriculture, and the limited employment of
new technological aids combined with the cultivation of an ever
increasing amount of marginal land to swell the volume of production
in major export crops. These factors in turn aggravated lagging
prices. The European move· toward independent national economies
shrank still further the markets already seemingly inadequate to absorb
the expanded production. Foreign rivals threatened to supplant the
usual trade channels.4
3In the course of debate upon one of the numerOl1s veterans'
appropriation measures, senator William A. Peffer estimated that Kansas
claimed at least 60,000 Civil War veterans. The frequent references by
Peffer and other Populist congressmen to their Civil War legacy lends
strong support to the idea that lII1ch of the western agrarians t bitter-
ness at their lot may be traced to their migration after the Civil War,
establishment on homestead land, and willing drudgery in the hopes of a
prosperous future. William A. Peffer, Cong. Rec., 2314: 2070, ibid.,
23:514214. ----
Lp.red A. Shannon attests to the impossibility of obtaining
accurate and complete statd.stical data for the period 1896-1900 on
mortgage holdings and agricultural prosperity_ Information entered into
the Congressional Record by Populist legislators often seems to be pri-
marily an expression of the intensity of agrarian grievances. But the
conservative estimates by the Bankers' Magazine and Statistical Register
and the conclusions drawn by editorial writers of the Commercial and
Financial Chronicle certainly indicate a decline in the attractions of
rural life. This writer has relied mainly upon the contemporary accounts
of the aforementioned journals, and on the secondary accounts by Fred A.
Shannon, The Farmers' Last Frontier--Agriculture 1860-1897 (New York,
1945), ~., liThe Status of the Midwestern Fanner in 1900," Mississippi
Valley Historical Review, XXXVII (December, 1950), 491-510. See also a
series of articles by Benjamin H. Hibbard, "Tenancy in the North Atlantic
I,
i
4
In the western, grain producing area of the United States,
political action became the death struggle of the homesteader's dream.
MOrtgage-burdened farmers considered themselves the victims of middle-
men and bankers, of eastern plutocrats, and railroad financiers. They
became increasingly angry that the myth of their prosperity should be
states," Quarterly Journal of Economics, XXVI (November, 1911), 105-17,
ibid., "Tenancy- in the North Central States, If ibid., XXV (August, 1911),
710-19, ibid., "Tenancy in the Southern States," ibid., XXVII (May, 1913),
482-96, Ibid., "Tenancy in the Western States," ibid., XXVI (February,
1912), 3b3=B'6. -
None of the Populist legisle.tors appear from their early debates
to have understood the relationship between railroad expansion and crop
expansion. Admittedly the curbing of speculation might have halted the
construction of competing and overcapitalized railway lines, and in turn
might have delayed the tilling of poorer farm land. Theoretically, how-
ever, this would have worked to confine agriculture, rather than to
expand its position. In reality the percentage of farm land added to
cultivation declined steadily after 1870, though &s a result of inroads
on the public domain "the proportion of new f arDiS started as free
pa1Ients under the Homestead Act from 1860 to 1900 barely exceeded one-
eighth, and the proportion of farms in tenancy rose to 35 per cent,"
according to Griswold, FarB)ing and Democracy, l41. During the eighteen
nineties, cotton exports increased, though net agricultural exports
declined. A precursor of the Farmers' Alliance was the Louisiana
Farmers' Union, organized in the preVious decade to stimulate cotton
prices. Louis B. Schmidt, "Some Significant Aspects of the Agrarian
Revolution in the United States, If Iowa Journal of History and Politics,
XVIII (July, 1920), 385, 86, Alex M. Arnett, ItThe Populist Movement in
Georgia, It Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law (Columbia
University), CIV (New York, 1922), 72. Erastus Wyman estimated land
cultivation increased as follows:
Period Additional Cultivated Land Percentage of
OVer Former Period Inorease
1871 7,500,000 8.1
1875 8,240,000 6.8
1880 6,400,000 3.9
1890 2,100,000 1.4
See Erastus Wyman, "The Farmer on Top," North American Review (Boston),
OLIII ( July, 1891), 17. Robert P. Brooks, liThe Agrarian Revolution in
Georgia, 1865-1912," University of Wisconsin Bulletin (Madison), III
(1914) •
fostered by politicians of both major political parties, who were kept
in office b,y the patronage of these eastern interests. Sectional rivalry
flared, as the agrarians, finding the economic weapons of the coopera-
tive movement and railroad rate regulation ineffective, took up their
ultimate weapon, the vote, to fight easternfmancial manipulation of
crop prices. Thus by 1892 the national elections returned two
senators and nine representatives who shortly designated themselves
Populist.'
Particularly was the South drawn to Populism by its economic
needs. The Civil War crushed many an independent yeoman farmer, as
well as his aristocratic slaveholding peer. And the grim poverty of
reconstruction left a well of bitter hatred from which Southem Bourbons
dipped repeated victory at the polls, but little was shared with the
southern middle class agrarians. Ambitious southern poor whites nur-
tured the suspicion that they were again betrayed in their hopes, and
roused themselves to political activity. And in the West the early
leaders of Populism were self-made men, determined to resist adversity,
unconvinced that the analyses· of their poverty which they received from
their elected representatives were honest explanations of their
'Hicks, Populist Revolt, 404, 4a3. Some doubt has been cast on
the Populist charge that mortgages fed eastern capitalists. :Research
done at the University of Wisconsin on the developnent of one frontier
area, Trwnploe County, indicated no great financial debt owed by that
section to eastern interests. Merle Curti, remarks concerning the
IITrumploe County Project," Eugene, Oregon, April 1" 19,,; Cong. Rec.,
23:1:1; Official Con ressional Director for the Use of the United
States Congress. 2 Congress, 1 Session Washington, 1 92 , 21: -11.
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difficulties. The primary concern of both western and southern
Populists became the alleviation of their immediate problems. Conse-
quently they developed a highly pragmatic approach toward problems of
government and finance.6
The intensity of middle class ~uthernerst needs, the rigidity
of caste within their own Demooratic Party machinery, and so simple a
factor as the growing population density in agricultural areas stimu-
lated the agrarian revolt in the South. Regional Farmers t Alliances
in both South and West were tranS£ormed, in 1892 into the political
alliance, Populism. Discontent thus culminated in the fomal adherence
of the fanners of the two sections to a common body of principles.
John D. Hicks has outlined the story of the doubts and difficulties
which beset the agrarians preliminary to their entry into the politi-
cal arena. Once this bold step was taken, however, the Populist Party,
6william B. Hesseltine, "Economic Factors in the Abandonment
of Reconstruction, It Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII
(September, 193,), 191-210, Arnett, l'Populist Movement in Georgia," 18,
19, 130. In spite of the price decline, what capital was available was
still being poured into the development of southern cotton. "From 1870
to 1890 capital invested in the cotton industry rose 1,0 per cent, It
while New England retained leadership in manufacturing, with 76 per cent
of the spindles in 1890.. as compared to 77 per cent in 1870. Victor S.
Clark, Risto of Manufact· in the United States (New York.. 1929),
II, 393, • e also the remarks of John W. Laps ey, Labor and
Capital, IV, 177. Roscoe C. Martin, "The People's Party in Texas, A
Study in Third Party Politics, U The University of Texas Bulletin
(Austin), Bureau of Research in the SOcial Sciences. Study No.4.
eLIII (July'.. 1691), 5-12; Hallie Farmer, RThe Economic Basis of Frontier
Populism, It Mississippi Valley Historical Review, X (March, 1924), 406-27.
One of the most complete accounts of post-Reconstruction southern prob-
lems is presented by C. Vann Woodward.. Origins afthe New South, 1877-
1913. Vol. IX of 10 vols. in A History of the South (Baton Rouge,
1951).
..
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newly born and possessed of few traditions, attracted reformers of many
creeds and purposes. 7
Though labor leader Samuel Gompers held little hope for any
permanent rapport between the labor movement and Populism, labor was
"well representedU at the early St. Louis and Omaha conventions of the
Populist Party. Still, the contrast between lIemploying farmera ll with
wage earners proved as unnatural a combination to the agrarians, for
the reception accorded labor delegations seemed lukewarm. But Populist
leaders early recognized their need for a wider base of political sup-
port if the party were to maintain itself, and played upon labor discon-
tent in an effort to gain popular influence. Thus they took care to
7Willie D. Halsell, ItThe Bourbon Period in Mississippi Politics, It
Journal of Southern History, XI (November, 1945), 519-37, C. Vann
Woodward, "Bourbonism in Georgia," ibid., XVI (October, 1939), 23-35;
Hicks, PO~istReVOlt, 205-37. John D. Hicks has also evaluated the
heritage an legacy of Populism. in domestic polities: "The Legacy of
Populism in the Middle West,T' ~rieultural Historl' XXII (October,
1949), 225-37, ibid., "The Persistence of PopUlism, It Minnesota History
(St. Paul), XII (March, 1931), 1-20, ibid., "The Third Party Tradition
in American Polities, tt Mississippi VaIrel Historioal Review, XX (June,
1933), 1-28. The continuity of agrarian discontent with the growth of
the reform movement is traced by Arthur S. Link, "The Progressive
Movement in the South, 1870-1914," North Carolina Historical Review
(Raleigh), XXIII (April, 1946), 172-95. seymour L1pset SWI1I1l&rizes
the economic and social trends which have in part accounted for the
secondary importance of the agrarian revolt. See Seymour M. Lipset,
liThe Background of Amerioan Radicalism," in Seymour M. Lipset and
Richard Bendix (eds.), Class, Status, and Power (Glencoe, Illinois,
1953), 554-67, and Orin G. Libby provides a summary of the post Civil
'War inflationists in "A Study of the Greenback Movement, 1876-84,"
Wisconsin Academy of Science, Arts, and Letters: Transactions, XII,
Pt. 2 (Madison, 1900), 530-1103. Other special studies which stress the
growth of agrarian political activities are included in the biblio-
graphy of this thesis. See particularly Chester M. Destler, liThe
Origin and Character of the Pendleton Plan, 11 Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, XXIV (September, 1937), 17l-81i.
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identify agriculture and labor as equal branches of industry. And the
rapidly declining Knights of Labor could hardly afford to ignore chance
that it might find association with Populism a temporary reprieve from
total collapse.8
Socialists found the alliance more difficult. Agrarians who
bolted their former parties when they could not control them sought
recognition in the existing politics.l system, and aimed at the limited
reconstruction of government policies to meet their specific demands.
The activities of agrarians of the middle and southwestern states who
operated grain storage and selling cooperatives in businesslike fashion,
and who were not averse to joining with other commercial interests in
the promotion of private enterprise, repudiated any hope that they
might work to overthrow contemporary society. It was socialism, always
an anathema to the agrarians, which provoked the major fight within the
party, and provided the opponents of Populism with one of their most
8aeorge H. Knowles, "Populism and Socialism with Special
Reference to the Election of 1892, II Pacific Historical Review, XII
(September, 1943), 295-304. The intra-party fight over the subtreasury
scheme is the most obvious eX8lRple of contention over the policy of
government competition in private enterprise. For details of the oppo-
sition to government granaries, see Hicks, Populist Revolt, 200-204.
The agrarians cooperated in business ventures which, though they were
based on the elimination of the middleman, could certainly not be termed
public ownership, or even profit sharing. See Ralph A. Smith, "Macunism,
or the FarlErs of Texas in Business," Journal of Southern History, XIII
(May, 1947), 220-44, and Henrietta M. Larson, "The Wheat Market and the
Farmers in Minnesota, 1858-1900," Studies in History, Economics, and
Public Law, aXXII (1926), 197•
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effective, if misdirected, public criticisms of the movement.9
Socialists began to abandon the party after agrarian leaders
failed to respond to the economic effects of the depression of the
eighteen nineties with any broad or comprehensive plan for social
reforms. The deepening class and sectional antagoniSIll of the years
1893 and 1894 threw the limitations of the Populist program into bold
relief, and even the loyal efforts of such men as Henry Demarest Lloyd
and Eugene V. Debs could not disguise its true conservatism.
So the farmers ruled the party they created with iron determina-
tion to better their condition and often, their critics jeered, with
9The printed essays and public addresses of Henry Demarest Lloyd
are disappointing to a reader in search of the philosophy which pro-
pelled so active and able a man as Lloyd in his lifelong search for
social justice. For the phrasES as well as the thoughts are pedestrian,
and if one is to judge the thinker from the incomplete record of avail-
able public addresses, Lloyd looked to a utopian future for all mankind,
as well as for his countrymen. The memoir of her husband by Caro Lloyd
is of equally little help to an understanding of Lloyd's position.
But the Secretary of the American Free Trade League clung to Populism
until 1896 in the hope that it would prove the vehicle of social
progress which he envisioned, though he, like Debs, advocated public
ownership of basic industrieso A critical study of Lloyd's social
philosophy would prove a most useful addition to our understanding of
radicalism in the United States. See also Chester M. DestIer , "The
ConsUlllation of the Labor-Populist Alliance in Illinois," in Chester
M. Destler (ed.), American Radicalism, 1865-1901 (New London, 1946),
108, and Ra;y GiDger, The Bending Cross (New Brunswick, 1949), 187.
Ginger's work includes a detailed account of the, attempt at labor-
Populist fusion. Caro Lloyd, Henry Demarest Lloyd, 1847-1903 (New
York and London, 1912), Henry Demarest Lloyd, Men, The Workers (New
York, 1909), ibid., Mazzini and other Essays (New York and London,
1910). -
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wooden heads as we11.10
A resurgent faith in democra~ and democratic processes marked
the Populist protest. The major parties limited their remedies for the
excesses of the Gilded Age to threats of new intra-party alliances and
demands for civil service reform. But Populist legislators countered
by demanding full partnership in the economic future· of the country.
Yet in spite of their seemingly blind faith in the popular will, the
formulation of policy within the Populist organization devolved to a
few party leaders. Several of these men, among whom William V. Allen
and Marion Butler were prominent, exerted influence to. guide and direct
Populism by virtue of their stature as national 1egis1ators.11
These Populist congressional leaders failed to achieve the
equality of prosperity with industry which they sought in behalf of
their constituents. Between 1890 and 1898 none of their major pro-
posa1s became law. If there were gains for agriculture, these gains
resulted from the tremendous increase in national wealth, which in
tum raised the level of agrarian economic life.
10Ginger, The Bending Cross, 189, 162, 163.
11After the election of 1892 William Allen and Marion Butler
seem to have asswned responsibility for Populist strategy in Congress.
The rise of Butler and Allen to congressional prominence coincided with
the rise of the silver coinage issue. These two senators were most
often able to gain the floor to address their colleagues, and it was
they who openly worked with silver partisans of both Republican and
Democrat allegiance. In the House of Representatives Tom Watson ful-
filled a comparable role until his defeat in 1893 when Representatives
John Davis and William A. Harris seem to have inherited his leadership.
B. Webber and S. J. Hanfie1d Jones, "Variations in the Rate of Economic
Growth in the United States of Ameri.ca, 1869-1939, It Oxford Economic
Papers, New Series, VI (June, 1954), 108.
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The "New Freedoml1 and "New Nationalism" of the early twentieth
century progressives transferred much of the Populist philosophy to the
urban middle class, but even the enactment of some of the major Populist
demands failed to realize the agrarian objectives. For the Populists
fostered the rising spirit of nationalism in the United States by
emphasizing the need for equal economic opportunity for all sections,
interests, and classes. They considered the sectional agricultural
interests of wheat and cotton which they represented to be of para-
mount importance as mainstays of the prosperity of the middle class.
Equality of opportunity Populist legislators defined as opportunity to
obtain a greater share in the national prosperity. Barring the
elimination of private wealth proposed by socialists, equality of
opportunity thus implied opportunity for growth, intensive (concentra-
tion), and extensive (expansion).12
The concentration of wealth and power in the hands of manu-
facturers stimulated the agrarian protest. Populists refused to accept
the limitations for agriculture which seemingly paralleled the rapid
trends toward centralized government and the concentration of indus-
trial life in the United States. Thus both logic and reality pushed
12Appeals to histor,y and patriots of earlier periods studded
Populist oratory. Occasionally even the memory of Daniel Webster stood
service. The works of Stanley Jevons, Nicholas Montcretien, and John
Stuart Mill became standard references in most Populist discussions of
monetary theory, but strangely, Populists drew no direct analogy between
their own predicament and that of agrarians during the English enclosure
movement. See, for example, c~. Rec., 2):!u3009, 3113; ~., 23:3:
2534, 137; ~., 23:3:2841, 2 3,~., 22:Appendix:62-63.
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the Populists, along with other agrarians, toward agricultural expansion,
at the same time that it gave a corresponding impetus to commercial
activity.13
Populist legislators consciously expounded a policy of decentral-
ization in government and in economic life. Equating agriculture with
industry and commerce seemed to them vital to preserve the developnent
of the nation along trad1tiona1lines. When the complexity of urban
industrial life increased the volume of governmental functions, Populists
reacted by condemning government activity per.!!_ Indeed, the agrarian
legislators felt that without the special intervention of the state in
behalf of industry, agriculture would stand in a position of power nearly
equal to the machine ciVilization, if not superior to it.14
Populists formulated their policies accordingly. They
endeavored to shape legislation to their own advantage for their ver-
sion of the national interest. At the same time they remained free to
criticize and obstruct the development of national policies which
would not directly benefit them. The seeming oscillation of Populist
legislators from their expressed desire for a strong and benevolent
central government to their attempts to repress the most elementary
l35ee, for example, the contention of John Davis that a "nation
.;/ grows through the accumulation of wealth in cOJllmerce. 1f Jerry S1J'pson
agreed that "surplus must seek foreign markets,·' and William McKeighan
feared "industrial paralysis." Cong.Rec., 23:3:3109, ibid., 23:3:
2105, ~., 23:Appendix:6l2.
l4cong• Rec., 23:4:3866, ibid., 23:3:3004-
governmental functions is best understood in this light. l '
Populist legislators saw in the tariff the scapegoat for many
13
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ills which beset their constituents. 'l,'hough elected to a national
legislative body, the fanners and small town lawyers who served the
new party gave their primary allegiance to local interests. Hence the
tariff of 1890, protective to industry and prohibitive to the importa-
tion of cheap foreign manufactures, drew sharp and persistent criti-
cism from Populist representatives. During the Harrison Administra-
tioD and into the early months of 1893 the case made by Populists
against the tariff placed emphasis on the farmer as a consumer of
protected domestic manufactures. 16
l'The pressure for government control of monetary policy
coupled with demands for tariff reduction is an obvious example of
Populist tactics. William Peffer phrased the problem bluntly: "Some-
one will always benefit. The question is who. It Cong. Rec., 23:,:
4211. In the period under consideration some Populist legislators
repudiated government subsidies as unwarranted paternalism. For
example James Kyle and William Baker opposed subsidies, while William
Peffer favored extending the bounty system to agriculture. This divi-
sion of opinion could hardly be termed a sectional one, since all
three nen represented the West. Cong. Rec., 23:4:3894-95. See foot-
note 20 for other evidence of Peffer's attitude prior to 1893.
l6Cong• Rec.,23:4:3l08. Whether or not ane agrees with the
theoretical argument that the tariff must be paid by the consW'I1er of
protected articles, it is true that "foot prices went steadily up"
during the first fifteen months of the McKinley tariff. Prices for
coal, lumber, and tin also jumped. Tarbell, Tariff in Our Times, 210,
11, Graham B. McAdams, The Protective Syste~: What It Costs the
American Farrrer (n.p., 1880), 36. The choice between free trade and
protection offered to voters by the Democratic Party in 1892 disguised
the fact that under the tariff of 1890 the admission to this country
of raw materials free of duty "increased from 119 million dollars in
1890 to 149 in 1891 and to 1,6 million in 1892, and to 116 million in
1893." Edward C. Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the
Nineteenth Centur..z (Boston and New York, 1903), 304; Cong. Rec., 23:4:
3821.
The tariff existed and was employed as a convenient device to
force consw:llers to pay the prices demanded by domestic manufacturers,
alleged the agrarians. Since powerful manufacturing and financial
interests prevented the operation of the tariff simply as a revenue
measure, it must be abandoned entirely to permit the unrestricted opera-
tion of the law of supply and demand. To the farmer, contention between
the two major political parties over tariff rates since Reconstruction
had become a !Isham. battle." Republican and Democratic politicians, under
the sway of the business community, debated tariff policy to the exclu-
sion of any immediate aid to the farmer. 17
The tariff battle remained, then, a "mythical issue":
Republicans Bay they are in favor of protection as a
principle, yet through reciprocity they are trying to
avoid it as a practice, while the Democrats say that
free trade as a governmental principle is thoroughly
right, but they do not adopt it as a rule of action.
Yet ardently as they pleaded for a return to a system of idyllic com-
petitive capitalism, the agrarians limited the area to which they
would apply their classical doctrine of free trade. For though the
jealous farmers noted that they would gain nothing through the develop-
ment of larger home markets in dairy products, cotton, wheat, beef, or
pork, which were produced in SIlch quantity as to be principally exports,
and the price for which was determined largely on the world market,
still they envied industrialists and manufacturers their influential
position in govermnent, which prompted the Republican Administratim to
17Cong • Rec., 23:3:2838; ibid., 22:4:3109.
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penetrate foreign markets in behalf of the manufacturers.18
But protection for the farmers' products failed to satisfy
Populists. Since the importation of agricultural staples was negli-
gible, there existed little prospect that a protective tariff could aid
the farmer, as it did the manufacturer. (Beet sugar seeMS to have pro-
vided an exception to the rule, but not until 1897 did Populist legis-
lators seriously" discuss the possibility of diversified farming. At
that time the agrarians fought to maintain tariff preferences for beet
sugar interests. But during the early eighteen nineties, though
domestic beet sugar production took giant strides, Populist legislators
seem not to have appreciated this effect of the tariff on agriculture.)
Admittedly, "under certain conditions of competition" tariff manipula-
tion became an acceptable device for the promotion of production. But
for the agrarians of the wheat and cotton belts, where Populism throve,
these conditions did not exist.19
Consequently, "the scheme of reciprocity" instituted by the
Harrison administration appeared to the distrustful farmer politicians
to exist "for the manufacturer, not for the farmer." But the representa-
tives of the farmers' party, though they made uniform demands for free
raw materials and minimum tariffs on the "necessities of life," often
l8Cong • Rec., 23: 3: 2838. Tom. 'Watson stressed the dangers of
promoting protection for "a certain class of industries, It manufacturers.
See also William A. Peffer, The Farmer's Side (New York, 1891), 138.
19Albert Shaw, l'William V. Allen, Populist, It Review of .Reviews
(New York), X (July, 1894), 37.
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weakened their case against the use of tariff policy as an aid to
industrial expansion when they made assertions which implied agreement
with, rather than opposition to, Republican policies. For example,
even the colorful Jerry Simpson, who considered himself "a free trader,
absolute" could be baited into the admission that he feared the competi-
tion and effects of foreign labor upon the prosperity of this country.20
Moreover J the free trade sentiment was far from unanimous among
the farmers themselves. The southern and gulf state farmers who led the
agrarian movement remained in many instances "ardent protectionists."
And Repu.b1ican electioneers of 1892 found it worth their while to stimu-
late interest in the "Knights of Reciprocitylt among western farmers whom
they hoped were "tired of the Alliances." Necessarily, the Populist
20Cong• Rec., 23:Ju3108. If one considers the problem of
tariff rates to be one of free trade versus protection he is easily
misled as to the Populist position. Western Populists backed their
southern colleagues' demands for free raw materials, and southerners
centered these demands around items such as jute bagging, twine, and
metal finished products. It is therefore more accurate to emphasize
special interests, rather than sectional alignment within the party.
William Peffer freely' admitted that he voted for the sugar bounty of
1890 Itbecause that is the best way in the world to build up an
industry quickly." Certainly no complaints were heard from Populists
that the cotton duties stif1e~ free trade, yet under the tariff of
1890 cotton importation was difficult. WU1iam A. Peffer, quoted from
the Boston Herald in Public Opinion (Washington, D. C.), XVII (July 5,
1894), 311, Tarbell, Tariff in Our Times, 190.
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legislators' position on tariff policy was a pragmatic one. 21
The agrarian legislators understood the advantage of identifying
their interests with those of industry. By doing so they might claim
a voice in the development of governmental policies, though their
minority position denied them any right to formal control of the
national govermrtent. And though they protested vehemently against the
rapid transition of the country to a predominantly industrial society,
they found in the labor theory of value the concept to serve their
21The lIKnights of Reciprocity, I' founded in 1892, organized
"laboring men, and farmers who are tired of the Alliances, for Blaine
and a protective tariff." New York Times, January 10, 1892. William
D. Sheldon, Populism in the Old Domin1on(Princeton, 1935), 397. It
was the southwestern and gulf states which led the agrarian revolt.
C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 188. Howard R. Smith has
re-evaluated the position of American farmers relative to tariff
policy. His conclusion is that they have aligned themselves on the
side of protection. See Howard R. Smith, "The Farmer and the Tariff;
a Be-Appraisal" The Southern Economic Journal (Chapel Hill), XXI
(October, 1954~, 152-165.Aona Rochester explains the omission of any
tariff plank from the OCala Platform of the Populist Party was due to
the general disgust of the agrarians with the presentation of the
tariff problem to the public. Such an explanation seems illogical in
view of Populist willingness to take issue with their opponents upon
the formulation of arguments designed for public consumption. It
seems more accurate to conclude that the Populist position on the
tariff appeared ambiguous because the agrarians desired to attract
labor's support, and labor seemingly required protection from foreign
competition. The McKinley bill engendered hatred among the farmers
because of its high rates on textiles and metal products. These
industries often demanded protection. This analysis is borne out by
the testimony of Populist legislator Benjamin Clover, who deplored
the farmer's need to compete "along cheap free trade products of other
countries, often made cheaper by reason of reciprocity schemes and
other free trade devices." Cong. Rec., 23 :Appendix: 31, and~.,
23:3:2838-41. See also Anna Rochester, The Populist MOvement in the
United States (New York, 1943), 77, Wilfred E. Binkley, American
Political Parties, Their Natural Historz (New York, 1943), 524.
b18
purposes. 22
Thus they asserted that labor might "be divided into two great
departJllents--one employed in producing property, the other in handling
it." And producers were "divided into two classes, as they have, or
have not, a voice in the disposition of their products." Significantly,
the proposition defined farmers as entrepreneurs, rather than as
laborers. An affinity with labor might be explained on the ground that
"that which is the capital of today was nothing but labor yesterday"
as the Populist leader Tom watson urged. Such accrued labor held
legitimate rights to profit, since its function was production.23
But Populist legislators refused to admit that overproduction
might be responsible for the economic miseries of which they complained.
Instead, Populist Senators from Kansas and North Carolina looked eagerly
to the development of markets "with our neighbors to the East of us";
and, in spite of the competition offered to this country's products by
the agricultural imports of South America, cotton state Senator Marion
Butler expressed himself as "mch gratified ll that his erstwhile
political allies of the Republican Party were "enlarging their economic
vision somewhat and reaching out to South America and. Canada and other
parts of the world" for markets. He sought for his fellow southerners
22Cong• Rec., 23:3:2435, ibid., 23:3:2531, ibid., 23:4:3101;
Peffer, The Farmer's Side, 43, 44~; Thomas W. Watson, "The People's
Party's Appeal," Independent (New,York), LVII (October 3,1904),829-32.
23Peffer, The Farmer's Side,146, Cong. Rec., 23:2:1250-51.
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new market prospects "in the countries south of us, in South and Central
America, and in Africa.'t Even more vehemently, a Kansas Populist pro-
tested the effect upon agriculture of the preferential treat.'11ent
accorded manufacturers: "Why, Mr. Chairman, It cried he to the presiding
officer of the House of Representatives as he ended a critique of
Republican policies, "we are driven from the markets of the whole
world.'t In response to their criticisms, the Republican Administration
made belated efforts, as the discontent of the insurgent agrarian
became apparent to them, to open new areas of trade to American agri-
culture, whenever it was possible to do 80 without detriment to the
position of American manufactures abroad. 24
Had the Populist revolt been limited to the expression of
discontent by a few western and southern farmers, it might well have
died in the halls of the Congress with the impassioned speeches of a
few elected agrarians. But domestic-political considerations and
world economic conditions gave rise to the protests, and these factors
worked to stimulate the sucoess of the new party. World agricultural
prices remained depressed, and were doubtless aggravated. in this
country by the tight money policy pursued by President BenjBJl1in
Harrison, who refused to coin silver, or to issue either long or short
term paper to stimulate the international exchange and the domestic
24COng. Rec., 23:4:2838, ibid., 23:4:)109.
In vain did the Department of State attempt to offset this
minister to Moscow received .his orders. He must impress upon the Czar
because of the failure of the European grain crop, the United states
20
agricultural surplus crisis by opening other markets. While J. C.
Morgan publicized the new grain markets in Russia open to this country
25
economy.
2'The efforts of commercial interests to stimulate silver coin-
age before 1893 seem to haw been generally ignored. But in early
January of 1892 the New York Board of Trade proposed an lIAddress to
c01llllercial organizations of Great Britain and other countries with the
view to give gold and silver legal equality at a uniform rate." Times,
January 17, 1892. At the same time Jesse Seligman journeyed abroad on
a "silver question tour Jl to be followed shortly by Secretary of the
Treasury John W. Foster. Conditions seemed favorable to the establish-
ment of an international ailver coinage agreement until Germany and
Austria announced plans to demonetize the metal. In England Foster's
conference with Chancellor of the Exchequer George W. Goschen gave
equally little satisfaction. The Chancellor hedged. He was not "well
enough informed to saylt whether 8. monetary conference would actually
settle the silver ~estion. When the English press openly deplored all
suggestions for increased silver mone~ization, the French editor of
I.e Temps .su11enly admitted that "nothing can be done without England IS
co-operation." Times, January 4, January 19, January 11, March 8,
May 6, 1892.
The failure of these early Republican monetization schemes
proved a relief to e1ection-minded Democrats. Conservative Republican
President Benjamin Harriaon indicated his preference for maintaining
the status quo. The New York Times noted with relief that the "silver
craze" seemed to have abated in May, 1892. It l1n.lst be noted that dur-
ing this period demands of the agrarians were not limited to silver
coinage. For example, though Tom Watson and William McKeighan demanded
silver coinage, Representative John Otis demanded merely an increase in
currena,r. Cong. Rec., 23:5:4211, 12, ~., 23:2:2433, ~., 23:4:
3004, 3868. See also Vo1wi1er, corres~ondence, James G. Blaine to
Benjamin Harrison, August 23, 1890, 11 , ~., August 15, 1890.
the cordial wish of "the American people" to extend their help. But
nothing came of the venture, which was so little understood by Populist
21
Congressmen that they refused to vote relief shipments of grain to
Russia on the grounds that such an appropriation involved aid to
middlewestern millers at governmental expense. 26
James G. Blaine I s prophecy that Republican policies could "whip·
the Alliances in six months" proved highly inaccurate. Drawn by the
nature of the economic problem which they faced to consider the rela-
tions of the United States with other countries, Populist legislators
soon advanced a wholesale criticism of Republican policies. Though it
cannot be said that there evolved for the agrarian legislators any
comprehensive boqy of doctrine for the conduct of American foreign
relations during these years, their constant questioning often helped
to clarify the meaning. and intention of Republican activities. 27
The agrarians insisted that measures to prauote domestic
I prosperity Dnlst take precedence in national policy. But, like the
founding fathers before them, they had trouble resolving the dilemma
of mercantilism: today's necessity or tomorrow's expansion. A false
26Times, March 1, 2, 4, 7, 12, 16, 1892. For. ReI., 1892, 542,
ibid., 1893, 546; Cong. Re~., 23:1:111.
27Volwiler, Correspondence, Blaine to Harrison, september 23,
1891, 193; Times, January 23, May 23, June 25, June 27, 1892. Before
the elections of 1892 ex-Senator Sabin of Minnesota warned conservatives
that he could IInot think of any time when so unsubstantial a party had
gained so substantially." Cong. Rec., 23:4:4009, ibid., 23:3:2841,
ibid., 23:2:1297. See also Ignatius Donnelly, Caesarrs Column (Chicago,
IB'92), 197. Donnelly's nationalism. led him. to advocate the fonnation of
an international organization to "lift up the oppressed and save society
and civilization. It should work through government instrumentalities."
In spite of these noble sentiments, Donnelly's work is an example of the
Victorian novel at its worst. For the relationship of silver to inter-
national peace see Chapter II of this thesis.
"*0
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economy asserted i tsel! in the Populist veto of Republican proposals to
join North and South America by railway, and thus gain direct access to
the markets of South America. Promoters schemes diesolved in a wrangle
over ItCamegie 's scheme, II and in the oppoaition of southerners, who
feared the competition of South American agriculture.28
28.An analysis of Populist votes cast upon major United States
Arrtry and Navy appropriation bills reveals no significant differences
among western Populist legislators who united in their opposition to
these expenditures. One southem legislator, Populist Representative
Benjamin Clover of Georgia, consistently abstained from voting. But
he assigned no reason for his unwillingness to cast his ballot. Clover
was joined in his silence occasionally by westerners William Baker and
Orner Kern. In the Senate, William Peffer refused to approve a proposal
to open the American coastal trade to ships of foreign registry built
with American capital.
Though Jerry Simpson insisted that "so far as I am concerned,
I do not believe we need a navy at all," Tom Watson did not care to
phrase the opposition "quite so strongly." Watson himself urged
caution because I'economy must begin somewhere." Similarly, William
Baker balked at attempts to "increase the navy" because he feared
domestic taxation to be the price of the undesirable foreign conquests
which might follow military expansion. But the opposition of Populist
legislators to military and naval expansion was never rooted in any
desire to isolate the United States, or to curtail the camnercial sea
power of this country. Congo Bee., 23:4:3399; ibid., 6:3956, 5623;
ibid., 7:5516, 0015, 0187; ibid., 23:7:0542; ibid:; 23:2:1091, 1096,
1099; ~., 5:4084; ibid.,6:60l5. See alsocong. Rec., 23:4:3801,
3230; ibid., 7:6541; ibid., 2:1036-37; ibid., 24:1:152; ibid., 23:6:
5851-52; ibid., 23:4:~-95; ibid., 23:4:3728. ----
Populist legislators and other expansionists conceived of mer-
cantilism and free trade as supplementary systems under which the home
market was to be reserved to domestic producers, while overseas com-
merce brought wealth to this country. Were the United States to pursue
a policy of free trade, it seemed likely that agriculture might remain
the bulwark of overseas cOllJIl1erce, and that European industrial competi-
tion would work to limit development in this country. Populist legisla-
tors often felt pressed to deny the validity of the latter premise, and
so they resorted to wild and extravagant praise of the ingenuity,
resourcefulness, and ability of domestic producers, whom they alleged
were equal to all threats of foreign competition. Congo Rec., 23:4:
. 3728, 3361, 3064; ibid., 23:3:2843; ~., 23:4:3868.
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Populist legislators insisted that the uses to which the
national government encouraged financiers to put capital were in reality
hostile to peaceful commercial activities. With credit and specie so
badly needed for domestic purpose, government expenditures should be
cut, and only minimal government8~ services retained, even at the cost
of reducing American economic activities abroad. From this logic came
the detennined Populist opposition to early Republican attempts to
expand and improve the United States Consular Serviceo Overseas
economic power for expansion constituted war power, the farmers
insisted. Thus they sought, by block voting against military and com-
mercial appropriation measures, to control lithe power of the purse and
the power of the sword. It It seemed apparent to them also that the con-
certed plans of the Republican Party to build naval power aimed at
aggression, both foreign and domestic. Furthermore, an acute class
consciousness underscored Populist fears that the rising spirit of
militarism would, if fostered, be used by the administration to fore-
stall domestic economic and social reforms. 29
But Populist legislators resolved their theories about the
legitimate functions of government with practical politics. They joined
in the scramble for sectional economic benefits. The fear that the posi-
tion of agriculturalists was being reduced to that of a renter class as
29con~. Ree., 23:2:1036; ibid., 23:4:3230, ibid., 23:0:5623;
ibid., 23:7:6 42; ibid., 23:4:3399, 3231; ibid., 23:3:1080; ibid., 23:4:
3009; ibid., 23:4:3661; ibid., Appendix:61~Seealso Cong.~.,
23:4:3109, 3361; ibid., 23:5:4199; ibid., 23:0:5858; ibid., 24:1:33-34,
51. - - -
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a result of exploitation by the owners of capital stimulated agrarian
efforts to obtain economic concessions. And though they professed a
fear of military might, it was not so much militarism i teel! of which
they seemed apprehensive, as it was their inability to influence the
extent and p~oses to which military power would be used.30
Thus when, in 1892, the economic expansion of the United States
into the Carribbean resulted in the threat of war with Chile, Populists
opposed any extended naval activities by this country in the Carribbean
as being unwarranted, and unnecessary to national defense. And on the
basis of the available evidence, Populist legislators seem to have been
ambivalent toward the efforts of the Harrison and Cleveland administra-
tions to extend the territorial holdings of the United States. They
expressed no sympathy for the treaty of Hawaiian annexation submitted
to Congress by Harrison)l
After the Hawaiian revolution of 1893, President Grover
Cleveland withdrew the pending treaty from the consideration of
Congress, and sponsored a special investigation into the role of United
States officials and military forces in precipitating revolution in
the islands. At that time Populist Senator 11arion Butler opposed the
reading of the findings of the Special Commissioner as a "waste of
time." He did not specify why. The publicity given to Cleveland's
30cong. Rec., 22:1:99-100 presents William Baker' 5 petition
for a military post at Pierre, South Dakota. See also Cong. Rec.,
24:2:880 for Peffer's bill to facilitate promotion in the navy.
31Cong• Rec.,23:4:3230; ~., 3360-61.
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condemnation of American intervention in Hawaiian affairs and the
President's stand against annexation stressed the anti-imperialistic
position of the United States. But this served only to confuse the
issue. For the President clung to John Tyler's doctrine of expansion
for Hawaii: "It is desirable that the ports of a country so near to
Japan and China should be open to our trade and to the convenience of
such vessels of our navy as should be in those waters. If On this Butler
agreed with the President. Hawaii must remain \olithin the American
orbit. Further, the Senator urged annexation if it could be achieved
"properly. n Other Populist senators showed even greater expansionist
sympathies. 32
Senator Allen in his turn introduced a resolution favoring
annexation. It remained noncommittal as to the circumstances surround-
ing the island revolution. Butler approved a substitute measure which
called for the noninterference of this countr,y in the affairs of other
nations, but which left the diplomatio door ajar for recognition of the
new pro-annexationist Hawaiian government. His predilection for popu-
!ar government oaused William Peffer to oppose this proposition, and
Senators Allen and Davis, though they withheld comments upon it,
joined Peffer in his negative stand upon the latter proposition. 33
Populists in the House of Representatives vetoed Hawaiian
32Ti.mes, February 27, 1894. Butler disapproved of any dickering
with the Dole government, which he considered illegitimate.
33cong• Rec., 26:2:1967, 68, ibid., 26:6:,,00, ~., 26:7:7041.
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annexation, and condemned American intervention there. For true
independence, they maintained, the islands must remain free of American
pressure.J4
Although the problem of Hawaiian annexation was intimately
connected with markets for both the South and vTest, Populist legislators
refused to be drawn into any intra-party sectional struggle which might
weaken their unity. But it must be noted that the tariff of 1890, by
removing the favored position of Hawaiian sugar growers in the United
States, contributed much of the impetus to the Hawaiian revolution, and
worked also to draw Cuba closer to the American commercial orbit (despite
Spanish attempts to maintain a closed commercial system between Cuba
and Spain through the use of preferential tariff rates with the mother
country and other restrictive economic devices). Harrison and Blaine
used the threat of concessions to German sugar growers to compel Spanish
acquiescence to a short term reciprocity treaty between the United
States and Cuba. Similarly Cleveland found it advantageous to accept
the advice of his Attorney General, Richard Olney, upon American-
Hawaiian affairs. One of the "practical considerations" of maintaining
the revolutionary Hawaiian government as Olney urged, would be the
34Ibid., 26:2:1967, 26:7:7041.
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leverage which the administration could exert to promote the Cuban
trade)5
But the attempts of the Harrison and Cleveland administrations
to quiet domestic economic tensions through diplomatic maneuvers failed,
largely because of the conservative financial policies of both administra-
tions. Thus the agrarian critics of Republican policies could find no
comfort in the succession of conservative Democrat Grover Cleveland to
the presidency. To Populist legislators, who fumbl~d for a way to
combine economic expansion with anti-oolonialism, currency inflation
seemed to provide a ready solution to their difficulties. Even within
the Democratic Party the opposition to the Cleveland Presidential
nomination in 1892 centered about the need for financial reform.
As the election approached, the activities of the farmer
governor of New York, David B. Hill, commanded attention. Hill toured
the South, bringing to industrial and agricultural interests there the
3'Richard D. Weigle, "Sugar and Hawaiian Revolution," Pacific
Historical Review (February, 1941), 41-58. Republicans later swmnar-
ized the objectives of the Harrison Administration: "Shortly after
Mr. Blaine became Secretary of State, in the administration of Benjamin
Harrison, it was the subject of consideration whether Spain could be
induced to acknowledge Cuba as independent should the United States
guarantee the sum to be paid by Cuba for the relinquishment of all
Spanish rights to the island. This movement was made by the sugar
planters, and it was thought that the entire sugar industry would sup-
port it. Mr. Blaine announced himself warmly in favor of the project,
but after long conferences it was ascertained that the consent of Spain
could. not be obtained. It Compilation of .Reports of the Comittee on
Foreign Relations. United States Senate, 1189-1901. Diplomatic Relations
with Forei~n Nations. Af'fairs in Cuba. VII (Washington, 1901), 23;
Volwiler,orrespondence, 120, Blaine to Harrison, July 21, 1890; John W.
Foster, Diplomatic Memories, II (Boston, 19(9), 8. Sylvester K. Stevens,
American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842-1848 (Harrisburg, 1945), 185.
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promise of unlimited silver coinage and prosperity. Unity among the
silver forces in the South and Ea.st remained the primary accomplishment
of Hill's campaign for the Democratic nomination. So powerful an
interest favorable to the free coinage of silver consolidated within
both major parties that Edward Atkinson, a northern industrialist who
quite understood the logic employed by his commercial brethren in their
campaign for silver, and who appreciated the possible consequences of
the fomation of a silver party, pamphleteered, cajoled, and threatened,
in behalf of the conservatives)6
If the tide of revolt could not be stemmed, it might be
channeled with the proposal that silver circulate within the country at
par with gold, and that all foreign silver be taxed in the amount equal
to the difference between its current value and gold. Such an ingenious
means of preserving the home market to American producers Atkins hoped
would not be necessary. Yet so prevalent had the silver heresy become
by the time of the Democratic National Convention that press reports
rumored the Democratic Platform Committee, comprised of "a silver
majority, It could be restrained from inserting a formal promise of
bimetallism only by Itwait and see" promises. Campaign strategy saved
Democracy from silver by the narrowest of margins. Thus the Populist
Party ticket offered voters in 1892 the single opportunity of expressing
themselves in favor of the "free and unlimited coinage of silver at the
ratio of sixteen to one." And for the first time since 1860 over a
36Times , March 15, 1892; ~., June 25, 1892.
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million popular votes were cast for a third party presidential candi-
date, Populist James B. Weaver)1
The analysis upon which the Populist plea for an inflationary
currency hinged emphasized three important views: (1) that a contrac-
tion of circulating specie had occurred spasmodically throughout mant 8
recorded history, induced by the manipulation of currency by ruling
classes for their own advantage; (2) that the apparent contraction was
in reality not a diminution of the currency fund, but appeared so because
of the steadily rising world price level with which the expanding cur-
rencies of national governments had not kept pace; and (3) that the
scarcity of circulating media was due chiefly to the withdrawal of
specie from domestic circulation for the uses of international finance. 38
Propagandists explained the IIcrime of 1813 11 in terms of currency
manipulation for private advantage. To them it appeared that an inter-
national conspiracy of bankers combined to wring from the fruits of
other ments labors all that cunning might extract. This retroactive
theory of conspiracy proved, apparently, a powerful weapon of persuasion
among the less astute of the reformers. But the conspiracy theory does
not appear to have been given much credence or circulation by Populist
Congressmen before the panic of 1893. Arter the panic the approaching
national elections rendered the sincerity behind such charges question-
able. Generally the agrarians attributed short range contractions to
37Ibid., June 24, 1892, Hicks, Populist Revolt, 261.
38See for example: Cong. Reco, 23:5:3862-65, 68; ~., 23:7:
612; ~., 22:3:2433-37, 23:2:1829.
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the refusal of financiers to back further the unsound expansion of rail-
road and mercantile interests.39
International exchange rates became a principal target for
attack among Populist monetary theorists. Vehemently they insisted
that silver coinage would stimulate the international export market and
so work to offset the high interest charges paid by this country on the
foreign market for seasonal advances on crop exports. They further
offered silver coinage as a means of equalizing transportation costs
between the United states and those countries favored by their geograph-
ical position in relation to overseas markets.40
Populists were quick to point out that under the existing gold
standard international exchange rates favored Asian purchasing power
at the expense of American agricultural exports. Furthermore, India
coined silver free~, and Indian silver, traded at a lower value than
American silver ore, commanded a greater quantity- of gold than did an
equal weight of silver offered in the exchange market by this country.
The advantage thus provided to the exchange balance of the British
Empire worked to the detriment of the United States, the agrarians
insisted.41
39See for example Cong.Rec., 23:3:2433-2437.
40Ibid., 23:4:3853.
41IfAt the present time England buys .32 cents worth of our own
bullion and converts it into rupees worth 48 cents and with which she
purchases from the Hindoo 48 cents worth of wheat. 1f James Kyle, Cong.
~., 23:4:3853, .!lli., 23:.3:2536; Fredrick E. Haynes, James Baird
Weaver (Iowa City, 1919), 230.
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Yet in spite of their suspicion that international bankers
conspired to control. the money market at public expense, a strong belief
in the comnnmity of interest of all English-speaking peoples led Populist
leaders to seek an international agreement which would prove favorable
to Populist demands for an increase in. the quantity of the world money
supply. Little contention existed between silverites and gold standard
advocated as to the necessity of maintaining a managed currency.42
It was Populist emphasis on the desirability of an increased
use of silver in foreign trade that led Ignatiu8 Donnelly to represent
his party at the International Monetary Conference of 1892. Though the
agrarians insisted that the supply of money should be regulated by the
demand for its use, they ranked both silver and non-interest bearing,
small denomination, negotiable government paper as highly aoceptable
additions to the circulating domestic currency. Unemployment and the
42Thus the Populists were brought, by 1893, to the same posi,tion
as that of the historian Brooks Adams. It seems reasonable to infer from
the disjointed and oft paraphrased arguments of Populist legislators,
none of whom approached A.dams in scholarship, that the influence of his
ideas sparked much of the Populist appeal to history. Though nowhere in
the Congressional Record during the period under examination is Adams
quoted directly by Populist legislators, he worked with party representa-
tives in the American Bimetallic League. It is possible, too, that his
influence may have permeated the agrarian movement at an early date as a
result of pamphleteering in behalf of birnetallism by Adams and his close
associate, economist Francis A. Walker. See Brooks Adams, The Law of
Civilization and Decay (New York, 1943), ibid., The Gold Standard; An
Historical Study (Boston, 1894), Francis A. Walker, Bimetallism; A
Tract for the Times (Boston, 1894), ibid., International Bimetallism
(New York, 1896), 219, 283. ----
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domestic tensions aggravated by the panic of 1693 stimulated this con-
viction of the farmers and their friends that international bimetallism
must succeed the gold standard. Meanwhile domestic politics, the contin-
uing international depression, and a re-alignment of the major world
powers combined to strengthen the position of the agrarians in Congress
and throughout the United States.43
43Ibid., 372-73, Carleton J. Hayes, A Generation of Materialism,
1671-1900, Vol. XVII of The Rise of Modern Ehro§e, ed. William L.
Langer (XVII vols., New York and London), 290-9. For Populist reactions
to the panic of 1693 see Chapter II.of this thesis.
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CHAPTER II
S<14E COWBIRDS OF REFORM
"Competing nations seek, along paths of least resistance,
the means which give them an advantage in the struggle
for survival•••"
Brooks Adams
The New Empire
The election of a Democratic president worked no special economic
miracle for the United States. After 1892, both agriculture and industry
~ . .
continued their plunge into a deeper cycle of depression. The'liquida-
tion of foreign securities progressed until rates for loans on call rose
to 186 per cent in New York. In desperation, Grover Cleveland announced
that he would convene Congress for the purpose of repealing the Silver
Purchase Act of 1890, the continued operation of which, he contended,
threatened public confidence in the ability of the government to main-
tain the nation's credit. 1
Some business journals laid blame for immoderately heavy with-
drawals of gold from this country on the contraction of the overexpanded
American railroad system. Still others saw what they came to consider
the dangerous relationship between American prosperity and dependence
IFrancis S. Philbrick, "The Mercantile Conditions of the Crisis
of 1893,1/ University of Nebraska Graduate Bulletin (Lincoln), IT (1902),
299-320, Allan F. Nevins, Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage (New York,
1932), ,24, Frank P. Weberg, The Background of the Panic of 1893
(Washington, D. C., 1929), 4.
- -------------------------------
upon foreign investment capital. And, in truth,
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Our abnormal imports of merchandise from Europe
from 1866 to 1890 represented for the most part capital
invested by Great Britain in negotiable American secur-
ities. The demand for capita.l following the Baring
failure of November 20, 1890, caused American securities
to be thrown on the market • • • during the first half
of 1891, 70,000,000 in gold was shipped abroad. .
The brief respite provided by the sale of seasonal crops could not pro-
mote recovery, and the cyclical increase of speculation could not pro-
mote trade. Rather these phenomena encouraged the hoarding of funds
which were formerly available. 2
When gold withdrawals "strikingly increased" in late 1892 and
early 1893, "foreign investors in American securities had grave appre-
hensions ll for the safety of their investments. But the determination of
the President to repeal the Silver Purchase Act of 1890 faced such oppo-
sition vTithin the Democratic Party that the Democratic Administration
resorted finally to the lever of political patronage in order to collect
sufficient congressional votes for repeal. Republicans exhibited no more
unanimity than Democrats in support of the gold standard. ''N 0 Republican
President could have secured the repeal of the Sherman Act, II reflected
powerful Republican Senator Allison of Iowa. But partisan attacks
upon the Democratic Administration served to distract
2See for examples: llThe Financial Situation,1I Commercial and
Financial Chronicle, LV (July 30, 1892), 160, and "Prospects of Trade,"
Bankers' azine and Statistical Register, XXXXIV (July, 1889), 3;
Weberg, . ibid., ,1"lontgomery D. Anderson, "An Agricultural Theory of
Business Cycles,1l American Economic Review (Ithica), XXI (September,
1931), 434, Times, October 20, 1892.
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from the split among eastern Republican financiers over the wisdom of
maintaining conservative policies. Liberal western Republicans such as
Charles G. Dawes, later Comptroller of Currency for the McKinley
Administration, spoke favorably of a "short term asset currency.1t And
even Samuel Gompers called for a five million dollar issue of paper)
The spasmodic gold withdrawals further paralyzed the already
depressed domestic econOl1lY'. Severe sociaJ. tensions, highlighted by
strikes, riots, and the estimated unemployment of three million men,
greatly facilitated the efforts of the silverites to force the public
treasury to adopt a 8ilver standard. A steady flow of Greenbacks into
the Federal Trea~ accelerated the depletion of the fast sinking gold
reserve. To sell their produce, westem grain growers were forced to
accept prices set on the Chicago market, in lieu of engaging in the·
usual speculative practice of holding their grain until they received
price increases. When the market price for grain fell below transporta-
tion costs, the farmers bumed their crops. From Georgia, the Democrat
Governor related a similar tale: "Our cotton is now ready for market.
There is not sufficient money to handle it. Farmers are compelled to
sell, and the price is necessarily reduced." Dependent on grain
3Grover Cleveland, Presidential Problems (New York, 1904), 132,
Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 603-06, Richard C. Hofstadter, The American
Political Tradition arid the Men Who Made It (Vintage edition, New York,
1954), 182, samuel Reznick, ItUnemployment, Unrest, and Relief in the
United States During the Panic of 1893-91," Journal of PoliticaJ.
Economy (Chicago), LXI (August, 1953), 325, 21, Nevins, Cleveland, 653,
Horace S. Merrill, Bourbon Democracy in the Middle West (Baton Rouge,
1953), 240.
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freightage for the maintenance of his railway empire, James J. Hill
verified reports that "few farmers have axr:r money, and the local banks
seem unable to helptt the agrarians.4
To the financial crisis the West and Northwest contributed
sixty one per cent of all banking failures, and fifty nine per cent of
all liabilities inCtU"red•. Southern states suffered thirteen per cent,
and the far pacific states fifteen per cent of these 108ses. The les8
speculative nature of their investments and a greater command of liquid
assets combined to hold the eastem and central states to eleven per
cent of the total banking failures. By June of 1893 New York banks had
shipped twenty three million dollars in gold to the West. But in the
period of economic consolidation which accompanied the bank panic of
1893, it appears that the agrarians received scant help from the banks.'
Perhaps it was because money and credit were in use elsewhere.
For the combination of depressed prices for American securities and. the
panic precipitated by the decline of the United States gold reserves
4Charles S. Vevier, The United states and China, 1900-1913 (New
Brunswick, 19,,), 19, Horace S. Merrill, William Freeman Vilas (Madison,
19,4), 200, Reznick, IlUnemployment, Unrest and Belier," 325, TimeS,
October 20, 1892. See also Herman C. Nixon, liThe Economic Background of
the Populist Movement in Iowa, II Iowa Journal of History and Politics
(Iowa City), XXI (July, 1923), '387, and the statement of Mr. C. G. Jones,
representing the Southwestern Winter Wheat Millers t Association before
the Committee of Ways and Means, in Report of the Committee of Ways and
Means Concerning Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties. House Report 22603.
~li Cong., 1 Sess. (Washington, 1896), 203-209. Iowa suffered less
severe~ than M8I\Y midwestern states, yet the change from grain to dairy
farming occasioned by the poor grain market worked still another hardship
upon Iowa tarmers.
'Philbrick, "Mercantile Conditions~1f 106.
-~------~-_.
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offered American financiers an opportunity to effect the transfer of the
American railroad system and IID1ch of the P.merican productive plant to
American ownership and control at prices they could afford. First they
acquired the railroads. The rapid consolidation and expansion of industry
followed:
As late as 1896, except for some railroads, there
were probably fewer than a dozen American corporations
capitalized at ten million. By 1903, again excepting the
railroads, there were more than three hundred corporations
capitalized at ten million or more, approximately fifty at
fifty million or more, and seventeen at one hundred million,
or more.
Thus pools, trusts, and combinations, many of them born during the
period, grew to become the new economic giants of American industry.
But farm tenancy stood at 34 per cent in 1895 as against 26 per cent
in 1880, and never during the crisis did the rate of increase in real
wages match industrial gains. Of the effect of these injustices upon
their way of life the Populist legislators continued to complain
bitterly.6
6After 1815, "except for the years 1888, 1889, and 1893, there
was a favorable balance of trade in merchandise" with cotton and bread-
stuffs the leading exports. But the United States remained a debtor
nation during these years. James C. Malin, An Interpretation of Recent
American History (New York and London, 1926), 59, Edward G. Campbell,
The Reor anization of the American Railroad S stem 1893-1900, Studies
in Economics, History, and Public Law Columbia University, CLXXXIV
(New York, 1938), William L. Miller, "American Historians and the
Business Elite," Journal of Economic History (New York), IX (November,
1949), 188, Webber and Jones, "Variations in the Rate of Economic
Growth," 102, 103, 118. A detailed record of the growth in steel and
manufactured exports may be obtained from records published in the Times
of May 20, July 2, July 16, September 4, 1893; ibid., July 16, --
November 30, 1894; ibid., January 1, March 1, March 18, June 2 and
November 14, 1895. -
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When India abandoned silver coinage, prominent American
financiers agreed that the United States had little choice except to
repeal the Silver Coinage Act or face bankruptcy. No longer would
the heavy silver production of the United States find a ready market
in the British Empire. Superabundance of the metal might force its
domestic price down within the United States, but the chances seemed
slight that producers would increase the supply at diminishing returns
to themselves to the point where silver would command a market value
equal to, or less than, the cost of its coinage, and thus facilitate
its use as a subsidiary domestic currency. There existed, too, the
problem of stabilizing the value of the metal at this low point. Con-
servatives insisted that it could not be done, their inference being
that private silver interests would restrict production to control
the price of the metal. 7
Holding to such beliefs, Perry Belmont interpreted private
information available to him as indicating that "the race between the
United States and India to get on dry ground first is all in favor of
7Wllliam P. St. John, President of the Mercantile Bank of New
York, and financier A. Foster Higgins favored silver monetization. But
other leading New York bankers insisted upon repeal, since the further
accumulation of silver would further depreciate its value, making it
"easy for the Bank of England to reinforce itself in this way. II Jim
Hill adVised Cleveland to "listen carefully" to Jacob Schiff, who con-
structed a plan to coin silver until the gold reserves fell below a
stipuls.ted figure. Meanwhile, the international bimetallists proceeded
with their efforts to effect an intemational ratio, conferr:ing with
the British Foreign Office in an effort to establish rapport. Times,
May 8, July 7, 1893; February 28, February 30, April 9, September 20,
1894; July 30, 1895. For details of the bimetallist scheme see the
summary of a speech by Pennsylvania .Senator Don Cameron, Times,
September 20, 1893.
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India. II Should the United States become, however inadvertently, the
nation upon which the world silver supply' was to be dwnped, silver
coinage could ruin the opportunity presented to the United states to
gain financial control of its economy. Populist legislators were not
moved by this logic. .They continued to demand an international agree-
ment to coin silver, and pleaded that United States possession of nearly
one half of the world silver supply must result in this country's
ultimate control of both market and monetary values of the metal. 8
To the end of the congressional battle over the Silver Purchase
Act, Populists resisted its repeal as ab~ as they could. Still, the
special session of the United States Congress called for the purpose of
effecting the repeal served another purpose, for it revived the question
of silver coinage before election time. Populists took full advantage
of their opportunity to belabor the Democrats. But the maj or concern
of the Populists was not to prevent the repeal of the Sherman Law.
Rather, they exploited the battle between the major parties in order to
"get a good place for silver. tl What Populist legislators most desired
was not s imply the circulation of silver, nor an inflated paper cur-
rency, but a combination of these two schemes, the circulation of a
silver-backed paper currency. Silver funding would stimulate the inter-
national trade balances, and paper might relieve the contraction of
specie within the United States. Furthermore, the agrarians contended
~evins, Henry White, 102, 101, 109, Matthew P. Josephson,
The Politicos (New York, 1938), 530, Stephenson, Aldrich, 101, Congo
Rec., 25:3:Appendix:322, 3863.
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that the United States would take its rightful place as the lead.er of
democratic nations throughout the world by adopting such a plan. World
peace and stability would result if the misery of debtors were allevi-
ated, and tension between classes would disappear.9
All this could be accomplished, the agrarian legislators insisted,
if the United States would fearlessly take the lead in monetizing silver.
Under the constitution the authority to coin money was vested in
Congress. The United States possessed abundant silver for trade pur-
poses. And the declining value of silver in relation to gold need not
deter the United States from silver monetization, for coin which
serves as a medium of exchange ought not to be intrinsically dear.
But Populists who hoped to swap their version of silver monetization
for the repeal of the Sherman Act failed to effect any compromise with
President Cleveland. When their failure became apparent, they balked
at all efforts of the Democratic Administration to repeal the Silver
Purchase Act. In a final, dramatic gesture, William V. Allen fili-
bustered to prevent repeal by reviewing the agrarian protest against
both the gold standard and the conservative policies of the administration. lO
9A complete exposition of the Populist case for bimetallism was
made by William Allen, Conge Rec., 25: Appendix: 293-330. See also Cong.
Rec., 23:2:1829, ibid., 23:5:4214.
- One of the most complete analyses of the financial policy of the
Cleveland Administration is made by Alexander D. Noyes, liThe National
Finances, 1893-97," Political Science Quarterly, XII (June, 1897), 189-211.
10Cong. Rec., 25:Appendix:18l, 185, 289, 291, 330. Times,
JUly 2, 1893. -
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For a short time India continued to import silver, though her
mints remained closed to its coinage. But as the demand for the metal
declined, its price on the international market twnbled rapidly. Mean-
while, overlapping the fight for silver, another issue regarded by
Populist legislators to be complimentar,y to an, increased money supp~
soon took their attention. Tariff reform was in the air. Grover
Cleveland apparently thought to calm irritated silverites while honor-
ing his campaign promise to lower the tariff. But Populists were again
disappointed in their hopes, for the authors of the tariff of 1894
aimed at "temperate reform." And considering the circumstances of the
panic of 1893, and the low point of the depression in 1894, the less
than ten per cent average reductions provided by the final tariff
schedule were moderate indeed. ll
It seems quite apparent that the framers of the tariff act of
1894 worked to promote the revival and further consolidation of American
industry, rather than to relieve immediate economic distress by stimulat-
ing imports and thus promoting competition to reduce consumer prices.
Democrats were "by no means united" on any supposed agreement to pass
a revenue tariff. The final product of these Democratic efforts sup-
plied free raw materials, such as coal, iron, wool, and lumber to
industry but still protected American manufacturers from foreign com-
petition. Even reciprocity was abolished. Grover Cleveland's scathing
llstanwood, Controversies, 307, Merill, Vilas, 203, Frank G.
Taussig, Free Trade, The Tariff and Reciprocity (New York, 1920), 291.
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letter to Democrats, deploring their efforts to maintain high duties
on foreign manufactures, earned him no more than a withering reply from
the leaders of the Democratic opposition.12
But for political purposes, the passage before the election of
some form of tariff legislation seemed a Democratic necessity. And
there was a good chance that Populists might support the tariff to get
the income tax provision which it incorporated. To conciliate southern
agrarians, tariff schedules included free cotton ties and binding twine.
Southern agriculturalists of course favored the provision for free jute
and bagging included in the final act. There was a possibility, too,
that middlewestern Populists might be persuaded to look favorably upon
free wool as leading to a reduction of imported woolen garments. Tariff
schedules designed to include raw, semi-processed, and finished materials
embarrassed Populist legislators, who found .it necessary to decide
between their preference for free necessities and the exclusion of
competing products.13
l~eVins, Cleveland, 282, 581, United states Congress, Comparison
of the Tariffs of 1897A1894, and 1890. Senate Document 3568, 55 Cong.,
1 Sess. (Washington, 1 97). see also Laughlin and Willis, Reciprocity,
2.50.
13Cong• Rec., 26:7:7136, ibid., 26: Index: 217, ibid., 26:1: Index:
116 for the amendments to the tariff introduced by Representative John
Davis and William Hudson. One contemporary analysis of votes cast in
Congress on the Wilson Bill distorts both the rationale of the voters
and the construction of the tariff. See William Hill, "A Comparison of
Votes on the McKinley and Wilson Bills," Journa~ of Political Economw
(Chicago), II (March, 1894), 291-93. Hill's conclusion that "no sort of
comparison or analysis of this vote can be made to yield encouragement
to the Protectionists lt does not seem warranted. There is certainly no
statistical measure which will show .to how great a degree the income tax
prOVision of the tariff may have offset features disagreeable to the
43
Populist preferences could not be interpreted as purely sectional
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bia,ses. Jerry Simpson had strong backing when he attacked the high rates
of the bill during the intra-party wrangle which preceded its passage.
The Indianapolis Non-Conformist, a Populist organ, went further, arguing
that the tariff was a minor issue, and concluding that it could be
settled intelligently only after the return of prosperity. James H.
Kyle accepted the challenge to sell free wool on the world market, and
William Peffer agreed with Ben Tillman of South Carolina that a bounty
system for agriculture might be both desirable and feasible. Henry
Demarest Lloyd, Secretary of the American Free Trade League, joined
Populist congressmen who fought the bill.14
Though it abolished the bounty paid to domestic sugar growers,
the tariff legislated, Lloyd insisted, "the right to tax the people
untold millions a year." Jerry Simpson agreed, and explained that he
voted for the passage of the new rates only because a slight decrease
in some areas seemed preferable to none at all. But William Peffer
agrarians. One must further consider the tariff schedules in relation
to depression prices to obtain an accurate notion of the degree of pro-
tection afforded by the schedules. Certainly Populist congressmen did
not consider the tariff acceptable. This is chronicled at length in the
debates of the Congressional Record. Populists emphasized the need for
lower rates on all manufactured articles. In reality their emphasis on
a moderate, or revenue tariff worked against their own program in 1894,
because a revenue tariff might have stimulated imports, built the treas-
ury reserve, and further limited the possibility of attaining the silver
standard.
14Public Opinion (Washington), XVII (September 27, 1894), 618,
Henry Demarest Lloyd, "The Revolution is Here," in Destler (ed.), American
Radicalism, 216, Peffer quoted in Public inion, XVII (July 5, 1894), 311,
Francis B. Simkins, Pitchfork Ben T:i,.llman Baton Rouge, 1944), 356. See
for example the petitions of the citizens of Kansas against the Wilson
Bill, Cong. Rec., 25:Index:116, 217.
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accepted the Republican theory of protected home markets "to build up
an industry quickly.1t The best that Populist legislators could do,
faced with such intra-party differences, was to insist upon the desira-
bility of a revenue tariff. With the single exception of William Peffer,
the Populists succumbed to the lures of sectional economic benefits and
the income tax provision appended to the Wilson Bill when they voted for
the passage of the final act.15
But Jerry Simpson left no doubt that Populists understood the
intentions behind the activity of the House Committee of !<'inance, which
replaced the duties upon iron, coal, raw sugars" and silver ores" which
Congress earlier abandoned. He understood that any attempt to rely upon
a revenue sugar tax could be dangerous both to American designs upon
Cuba, and to the gold standard. For Spain was rapidly flooding Cuba
with silver, "forced upon the market in place of gold." Such specie,
collected by Washington as taxes upon the output of American owned
refineries, and absorbed as payments in trade with Cuba, would push the
ratio of silver to gold in the treasury even higher. It did indeed
seem apparent that an administration so determined to preserve the gold
standard that it refused to coin the seignorage of the treasury for fear
of incurring silver monetization would design its tariff legislation
most carefully. And certainly the policy of the Cleveland Administration
15Llo;yd, llThe Revolution is Here," 216-17, Public Opi-Ilion, XVII
(July 5, 1894), 311, Cong. Rec., 26:2:1796" ibid., 2bi7:ll36. ---
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favored American noncolonial expanSion.16
For a short while the income tax offered hope to advocates of an
inflated national currency that their program might prevail. If an
expanded currency could not be achieved directly, by legislation to coin
silver or to issue notes redeemable in silver as well as in gold, per-
haps the inflationists might induce the acceptance of their program by
passing the necessary legislation in a sequence less obviously calculated
to arouse the ire of gold standard advocates, who opposed any further
diluting of the national reserves with silver. But the tortured logic
of the Supreme Court decision in Pollock ~. Farmers' Loan and Trust
put an end to this indirect approach when, less than a year after the
passage of the Dingley Tariff, its entire income tax section was
l6Cong• Rec., 27:2:1514. The Senate resolution to send the
sugar schedule to the Finance COJlll1littee received favorable votes from
Populist Senators I1arion Butler, James Kyle, and 101filliam Peffer, who
presumably cooperated in hopes that the sugar schedules would be
revised to lower the duties, and so result in less governmental revenue.
Some indication of Populist sentiment at the time may be gained from
Populist votes upon a resolution to censure Thomas Bayard, .American
minister to the Court of st. James. Bayard had delivered an address
condemning the "form of protection known as socialismo I' Two motions
stood before the House of Representatives, one to censure Bayard for
the address, another a condemnation of partisanship by an official
representative of the United States. Populists refused to censure
the Ambassador, but favored the second resolution. Cong. Rec., 26:
8:8566; ibid., 28:4:3035, Times, May 8, 1892, Stanwood, Tariff
ControversIe'.!, 328.
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adjudged unconstitutional. 17
Thus under the administration of Grover Cleveland the foreign
policy of industrialism received what appeared to be a temporary set-
back. Although Cleveland and his Secretaries of State, Walter Gresham
and Richard Olney, endeavored to meet the criticisItls leveled at the
conservative policies of their administration by recourse to the time
honored weapons of military expenditure and aggressive diplomacy, they
refused to commit the United states to the coinage of silver, the finan-
cial policy ardently desired by growing industrial and cOIllIllercial, as
well as agricultural interests. To Americans who viewed the combina-
tion of relatively high tariffs and demonetization of the gold dollar
as an instrument of domestic oppression, Cleveland became an heroic
figure, staving off disaster and possible social revolution with forti-
tude and honor. In their eyes, threats to the stability of the American
domestic social structure offset the attraction of prosperity to be
17Alfred H. Kelley and lllinifred A. Harbison, The American
Constitution, Its Origins and Development (New York, 1948), 564-73.
Blake, "Background of Cleveland's Venezuelan Policy," 260, 61, 62, 65,
For. ReI., 1895, Message of the President, xxxviii. In a pathetic
attempt to ward off the wrath of the farmers Cleveland explained that
he distrusted the motives of the silverites. His earlier effort to
meet the criticisms of agriculturalists by initiating a survey of agri-
cultural markets and products failed miserably. In 1894 Cleveland also
sought to elaborate upon Mexican-American relations by intimating that
the best solution for Mexico to border raids such as the Garza Revolu-
tion of 1892 would be a Mexican-American commercial treaty. When Mexico
spurned the treaty Cleveland focused attention on the relations of the
United States with the ottoman Empire and with Germany. This was per-
haps unwise, for expansionists advocated intervention in Turkey. But
Cleveland's policy toward both Germany and Turkey seems to have been
more an expression of American nationalism than one of calculated hostil-
ity. For. ReI., 1895, xxxviii, ibid•., 1894, XXXVii; ibid., 1891.\., xi,
~., 1895, xxxv. - -
If the productive capacity proved incapable of shoring up the damage;
national exchange balance would be immediately and drastically slashed.
the possibility that the gamble would fail. The already shaky inter-
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These objections seemed to imply a pessimistic View of human
gained by temporary stimulus to industrial productivity and expansion
"I t· t" 18through S1. ver mone 1.za 1.on.
nature, as well as a short run view of economic good. But there existed
volume of American sales abroad; if' the governments of foreign nations
if international recovery should prove so incomplete as to restrict the
should undertake to.protect themselves from the American invasion of
their markets, then the resulting liquidation of the economic assets of
the United States would be ruinous.
To many producers, caught in the low tide of economic depression
in 1894, Cleveland was the villain who refused to take the daring step
which would prime the pump of national production. They reasoned that
---------
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18The literature and propaganda dealing with tariff reform and
silver monetization is voluminous. But, designed for public consumption,
the appeals to the national prejudices, local preferences and sectional
interests are a sad example of the distortions popularized for political
reasons. The important question of whether the issues of the tariff and
monetary policy were geared to operate as a system during the eighteen
nineties is often ignored. But important positive evidence linking the
plans of the silverites to the high tariff policy of the Republican
Party is offered by Don Cameron in a letter to Andrew D. Humphery,
Secretary of the National Republican League. The letter, dated June 11,
1894, is to be found in United States con~ess. Senate rUse. Doc. 262,
53 Cong., 2 Sess. Gold and Silver Prices Washington, 1894), 7-10. See
also Blake,. "Cleveland's Venezuelan Policy," 260-65, American Bimetallic
League, Facts About Silver (Washington, 1891), and the bibliography of
this thesis for additional references.
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the President refused to render their position and consequently that of
the nation, prosperous once more. It was a craven fear of foreign
economic interests, alleged these propagandists, that prevented silver
monetization.19
Cleveland and his economic advisers must have smiled at the
wildest of the calumnies. These men were conservatives in economics
and politics. They, and their friends in Congress, considered not only
the morality of the American position, 'but the means of promoting the
economic welfare of the country, upon which their own welfare remained
contingent. As statesmen they were no less interested in the ameliora-
tion of economic misery and the prevention of domestic revolution than
were the wildest of the silveriteso More than this, the policies of the
Cleveland administration aimed at transferring the American productive
plant from foreign to domestic ownership. Congressional debates between
the closing of India t s mints to silver in 1893 and the beginnings of the
American business revival in 1895 reveal the clear outlines of the
Cleveland policy.20
Populist fusion tickets with the major parties of Alabama,
i'1ichigan, Iowa, and North Carolina in the elections of 1894 offered
19Cong• Rec., 23:2:1252-53, ibid., 23:3:2434.
20Complete and detailed expositions of this period of American
history are provided in James A. Barnes, John Go Carlisle, Financial
Statesman (New York, 1931), and NeVins, Grover Cleveland. Matthew
Josephson, The Politicos, offers a broader synthesis from the end of
Reconstruction to 1896. But none of these works contains the intimate
picture offered by the Congressional Record.
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additional testimony, if such were needed, that a "renewed interest in
silver" swept the country as the election year approached. But the
Democrat-Populist fusion of Kansas was not renewed. The alacrity with
which Kansas Democrats embraced Populism alarmed gold-standard Democrats
who declined another alliance, convinced that fusion, even to defeat the
Republicans, "proved a mistake. 1f2l
Meanwhile Cleveland urged a naval building program to serve as
a counterweight to tariff reform and domestic unemployment. But silver
coinage Populists, who condemned the President for resorting to the
Morgan-Belmont bond sales to maintain the gold standard, became even
more recalcitrant toward the military program. One gains a better under-
standing of Cleveland's position by reviewing the conduct of American
diplomacy during the controversy with Great Britain over arbitration of
Venezuelan boundaries in 1895. It is a commonplace of American diplo-
matic history that the domestic unrest prevalent in the United States
explains Cleveland's aggressive demand for arbitration as an attempt
to divert social unrest by appealing to the anglophobia of the silver-
ites, and thus clear the "populistic ll pus from national politics with
a patriotic gesture. Cleveland may indeed have hoped to pacify
exporters and industrialists in the months before the national presi-
dential election by extending the Monroe Doctrine to cover trade, as
2lTimes November 29, 1895.
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Consular representatives of the Cleveland ~dministration pushed
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~ell as colonization in South America. 22
\ :
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the development of South America by United states firms, and even
arranged a tour of the continent for the New York Chamber of Commerce in
1895. Moreover, the mouth of the Orinoco River, the critical area
embraced in the difference of interpretation between the Venezuelan
and British boundary claims, provided a key to the future economic
development of that portion of South America perilously close to the
projected route of the trans-isthmian canal in Panama, over which
American diplomats persistently asserted their complete control. 23
In this light, Cleveland's offer to buy Cuba from Spain is not
as "ironic ll as Samuel Flagg Bemis suggests. It seems, rather, B. crucial
factor in the fulfillment of Blaine's earlier attempts to make the
Caribbean the American lake. Fully aware that the Pacific Ocean leads
to Asia, the Cleveland Administration refused to allow cancellation of
the Panama concessions of the United States' }'taritime Canal Company,
despite the company's nonperformance of its contracts. One cannot
22For • P~l., 1893, Message of the President, xxv~~~, ibid., 1895,
xxvi. Nelson M. Blake, "The Background of Cleveland's Venezuelan Policy,lI
American Historical Review, XLVII (January, 19h2), 274; Harold D. Cater
(ed.), Henry Adams and His Friends (Boston, 1947), 352.
23The consensus of American Consuls in South America was that the
South American trade could best be gained by establishing branch banks
and branch distributing houses abroad. They repeatedly warned American
producers against handling goods on a consignment basis. One of the most
complete sources on the extension of United States trade abroad was the
monthly Consular Report. See the bibliography of this thesis for
pertinent Reports.
much, and at the same time countered manifestations of British colonial-
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termed expansionist, though it eschewed, for the very purposes of expan-
sion, the· coinage of silver. The debate was over means, not ends. 24
ism on an adjacent continent. The Cleveland Administration must be
dismiss lightly the diplomacy of an administration which envisioned so
--------------------- --- --
Henry Adams expressed amazement at the rapi.dity with which
Secretary of state Richard Olney assimilated the conclusions drawn by
Henry's brother, Brooks Adams whose researches into the tendencies of
history had for several years been the subject of discussion among
Boston intelligentsia, and were shortly to be summarized by Brooks in
the Law of Civilization and Decal. Upon the publication of the volume
in 1896, Henry distributed copies to Supreme Court justices and Cabinet
members. And certainly ample opportunity existed for at least indirect
contact by Olney with the younger Adams' thoughts about history and
national affairs before the publication of the Law. For example, both
men had a common acquaintance with Theodore Roosevelt, and with
I '
I .
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, whose preoccupation with foreign affairs
I
I~,
I
"
I
must have brought him into frequent contact with the Secretary of State.
And presidential adviser William C. Whitney provided close liaison
between the President and the Adams clique in the period of the second
24Samue1 F. Bemis, A Diplomatic Histor~ of the .American People
(3rd ed., New York, 1950), 450, For. ReI., 189 , Message of the
President, xiii; ibid., 234-363-
II
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Cleveland Administration.25
By May of 1895 financial reviews commented upon the "heavy
London purchases in Railways at good prices ll in the American securities
market, a development which doubtless helped to explain the plummet in
industrial securities occasioned by Cleveland's assertion (in the note
written by Olney and himself) that the United States would always oon-
sider the protection of its own interests a matter "beyond all question
of International law. 1t Roosevelt voiced his pleasure in this diplomatic
stroke to William Rockhill, Assistant Secretary of State: "In spite of
your Democratic policies, I have to be proud of Olney and yourself. n
Cleveland's diplomacy doubtless pleased Brooks Adams as a welcome
change from the relatively tame gunboat maneuvers in South America
undertaken by Harrison and Cleveland, for Adams favored the entry of
the United States into war as early' as 1892.26
The younger Adams stressed the concentration of economic energies
as the key to the development of civilization and placed emphasis upon
the need for an expanded currency during periods of expanded trade.
And one of the numerous ramifications of his thoughts and activities
was the establishment, in February of 1894, of an organization to pro-
mote international bimetallism. Numbered among the charter members were
25Cater, He~ Adams and His Friends, 382, Brooks Adams, The Law
of Civilization and~Cay (Vintage ed., New York, 1955), 213-84, 'William
A. Williams, tlBrooks dams and American Expansion,1I New England
guarterly (Brunswick), XXV (June, 1952), 220, ~, February 28, 1894.
26Times, July 30, 1895, For. Rel., "Venezuelan Message,tl 1895,
Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt .and the Rise of America to World
~ (Baltimore, 1956), 23, 31.
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such prominent citizens as economist Francis A. Walker, Boston banker
Henry Higgenson, and members of the Aggisez family, as well as Brooks
and Henry Adams. According to Moreton Frewen, an English bimetallist
and close friend of Henry, this group first agitated for the appointment
of a special monetary conmission by President Cleveland for the purpose
of arranging an international bimetallic standard. Frewen asserted
that plans for the establishment of the cownission were formulated at a
dinner in 1894 attended by Walker, Senator Oliver H. Wolcott, Brooks
Adams, William S. Whitney, and Frewen himself. Thereupon "one of the
Americans urged upon the President the appointment of such a commission."
But the President had other plans. 27
Olney's note would tide the country over the critical period
between the Belmont-Morgan support of the international exchange rates,
and the expiration of the relief which would be afforded to American
commerce by foreign credits derived from agricultural crop sales in the
fall of 1895. To avert the threatened rupture in Anglo-American friend-
ship, the English Foreign Office aimed to conciliate the American State
Department. Reports favorable to the ilmerican proposals for control of
the Inter-American Isthmian Canal emanated from the British foreign
office at this juncture, while at the request of Lord Salisbury the
Liberal cabinet minister expressed to Ambassador Bayard in London his
fervent hope that the Venezuelan controversy "be promptly settled in
an amicable manner. 1t To the truculence of the American position, and
27Adams, Civilization and Decay, 273-84, Times, July 30, 1895.
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Olney's refusal to assent to a conference of the major powers for the
purpose of exploring the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine, must be
attributed the languid negotiations toward settlement of the Venezuelan
dispute which followed. 28
Yet the prominence of the bimetallists in the development of
American economic policies during the critical years before 1898 can
not be underrated. Their ideas gained wide support in Congress where
they attracted, for various reasons, the support of so diverse a group
as Henry Cabot Lodge,l1atthew Quay and Don Cameron. Cameron and Lodge
operated in close political liaison with the bimetallists and thus
found themselves well qualified to. plead the case for bimetallism to
their more conservative colleagues. At that time, Henry Adams, still
in agreement with his brother, wrote an historical justification of
American intervention in Cuba for the use of Senator Don Cameron and
other Cuban interventionists. To Cuban intervention the English foreign
office eagerly assented, and hastened to reassure the American ambas-
sador that they remained "anxious for settlement" of outstanding disputes
with the United States. 29
If it be true, as Henry Adams charged, that Olney deserted his
friends when he refused to exact international bimetallism as the price
28Times , November 3, 1895, ibid., December 6, 1896, James,
Olne~> 229-.-- --
29United States Congress, Compilation-of Reports of the Committee
on Foreign Helations, United States Senate, 1789-1901. Diplomatic
Relations With Foreign Nations. Affairs in CUba, senate Report 1160.
54 Cong., 2 Sess. (W~shington, 1901), VII, 40-64; James, Olney, 244.
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of peace with England, the charge :must be examined in a larger framework
than that of purely immediate interests of the United States. Although
he approved the scheme for bimetallism, Olney admitted that his fears
of radicalism narrowed his appreciation of the struggle of the radicals
for silver coinage.30 Yet Olney, and Gresham before him, attempted to
gain through diplomacy what the radicals wanted to get by devaluating
the currency. In years past, the operation of United States traders in
Samoa had climaxed in a joint protectorate over the island, shared
betloleen Germany, England, and the United States. Former Secretary of
State Thomas R. Bayard successfully resisted a three way partition of
the island proposed by Germany by objecting that German influences at
work in the island did not "have the interests of the natives at heart."
James G. Blaine followed up Bayard's policy for Samoa by attempting,
during his tem as Secretary of State, to secure exclusive rights for
the United States to the Samoan harbor of Pago Pago. Failing this, the
Harrison Administration continued to favor joint control of the island
by the three powers. British and German proposals for harbor conces-
sions which might limit the possibility for eventual American
predominance were thus abandoned for a time.3l
The Cleveland Administration continued the diplomacy of
Republican predecessors. The President recommended to Congress that
3Oworthington C. Ford (ed.), Letters of Henry Adams (Boston and
New York, 1938), II, 166, James, Olney, 309.
3~oster, Diplomatic Memories, 395, Times, May 2, November 4,
1894.
~i_
steps be taken to withdraw this country from the joint government in
Samoa. Restrictions imposed upon the freedom of action of the United
States by continued joint occupation Cleveland characterized as "the
first departure from our traditional and well established policy of
avoiding entangling alliances with foreign powers in relation to
56
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objects remote from this hemisphere. • • • rt When the German Ambassador
countered with a request ,for suggestions from the United states as to
the manner in which permanent disposition of Samoa might best be assured,
Secretary Olney limited his reply to the cautious statement that the
United States had for the moment "no better plan ll for the government of
Samoa. Freedom of action was the objective, sole control of the harbors
the ultimate goal.32
Deeper into the Pacific, a treaty of Amity and Commerce with
Japan brought more favorable results. There, by the terms of the
Japanese treaty, the United States unburdened itself of extraterritor-
iality restrictions, and assured this country a growing share in the
Pacific trade. But relations with China were doubtless hampered by the
affinity of the United States with Japan, China I s traditional enemy.
Thus, though the good offices of this country were offered to the
belligerents during the period of the Sino-Japanese war, no appreciable
stimulus to Chinese-American good will resulted from the venture. The
United States accepted the Japanese invasion of Waiweihai as an oppor-
tunity for the dispatch of three warships to the East to protect her
32For• Rel., 1896, 534.
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interests. The Administration's broad application and rigid interpreta-
tion of the Geary Act, which prohibited the immigration of Chinese
laborers and restricted the travels of Chinese merchants within the
United States, compromised friendly relations between the two countries,
,
,
, ,
I·
and did little to gain a friendlier reception for American businessmen
in China.33
Closer to home, Walter Phelps formally asserted the doctrine of
Mare Clausam on behalf of United States' sovereignty in the Bering Sea,
and an American naval survey of the Cuban harbor of Guantanamo, unauthor-
ized by Cuban and Spanish officials, illustrated direction of expansion-
ist activities. Republicans urged the annexation of Cuba "rather
wildly. II "Our frontier is almost gone, Professor Turner tells us, and
we are getting land hungry again, II commented the New York Times. More
than land appeared involved, however, for the State Department shortly
appointed a commission to survey the proposed route of the Nicaraguan
Canal, and Walter Gresham dispatched American naval units to Hawaiian
waters to back the pro-annexationist government he once threatened to
spurn. Populist Senator P~len interpreted these extensions of _~erican
influence as ftwise and enlightened policy." He and his colleague, Marion
Butler, further agreed that the laying of a Hawaiian telegraphic cable
by the United States constituted a legitimate use of governmental
powers. Butler's earlier teamwork with Senator Kyle against the expendi-
ture of funds for a naval survey of Pearl Harbor thus gave way to more
330. s. For. ReI., 1895, 103•.
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expansive views. For American trade at the end of 1894 showed a level
of activity approximating that of 1891, and Populist legislators, intent
upon attaining prosperity, became willing converts to a more forceful
policy of naval expansion.34
But the threat of silver coinage blighted the efforts of the
administration to make peace with its critics, and the harassed Democratic
President found it necessar,y to remind his countrymen that no nation
could "hope to control the trade of any considerable portion of the
world" until it gained the willing cooperation of sister nations. To
liberals as well the narrowing vision of reform which focused on the
single issue of silver coinage after 1893 spelled disaster. Henry
Demarest Lloyd accurately dubbed silver the llcowbird of reform. n Like-
wise, silver coinage became the principal facet of expansion through
which Populist legislators might revive their sagging political fortunes.35
34when the German Minister to the United states inquired as to
the reason for favoritism to Hawaii, it was explained to him that the
United States granted exceptional advantages to Hawaii because of
"geographical propinquity." But in 1895 reciprocity by law no longer
existed. For. ReI., 1895, Times, July 5, 17, 1893. The division of
opinion among Populist Senators on military appropriations shows the
changing Populist attitudes. The first is a bill for naval appropria-
tions, on which yea votes were cast in the Senate by Peffer and Allen;
nay by Butler, and Kyle abstained from voting. The second bill is for
an increase of the appropriation. Nay votes were cast by Allen, Kyle,
and Peffer, Butler abstaining. On the last bill to pass the appropria-
tion for 1895, yea votes came from Allen, Kyle, and Peffer, Butler again
abstaining. COngo Rec., 26:4:3049, ibid., 26:3:3092, ibid., 26:3:3124.
COngo Rec., 20:6:5434, ~., 27:2:1277, 1820.
35Henry Demarest Lloyd, nThe Populists at St. Louis, It Review of
Reviews (New York), XIV (September, 1896), 298-303.
.,
I .
I i
. ,
59
For when the silver fever mounted in the major parties, the
popular vote for Populist candidates staggered to a halt. In dire need
of contributions with which to revive their fortunes, the party leaders
were driven to confer "with the silver men about funds. 1I Control of
state governments might assuage the pride of the worried rebels, but
the decline in party power could not hide from members of the Populist
National Committee the implications for the future. They feared the
strength of the silverites within the major parties.
We must recognize the fact that if a new party is
organized and they make the money question the great
issue, we will receive no more recruits, except a
few socialists and communists, and that many of our
best men in the west will leave us to join the new
movement, and we will simply become the forerunner
of a great third party that is to be organized,
warned the National Chairman. And when it appeared that party survival
became contingent upon fusion with the silver forces, Populist legisla-
tors took the lead in formalizing the alliance which already existed on
a limited and informal basis in Congress, and substituted silver for
refonn)6
36Hicks, Populist Revolt, 337-38, Ignatius Donnelly Papers,
Mirmesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota. Herman E. Taubneck
to Ignatius Donnelly, July 7, 1892, July 8,. 17, 1893.
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CHAPTER III
THE PRICE OF A PARTY
''We don't need population, we don't need wealth, we don't
need well dressed men on the streets, we don't need cities
on the fertile prairies; You bet we don't! i'
William Allen White
''What's the Matter with Kansas?"
Long before the election of 1896 the American Protective Tariff
League attempted to turn the threat of a Treasury reserve deficit to its
own advantage with an appeal to Populist "patriotism" by- inviting Populist
support for its proposal to restore a 15 per cent duty- on woolen goods
which was cut from the schedule by the Wilson tariff. And as foreign
economic recover,y advanced, Representative Dingley in turn proposed a
flat 15 per cent horizontal addition to tariff rates to be effective
until December, 1898. Populist legislators continued to express their
opposition to such proposals to protect the home market until atter the
election of 1896, and continued to deal with tariff legislation in con-
junction with their demands for financial relief. Then, although it
seemed improbable that either major party would undertake tariff adjust-
ments before the election of 1896, Marion Butler unhesitatingly proferred
"six votes to the body which will stop the further issue of bonds, \I and
vlilliam Allen offered his support for prohibitive tariff rates if these
rb _
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were "coupled with free coinage. ,,1
But, instead, the Democrats attempted to promote cOJmllercial
activities in other areas. Richard Olney indicated a strong interest
in the nature and extent of American trade in Martinique, onlY' to be
deterred by" France r s assumption of a protectorate over the island, and
the subsequent cancellation of all non-French concessions there.
Washington moved to counter this loss by" publishing the consular reports
of Ja:mes H. Mulligan, American Consul in Samoa, who called for the
abrogation of the Berlin Treaty, and abrogation of tripartate control
of the island if the United States planned to obtain the harbor of
Pago pago.2
The visit to this country of 11 Hung Chang, Viceroy and
Foreign Minister of Chima, proved of equally consuming interest to
Democrats. Though the American Minister to China, Charles Denby,
reported the Chinese-American trade to be flourishing, Li I S errand
appeared such that he could be only informally received. But the
President, Secretary of State, cabinet members, and railroad financiers
proved greatly solicitous, and eager to cement commercial intercourse
lTimes, January 6, 1898; Cong. Rec., 28:5:4720, ibid., 27:3:2441.
2For• Bel., 1895, 335-58; ibid., 361-82. Times, May 24, 1896.
..,.
Republicans could not avoid the problems inherent in their accession to
indicated that the wisest course for the Republicans would be post-
of Congress. Senator Allen, doubtless sensing the difficult position of
"l
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amendments. Though they successfully avoided Populist tariff bait, the
the new Republican Administration, attempted to introduce tariff legis-
lation into the Senate in December of 1896. Senator William Peffer
The narrow margin of Republican victory at the polls in 1896
ponement of all controversial legislation until the next regular session
between the United States and China.3
followed suit by proposing that a commission be set up to study monetary
power. A special session of Congress met in March, 1897, to map tariff
3The .American Minister to China, Charles Denby, sought the
establishment of American banks, newspapers, and mercantile interests
in China. TimeS, August 22, 23, 29, 30, and September 3, 1896.
Viceroy Li r s visit followed closely upon the conclusion of the Sino-
Japanese War, and the ignoble defeat of China by Japan. Apparently
the Chinese Viceroy hoped to obtain some assurance from America and
England that they would work against a possible partition of China
or Korea by Japan. Li I s conferences with American railroad financiers
hint of an offer by which China might counterbalance Japanese expansion
on the Chinese mainland with concessions to other foreign nations.
Minister Denby worked steadily to obtain American Railway concessions
during this period in the hope that the United States might gain
"complete control" over "national progress" in China. Concessions were
demanded for the Baldwin Locomotive Works and the American-China
Development Company on the grounds that other major European nations
had been "rewarded" for "securing peace in China" after the Sino-
Japanese War. It was the American-China Development Company which
pressured the State Department for a change in policy when concessions
failed to be forthcoming. For. ReI., 1897, 58-59, ibid., 1896, 426-27,
Charles S. Campbell, Special Business Interests and~ Open Door,
27-31.
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legislation.4
Borrowing a page from the record of an earlier Republican
Administration, the House Committee on Ways and. Means promptly under-
took an examination of the success of the reciprocity policy which
Democrats had abandoned. Undoubtedly the favorable conclusions of the
examining cOllUllittee can be explained in part by party loyalty, yet the
statements of representative exporters from a cross section of the
American economy' attest to the popularity of reciprocity legislation
with manufacturers and cereal producers. From the hotbed of the
agrarian revolt the Kansas Millers I Association emphatically asserted
that reciprocity agreements "would do more than any action taken in a
long time lt to restore prosperity. Head. of the Lakes Millers' Associa-
tion declared itself "heartily in favor of presidential authorization"
for reciprocity arrangements, as did the Farmers' Headquarters of
li,
Clarindon, Iowa, the National Livestock Exchange of Chicago, and the
Michigan State Millers t League. An exceptional objection of the
Gainesville, Florida, Board of Trade held reciprocity to be ineffective:
"Diplomacy be blowed. Dig the Nicaraguan Canal and give us free ships."
&t milling interests replied by citing the decline of their Cuban
trade after the expiration of reciprocity treaties as a cause of their
4Times, December 10, 1896, December 11, 1896, ibid., January 1,
1896, Januazy 15, 1896, Cong. Bec., 28:3:2103, ibid., 2151.
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market decline.
Exporters maintained that discriminatory practices aimed at the
products of the United states could be dealt with handily with the
weapon of trade agreements. The much maligned tariff of 1890 became
desirable :In retrospect: it had effected reductions of up to 37t per
cent on cereals exported by the United States to Germany. Now" by con-
trast" transportation costs and wharfage rates put the United States
at a disadvantage even in England; and. continental countries openly
discrimiliated aga:lnst these American products which managed to surnve
the restrictions upon their importation from this country.6
Those who did not infer the conclusion stated it in forthright
fashion. The United States must adopt reciprocity as a means" not so
much of securing raw materials" but of gaining access once more to the
markets of Europe. With evident satisfaction the House investigating
committee concluded:
It will be observed that there is a remarkable unanimity
in the sentiments expressed concerning the value and
results of the reciprocity arrangements negotiated with
5RePort of the Committee on Ways and. Means" 152" 162" 173" 182;
ibid." 159" 303" 162" 224" 230. The Brass and Iron Works of Fostoria"
OhiO" called for Ita protective tariff" fair reciprocity" and the coinage
of only American silver." Ibid." 241.
The reciprocitY" sci'iedUle with Spain for Cuba arranged by John W.
Foster in 1892 proved unsatisfactory to manufacturers because" while
some duties were reduced" Itthe number of articles which must still go
from SpainII increased" under the terms of the treaty" preserving the
animosity between rival Spanish and American mercantile systems. Times"
July 7" 1892.
6Ibid." 153-59" 256-59.
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certain countries and colonies under the authority of
section 3 of the tariff act of 1890 and the disastrous
effects of their repeal. It will also be noticed that
the commercial and industrial interests of the United
States, as thus represented, without political distinc-
tion, are almost without exception anxious that such
arrangements shall be renewed and negotiated with other
nations, and the reciprocity policy be permanently
adopted in future legislation affecting the tariff and
foreign commerce of this country.
Manufacturers still received preferential attention in Washington.
But the failure of the United States to avoid restrictions upon
the admission of American cattle abroad by shipping them across Canada
'')
h _
rankled, when contrasted to the Republican Administration's successful
cattle shipments to England two years earlier and settlement of a similar
dispute with Britain at that time. Secretary of Agriculture Levi P.
Mor;'ton replied to critics that governmental policies must be designed
to benefit "all commerce," not merely agricultural interests. 7
Co~nercial activities might be further stimulated by the acquisi-
tion of a naval base in Greenland, Henry Cabot Lodge contended, and
John W. Foster urged the annexation of Hawaii as lithe white man's
burden. II The revival of a project to acquire Santo Thomas also appeared
imminent at the same t~~e. The extension of knerican patent rights in
Japan and. Turkey, and retaliatory action against German trade
7Ibid., 5, 9. In 1893 the American Ambassador to England,
Henry White, understood that "political considerations" made the
removal of English restrictions upon American agricultural products
extremely unlikely. For. Rel., 1896, 34, Times, January 16, 1896,
January 18, 1896; ibid., December 1, 1896, April 3, 1896; For. Rel.,
1896, 426-37. ----
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restrictions upon American goods pointed up Andrew D. 1.fuite' s toast to
"commerce and diplomacyII before the New York Board of Trade. 8
Their votes on naval appropriation bills revealed Populist
legislators still intent upon limiting naval expenditures to defense
requirements. But they were expanding their concept of the defensive
perimeter of the United States. The reappearance of Jerry Simpson in
Congress after a term of absence was marked by his apparent conversion
to the use of the navy for the "protection l1 of overseas commerce. The
increased settlement of this country might necessitate naval expansion,
he conceded. Further, Senator Allen openly bid for shipbuilding con-
tracts on the Missouri River in return for Populist votes. They still
bickered, as in former years, over appropriations for the military and
naval academies of West Point and Annapolis, but the agrarian legislators
refused to quibble on the larger issues. Jerry SilIlpson maintained, in a
pointed reference to the high tariff policy of both major parties, that
if Congress found protection and the home markets more profitable than
1
~
8New York merchants undertook a campaign to stiInulate their
trade which remained depressed after other urban areas began to
exhibit steady economic recovery. And it was New York which felt
the effects of depressed cotton prices as the center of the cotton
exchange shifted to that city. At the request of the American Cotton
Oil Company, \ilTilliam. Buchannan, United States Consul in Argentina,
undertook to widen the cotton oil market there. 'fhe New York Chamber
of Commerce also sent a representative delegation on a commercial
tour of South America, and the next year organized a home market
aSsociation in an effort to stimulate trade. Times, July 1, 1896,
July 12, 1896.
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free trade, it ought not to foster naval expansion.9
Only Senator Peffer remained adamant. If American railway
hz _
transportation were to join the entire hemisphere, as was proposed,
he once lightly remarked, certainly the United states would require no
foreign shipping. He continued to advocate hemispheric commercial
solidarity, and the internal development of the United states as the
alternative to naval construction. Yet even he added his name to the
final endorsement given to naval appropriations by Populist legislators.IO
Meanwhile, the continued Populist attempts to obstruct all
revenue bills made imperative some adequate provision for the collec-
tion of additional funds if the United States were to meet its current
obligations. And a strong suspicion existed in American circles that
if the United States could hold to the gold standard for but a short
time longer, all would be well for the nation. In the course of re-
evaluating the trade statistics of the United states, a task undertaken
by economist-historian Worthington G. Ford upon his appointment to
office as chief of the Bureau of Statistics in the Treasury Department,
it was discovered that the relative position of the United states in
world trade had been greatly undervalued. Ford t s corrections indicated
that the United States would soon command a volume of industrial
exports which would surpass Great Britain if the rate of growth in
9Cong•.Rec., 27:3:224J.. For Populist reaction to the naval pro-
gram see also Cong. Rec~, 28:5:4511, 4721, 4725, 4733, 4856; ~., 28:
7:6085, 6195.
10Ibid., 28:5:4720.
~
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production and exports could be maintained. In such an eventuality it
would be possible to undersell the chief conunercial nation of the world.
Commerce and industry in the United States would then reap benefits
identical with those projected by the bimetallists, even greater because
competitors would be denied the stimulus afforded to American
t . 11en erprJ.ses.
During the second week of October, 1896, the New York Times
financial reports carried the assurances of New York bankers that, even
allowing for the balance due this country for seasonal crop sales on the
international market, imports of gold into the United States followed
"the natural course of trade." The announcement climaxed wide publicity
given to the Ford reports, which were, of course, pointed up by the Times
before the election of 1896. James A. Barnes, reviewing the llMyths of
the Bryan CampaignIt has called for other explanations for Bryan's defeat
than those most often accepted so uncritically by American historians.
Though special studies of the phenomenon are lacking, it is here sug-
gested that an inquiry into the behavior and rationale of the business
community, where the clamour for bimetallism tapered off in the months
immediately preceding the election, would prove helpful to a more
llTimeS, April 4, May 4, June 14, June 27, July 7, July 23,
July' 24, July 28, 1896. From London, Henry Adams calculated an over-
draft of Itat least twenty million" by J. P. Morgan and his American
banking associates. The lack of investment opportunities for British
capital resulted, apparently, in an indefinite extension of credit to
the American banking consortium. Cater, Henry Adams and His Friends,
342, 43, 44, Times, May 4, 1896.
i
Inn _
69
critical analysis of the Republican presidential victory.12
The close margin of victory for gold standard advocates in
1896 prompted Grover Cleveland to attempt the arrangement of some
basis for a compromise between "gold bugs" and silverites of all
parties before the President retired from office. The plan advanced
by Cleveland in his December, 1896, Message to Congress retained the
original Cleveland proposal, which Congress had earlier rejected, for
the cancellation of all greenbacks. The President now added his
suggestion that new bonds be issued to cover the silver coin which
might come into circulation as the greenbacks were redeemed. But
Cleveland's proposal did little to alleviate the silverites' distrust
of the President or of bondholders. The bonds were to be, according
to Cleveland's policy, redeemable only" in gold.13
Readers of the final Presidential message mst conclude that
the progress of American diplemacy in alleviating domestic tensions
preoccupied the departing President, although diplomatic relations
with England no longer presented any problem. In the month following
the financial victory of the United States over British rivals,
l2Times, August 20, August 26; ibid., October 4, October 10, 1896.
l3For• ReI., 1895, Message of the President, xlv-liii, ibid.,
1896, Message of the President, lviii-Ix. Cleveland's proposals for
currency reform offended in two respects. The President clung to his
desire to cancel the greenbacks, and proposed to issue bonds to cover
their replacement by silver coin. The argument that silver would
replace greenbacks did little to remove popular distrust for bond-
holders, since bonds themselves were by Cleveland's policy valued in
gold.
rl
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Britain's Lord Salisbury could be "very sure England's dispute with the
United States with reference to Venezuela" was ended. But strained
relations with the Ottoman Empire, a legacy of the Harrison Administra-
tion, plagued the President. Though he continued to press for the
recognition and extension of the rights of American citizens in Turkey,
the President satisfied interventionists who clamoured for American
interference there with a display of naval power,.participat1on in lln
advisory commission to the Sultan, and a public declaration of American
concern over the brutality of the Turkish-Armenian clashes. From con-
sideration of commercial relations with Germany and China, the
President focused attention on the immediate problem presented to the
United states by the .resurgent Cuban rebellion against Spain.14
Cleveland's policy i'oreshadowed that of the McKinley Administra-
tion: ''When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the
problem!' of civil insurrection on the island appeared manifest, this
country would act. And truculent though it might be, such a policy now
offered no threat to Anglo-American relations. The Cleveland Administra-
tion refrained onlY' from immediate intervention in Cuba, and from the
prompt recognition of the belligerency of Cuban rebels. Intervention
remained unwise while the treasury reserves were low, and recognition
of the belligerent status of Cuban rebels carried with it the further
danger of absolving the Spanish government from responsibility for
14Ti.mes, November 19, 1896, For. Rel.~ 1895, Message of the
President, xxiii, xxv, xxxvi; ibid., June 2~ August 29, October 29,
1896.
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damage to American property in Cu.ba.15
Though the United States remained to the end of the Cleveland
Administration 'avowedly neutral" the diplomatic note of April" 1896"
in which this country tendered its good offices to Spain for the
purpose of ending the rebellion" reassured Americans who held, as the
President noted" "from 30 to 50 million capital in Cuba." For" in
response to Congressional prodding, Cleveland had already promised
that "when Spain has failed, and the continuance of the conflict
results in the utter destruction of the subject matter of the conflict"
our duty to Spain will be superceded by a higher obligation." The
President's Secretary of state" in his turn" defined this obligation
as intervention "at a time not far hence. n16
Before the adjournment of Congress in March" 1895" the Cu.ban
rebellion assumed new importance in the thinking of Congressional.
bimetallists. Senator Don Cameron announced his intention to submit
a resolution to the next Congress calling for the recognition of the
Cuban rebels as belligerents. But conservatives who considered Itswap-
ping off free silver for the Cuban question" derived little satisfac-
tion fran. the subsequent introduction of Cameron's resolution or the
debates upon it. During the early part of 1896 the Senate refused to
pass bills designed to increase available revenue" while Congressional
l'For. Rel." 1896" Message of the President" xxxii" xxxv.
16Times" December 29" 1896; For~ ReI." 1896" Message of the
President" xxxix" xxv" Report of the secretary of state" lxxxiii; Times"
January 30" March 6" 1896.
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appropriations continued apace. Populists lent their support to the
passage there of a bill prohibiting the issue of government bonds with-
out Congressional consent at a time when goverrunent expenditures showed
an annual deficit of $20,000,000.17
Their response to the belligerency resolutions indicated that
the Populists hoped for the strongest possible action by the United
States in Cuba. Senator Allen became sponsor of one resolution, which
called for the recognition of the independence of Cuba from Spain.
But Populist legislators would not oppose, as a group, arrr of the
resolutions submitted. All showed a willingness to pass some form of
legislation, though conservatives insisted that such matters of foreign
policy might remain under the President t s jurisdiction. Not one
Populist consistently abstained from voting.18
Though the Administration successfully resisted: the encroach-
ments of Congress upon Executive authority, Populists attempted to
extend Cleveland t s interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, which he had
used with marked success during the American-British dispute over
arbitration with Venezuela, to Cuba's dispute with Spain. Properly
read, the Doctrine would justify American intervention in Cuba, and
could be used to promote the "financial partnership" this country
sought with Great Britain, the agrarians alleged. Party congressmen
J
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17William D. Sheldon, Populillll in the Old Dominion (Princeton,
1935), 143, TimeS, May 26, 1896; ibid., May 24, June 3, June 5, June 7,
1896.
18
Cong. Bee., 28:2:1448, ~., 27:1:107.
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in one breath applauded Cleveland's vigorous diplomacy in protecting
the smaller western hemispheric nations against the aggression of
England, but in the next they condemned the policy as IItardy, and there-
fore inefficient. II A principle so Itexpansive, pragmatic, and flexible"
would easily provide the impetus to American diplomacy for which the
agrarians hoped. Senator Allen found justification for the annexation
of both Cuba and Hawaii in his own corollary to the Doctrine of 1823:
Whenever territory is essential to the safety and
security of this country we should not only insist
that such powers should not acquire additional
territory, but we should also insist that this
government should have the right to such territory
by purchase. .
The interpretation appealed to both Pacific and Caribbean expansionists. 19
As the fever of interest in Caribbean expansion mounted,
Populists continued to press for the construction of an isthmian canal
between the North and South American continents. In 1895, Thomas Bayard,
then Ambassador to the Court of St. James, attempted, unsuccessfully,
to delay the landing of British Marines in the B1uefie1ds of South
America by negotiating an It.merican loan in Nicaragua's behalf so that
country might satisfy the claims of British creditors and remove the
threat of British occupation of the canal route. Congress, by then
19Cong.Rec., 28:3:2556, 51, 59, ibid., 28:4:3621. Senator
Morgan, leader of the si1verites in the Senate, candidly admitted that
"we want a war with Spain or England. We shall need more money."
Times, Harch 12, 1896. During this period Republican silver senators
and Populists worked closely together, often caucusing before important
legislation came to the floor of the Senate. See also Weinberg,
Manifest Destiny, 393.
-
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aroused to the need fpr' sustained activity in South America if the
United States were to secure permanent control of the proposed
isthmian waterway, appropriated funds for a canal route survey. 20
Populist legislators, still violently resisting appropriations
for government aid to private commercial interests, contented themselves
with a mild attack upon the survey proposal. It was certainly not the
construction of the canal to which they objected. Populists advocated
construction of the isthmian waterway to increase trade. But party
legislators did object to the features of the survey scheme which
authorized government support of the market value of bonds is~ed by
the private development compaw which proposed the survey. Instead,
Populists favored an outright survey of the canal route by an agency of
the United States Government. If the Clayton-Bulwe.r Treaty, by which
the United States agreed with England to refrain from the construction
of an isthmian canal independent of joint English-United States control,
prohibited such direct activity by the United States, then the treaty
must be abrogated, Populist legislators insisted. But the agrarians
deplored granting to a private corporation any power to conduct the
business of the United States Gover.nment.2l
2°T.imes, March 24, April 29, 1895, Congo Rec., 21:1:348. For
the history of the canal diplomacy, see Mary W. williams, Anglo-6l\.merican >
Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915 (Washington, 1916).
21Congo Rec., 21:2:1101, 1341-48, ibid., 27:1:245, 246, 249, 250,
341-51, 438, 447, 448, 449. -
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Populist advocates of expansion into the Pacific, who favored
the construction of the canal and feared British encroachment in South
America, had another cause for concern. Eager to acquire the Pacific
trade, they now began to fear the effect of the Geary Act upon American-
Chinese friendship. Senator Davis anticipated that the new Chinese-
Russian railroad might turn China I S economics away from the United
States. The flour market in China had, in fact, decreased steadily
since 1892. Perhaps the public excitement over a Russian-American
extradition treaty of minor importance worked upon the Senator r s fears.
But now, more than ever, Populists of the wheat belt had reason to fear
Russian expansion into Asian markets. 22
Once again sUver monetization appeared to offer the solution
to the problem. For China paid the amount of her indemnity to Japan
in sUver at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War and, were the
United States to monetize the metal, a tremendous advantage would accrue
to American traders in China whose operations would be facilitated by a
ready supply of standard trade currency and the elimination of unfavor-
able exchange rates paid for British silver in China.23
I
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22Cong• Rec., 26:4:3085,
Times, December 10, 1894.
23Times , April 12, 1895.
Campbell, Sp!cial Business Interests,
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Thus Populist legislators were intent, by election time, upon
the monetization of silver b,y the United States. Populist leaders
entertained no doubts as to the sentiments of the Democratic presidential
nominee William Jennings Bryan after the Democratic National Convention
at Chicago, but much public uncertainty existed as to the true position
of the Republican nominee, William IvrcKinley, on the monetization issue.
McKinley aided James G. Blaine in his efforts to secure a silver trade
dollar at the Pan American Conference of 1889, and voted for the Bland-
Allison Act of 1878, which provided for a limited increase in silver
coinage. The Manufacturers' Club of Philadelphia, a pro-silver
organization, backed McKinley's "bimetallist!' sympathies, and repre-
sentative Francis G. Newla:nds of Nevada headed a "silver League for
HcKinley. It Yet John Hay, "who held the confidence of the members of
the coalition government, It reassured his friends in the British Foreign
Office of the Republican presidential candidate's sound money sympathies
during the summer of 1896. At the same time, McKinley campaigned on
the argument that the foreign trade of the United States was being
"precipitately cut off lt from abroad. Remembering that he had favored
an increased currency in 1892, southern delegates to the Republican
National Convention continued honestly to regard McKinley as ltfavor-
able to silver. If And l'4:cKinley understood the need for a stable
I77
currency. 24
Senators Allen and Butler, who stampeded the Populist national
convention into the alliance with pro-silver Democrats, appreciated the
strength of the silver forces within the Republican Party. Often they
had allied themselves with Senator Don Cameron of Pennsylvania, and
other proponents of bimetallism. They understood the position of the
Republican presidential aspirant, l·lcKinley, who, as a member of the
Republican Platform Committee of 1888 helped to frame a plank friendly
to silver. McKinley, the political representative: of the state which
had spawned "the Ohio Idea,1I a candidate pulled from obscurity by the
industrialists of his party, was a symbol of their hopes to Republican
expansionists. And he advocated the lIwidest possible use lt of silver
during the election campaign of 1892. 25
Yet now l'4cKinley seemed to tum his back upon silver, and the
Republican Party platform of 1896 clung to the gold standard. By
contrast, the silver coinage plank adopted by the Democrats seelned to
offer the opportunity for the agrarian legislators to enact their
silver funding scheme. And it seemed highly improbable that Populists
24rimes, May 11, lVJay 14, May 25, June 30, 1896, December 29,
1896, Paxton F. Hibben, The Peerless Leader, William Jennings Bryan
(New York, 1929), 179, \'1illiam D. Sheldon, Populism in the Old Dominion
(Princeton, 1935),125, Bertha A. Reuter, Anglo-American Relations
During the Spanish-.American Har (New York, 1924), 50, Dunn, From
Harrison to Harding, II, 227-28.
25Destler, American Radicalism, 43, Times, May 12, 1892,
Wilfred E. Binkley, ilmerican Political Parties;-Their Natural History
(New York, 1943), 330.
would achieve national victory at the polls, more so after Democrats
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8Ild Republicans formed public battle lines over the issue of sUver
coinage. Therefore Populist silverites closed ranks with like-minded
silverites in both major parties. Discontented reformers and laborites
who hoped for the Populist nomination of Eugene V. Debs for President
left the St. Louis convention of the Populist Party with few illusions
about the objectives of Populist politics.26
Perhaps William Jennings Bryan' s refusal to acknowledge the
official support of the Populists stemmed from a foreknowledge of the
intentions of the silverites within the party, especially after James B.
Weaver, leader of the greenback wing of Populism, received the Populist
Vice Presidential nomination. But the strategy of the Democrats could
be summed up in the advice given to fellow Democrats by the editor of
the Atlanta Constitution: "Advocate every principle of the Populist
Party platform if it is necessar;y in order to keep the people inside
the Democratic Party.u Certa~ the Democratic silver plank offered
scant promise of silver funding unless silver could somehow be pegged at
a legal exchange rate with gold. "Free and unlimited coinage tf of silver
as popularized by the Democrats was best described as gold standard
politics. The chagrin and bittemess of Populist reformers who witnessed
the collapse of their party as well as the failure to achieve
international bimetallism after the election of 1896 can therefore easily
26Binkley, American Political Parties, 333-34, 320, Lloyd, liThe
, Populists at St. Louis."
Ilmiddle states!r where the balance of power between the parties was
decided. The campaign of voter education undertaken by the Republicans
Republican Party strategists aimed their ~\n campaign at the
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be understood. 27
is well known. Literature and speakers poured into agrarian strong-
holds of silver coinage sentiment urging Eepublicanism and prosperity.
By a margin of popular vO'ces barely comfortable enough to insure victory,
and in which an estimated 14,000 votes in seven middle-western states
could have reversed the outcome of the election, the Republican Party
carried William McKinley of Ohio to the presidency of the United States.
Control of the middle states, the alleviation of urban-rural tensions
and the Republican labor vote in agrarian districts accounted for
Republican success. 28
27HetInan C. Nixon, liThe Populist Movement in Iowa, II Iowa Journal
of Histor~ and Politics, XXIII (Iowa City), 85-86, Hicks, Populist
Revolt, 2 7, 358, Ida M. Tarbell, The Tariff in Our Times (New York,
1911), 241, C. Vann Woodward, Tom Watson, Agrarian Rebel (New York,
1938), 290, Congo Rec., 28:3:2150.
28C• Vann Woodward, Tom Watson, 280, Harvey S. Wish, "John
Peter Altgeld and the Background of the Campaign of 1896," l'1ississippi
vallefuHistorical Review, XXIV (March, 1930), 503, Times, July 11,
July , 1896. A strong rural-urban split appeared in all sections of
the country. Only in the silver mining "mountain states ll did Bryan
receive a majority of urban votes. Even the states of Kansas, Nebraska,
Missouri and Tennessee, all of which were carried by Bryan, gave
N:cKinley a majority of votes in their urban areas. And rural wheat
growers favored Bryan with large majorities. ~villiam M. Diamond,
"Urban and Rural Voting in 1896," American Historical Review, XLVI
(January, 1941), 281-305, Barnes, lIl"Iyths,1I 392-93.
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The oratory of the Republican candidate carried strains of
patriotism and orthodoxy which echoed through his public utterances
for the next four years. Themes of country, flag, and "only one class"
offset the attractions of the seemingly indefatigable Bryan. The
identif'ication of Populism with the menace of cozmnunism "proved
convenient" to campaigners of both major parties, who promised pros-
perity and the abolition of gross c1s,ss inequality within the country,
should they succeed to office. The Republicans won the task of fulfill-
h • 29ing t e prom1se.
29Times, November 1, 1896, William S. McKinley, ,eeches and
Addresses, March 1, l897-May 30, 1900 (New York, 1908), 8 , 100, 107,
113.
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CHAPTER IV
JNTERLUDE
"Unless the thoughts of 8. nation run a common course,
the affairs of a nation cannot run a cOIl1lllon course. n
Woodrow Wilson,
Address to The Quill Club
of New York City
December 15, 1897
The agitation for silver coinage continued after the election
of 1896. Bimetallists and silverites, who remained powerful forces in
"
I
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Congress and throughout the nation, renewed their efforts to secure an
increased silver coinage. Indeed" John Wanamaker, Postmaster General of
the 11cKinley Administration, early voiced his fear that if eurrency
reform were not speedily effected "an outraged people ll might turn Uto
those who can provide better times." In Ohio, the home state of the
new president, a league of politically nonpartisan bimetallist clubs
renewed its demand for an international silver coinage agreemant. The
Democratics of Ohio again pledged themselves to free silver. Orville
Platt of New York attempted to make a free silver plank the "controlling
force fl in New York politics, while Senator Ben Tillman of South Carolina
stumped New York State for the silver forces. In Iowa, meanwhile,
silverites, Populists, and Democrats pooled their strength to struggle
for an increased money supply. The Democratic State Convention of
Haryland, under the leadership of Arthur Gorman, adopted a platfom
i
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calling for international bimetallism at a fixed ratio. Though the
Populists of Michigan, Missouri, and Nashville, Tennessee, rejected
free silver as too narrow a basis for reform, the expression of such
discontent became infrequent. It was little wonder that William L.
Buell, ex-President of the New York Stock Exchange, reported that
"Europe is disgusted, and believes that in 1900 the United States is
going on a silver basis."l
Another complication to the framing of a new financial legisla-
tion arose to hamper the administration. .A.fter 1895, though the indus-
trial recovery of the nation progressed, a plethora of investment funds
became available in the United states and Europe. From January 1896 to
April 1891 the 11visible gold supply of Europe" increased by 1» 30,000,000,
though Britain lost ~ 5.6 million and France ~ 1.4 million in gold
reserves. During 1896 the balance of trade for the United States con-
tinued to shift until "more than a million of dollars for every working
day" became credited "to the United States in international trade trans-
actions. It Industrial recovery, however, absorbed little investment
capital. Consequently, investment rates in the United States plunged
to a new-time low. Financiers turned abroad for investment opportun-
ities which offered larger returns on capital than did this country.
The interest rate of hi per cent offered in Germany thus attracted
ITimeS, May 11, 1891; June 24, 1891, July 1, 1891; May 19,
May 24, 1891; June 23, 1891; May 28, 1891; July 29, 1891; September 1,
1891; January 15, 1898; January 15, 1898, March 11, 1898, July 9, 1891.
'.
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American capital, since only 3 per cent was offered at home. To
counteract these low rates, some Americans urged the employment of
domestic investment capital in the further development of the natural
resources of this country. But the days of wildcat exploitation and
quick profits from American natural resources required markets. The
spectre of a mature economy continued to haunt American investors. 2
The Republican Administration clung to its belief that increased
prosperity could best be realized through a change in the financial
legislation of the country. The President's inaugural address stressed
the need for currency reform. Such refonn must. take place along lines
which, "without diminishing the circulating medium or effecting a
premium for its contraction, I' would "present a remedyl' for economic
distress. McKinley' 8 inaugural message to Congress centered around an
analysis of lmerican monetary problems as the key to future prosperity,
2New York Times, April 20, 1897. Russia, which adopted the gold
basis in 1896, absorbed .. 12,000,000 in gold during the time of a criti-
cal gold shortage in the United States. Austria absorbed .. 5,000,000
and New York .. 3,500,000 of the new su.pp~, while the United States
Treasury took It 17,300,000. A cootinued 108s by Britain and France
during this time doubtless provided encouragement for the advocates of
bimetallism. See also Times, January 1, 1897, and April 21, 1897.
President Warner Van Norden of the National Bank of Commerce announced
the existence of "pl enty of money but no demand. It \tAs soon as business
picks up, however, and there comes a demand fran trade sources, we will
see better rates, It he encouraged. Officials of the New York Life
Insurance Company could not be so cheerful. One executive, Rufus J.
Weeks, frankly warned of his company's concern over the lack of invest-
ment opportunities: liThe truth, It said he, "is forcing itself firstly
upon custodians of trust funds and lastly upon the public. II Times,
January 3, 1898; ibid., January 2, 1898.
of the Indianapolis Monetary Commission, an independent organiza.tion of
businessmen and economists who desired the stabilization of the currency.
for the advocated reforms. The President did, however, note the research
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though he carefully omitted the presentation of any specific measures
Further, the short range plan of the McKinley Administration became
evident when all proposals for new financial legislation were delayed
until the passage of the Dingley Tariff, which the administration hoped
would provide an adequate revenue. The President's request for a
congressional committee to study the currency blocked any immediate
financial legislation. Secretary of the Treasury Lyman J. Gage explained
that the administration, while intent upon ensuring a stable currency,
"need not ignore the fact that there are many wounds to be cured,
excited passions to be calmed, and many misunderstandings to be com-
posed, II before appropriate legislation might be enacted. The Senate
Finance Committee promptly undertook consideration of the recommendations
of the presidential message; but in the Senate itself opinion remained
weighted in favor of silverites and inflationists. So in order to
explain HcKinley's program and to "secure the support" of the banking
I
, I
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community, Secretary Gage was dispatched to New York for conferences
with leading financiers. He returned to 1rlashington armed with the
lIassured support of New York financial interests ll for the President's
\'jl
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All during the autumn of 1897, Secretary Gage and President
McKinley consulted earnest~ upon the President's second financial
message which would be presented to Congress in December and which
would elaborate the administration program. one proposal embodied a
scheme for funding National Bank notes with Treasury bond receipts.
This the administration rejected as inexpedient since it failed to
provide for a necessary elasticity of the currency. Another tentative
proposal to issue short term low interest gold bonds "as security for
circulating notes, in substitution of currency previously depositedM
drew such opposition, when made public, that Secretary Gage, through
whom the arrangement was first given notice, offered his resignation
to the President. The resignation was refused, but the administration
retreated from plans to issue new government bonds. Meanwhile, the
comptroller of currency, Charles G. Dawes, noted that Ita portion of the
financial press is already attacking the Dingley Law for its failure
to produce the required revenue." The President continued to urge
Itthe establishment of two policies: protection and the present gold
~cKinley, Speeches and Addresses, 2, Inaugural Address,
March 4, 1897; Times, July 8, July 28, 1897; July 25, 1897, "The
Financial Situation," Commercial and Financial Chronicle, LXV (July 10,
1897), 64-65; Times, April 30, 1897.
Represented at the meeting with Gage were the following New
York banks: Commercial Exchange Bank, Lincoln National Bank, Chase
National Bank, Hanover National Bank, First, Third and Fourth National
Banks, City National Bank, The American Exchange National Bank, The
Bank of Co:nuneroe. Also in attendance were representatives of the
First National Bank of New Jersey.
See also Times, December 3, 1897.
For, with the favorable balance of exchange rates continuing in
existence, the currency problem became, under the principle of the pro-
tective tariff, "simply a revenue problem." So the President stressed'
the "great evils lt of maintaining the existing parity between the paper,
silver, and gold in circulation, whereby all circulating specie JIDlst be
the endless chain of redemption of paper and silver in gold, which
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standard. "
only paid out in exchange for gold. If McKinley's policy thus proved to
be essentially that of his Democratic predecessor, Grover Cleveland.5
any of the United states notes are presented for redemption in gold
and are redeemable in gold, such notes shall be kept and set apart and
fettered the Republican Administration, McKinley proposed that "when
accorded equality of redemption by the federal government. To break
Public feeling ran high after the publication of the message,
when it appeared that the President still determined to restrict the
circulation of paper currency. The National Board of Trade, meeting
"
in annual convention, considered that "probably there is no subject
which is still of such importance as that of currency. There is still
much to be desired in the way of prosperity. A spirit of unrest and
dissatisfaction still exists • '. • in New York and Nebraska the
4TimeS, November 25, 1897, Charles G. Dawes, A Journal of the
McKinley Yei'i=S, edited by Bascom M. Timmons (Chicago, 1950), 166;
Times, November 20, December 29, 1897.
Swilliam McKinley, quoted in Dawes, Journal, 129; For• .ReI.,
1897, Message of the President, ix, x.
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opinions of the dissatisfied are now practically the same as before the
election." Prominent businessmen knew that "the moral and political
atmosphere" had not been cleared of "revolutionary influences," while
"some sections of the country" still clung "to the Chicago platform l1
and its free silver heresies ..6
Upon the receipt of the presidential message, Populist members
of the House of Representatives promptly caucused, then issued a joint
resolution: "That we are opposed to and will resist all efforts to
destroy our greenbacks and Treasury notes whether it be b.r direct legis-
lation or by the subterfuge of refusing to reissue the same except in
return for gold. II They further unanimously opposed any extension of the
power of note iSSlle to tlany bank, corporation or individual-II Thus the
compromise proposals embodied in the .Report of the Indianapolis Board
of Trade proved unacceptable to the Populists. The report, first pub-
lished in January of 1898, became, in fact, the pa-t;tern for the monetary
adjustments ultimately adopted by the Republican Administration. But
while hopes of silver coinage lingered, no substitute reforms proved
acceptable to the agrarians. 7
But to show its good faith in the fulfillment of campaign
pledges, and in the hope that true bimetallism mi.ght be secured, the
Republican President fostered the activities of the silver coinage
6Times , November 24, December 7, 1897, December 15, 1897;
~, DeC'e'iiiber 17, 1897.
7Times, December 17, 1897, January 3, 1898.
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advocates. Soon after his inauguration, the President, with the nearly
unanimous consent of the House of Representatives, appointed a co."IUllittee
empowered to deal with foreign nations in preliminary negotiations to
effect an acceptable international parity between gold and silver. The
Wolcott Commission conferred with European statesmen and financiers from
April until November of 1897. As in 1892, the early contacts of the
commissioners indicated that some plan acceptable to England, Germany,
France, and the United States might be arranged. Henry White, the
United States Ambassador to the Court of st. James, met with the
American Commission in France, and aided them in the drafting of a
preliminary report for John Hay. Hay then approached the British
government l1informall,y, on bimetallism. ,,8
France agreed to cooperate in maintaining an intemational
bimetallic parity, and the commission obtained Germany's promise to
enter the informal discussions looking to the coinage of silver. Yet
the earnest efforts of the American silverites met with defeat. The
passage of the Dingley Tariff in June of 1897 antagonized France. In
early July, Germany, likewise irked by the adverse effect of the
Dingley legislation on the export of German sugar and manufactures to
8UI do not need to be reassured that you are using untiring
energy and tact to help along two of the administration's greatest
efforts: bimetallism and the Bering sea negotiations, II McKinley com-
plimented John Hay, American Ambassador to the Court of St. James.
Louis B. Sears, IfJohn Hay, II American Secretaries of State and Their
Diplomacy, edited by Samuel F. Bemis (New York, 1927-1929), rx, 120.
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the United states, replaced its representative to the Commission,
sympathetic Chancellor Possadowski Wehner, with Baron von Thulmann, a
statesman favorable to the gold standard. The next week, at a crucial
meeting in the British Foreign Office attended by Lord salisbury,
Arthur Balfour, Sir Michael Hicks Beach and the French Minister of
Finance Geoffrey, Senator Wolcott formally presented the American pro-
posals to the British, French and German governments. The result of
this, and subsequent meetings held by the representatives of the four
nations, became the "final refusal of the British Government to accede
to any of the proposals made by the Comission." Thus ended another
attempt to obtain an increased coinage of silver, and to establish a
pemanent international bimetallic ratio.9
9Times, February 27, November 2, 1897; ibid., July 8, 1897.
The British record, Correspondence Respecting theProposals on Currency
Made B the ecia1 Env s from the United States, is printed in Session
Papers, CV October, 1 97 , 601-17.
The tentative proposal of Britain to maintain one-fifth of her
bank reserve in silver met with inunediate objections from the British
Bankers' Gold Standard Defense Association. Association members main-
tained that England in no way pledged herself to bimetallism simply
through the adulteration of her gold reserve, and that such an adjust-
ment in the reserve could result at best in only a temporary price rise,
while England purchased or coined silver. British capitalists feared
that American production would llruin the market" and that silver prices
must therefore f all again. In this country, Secretary Gage agreed that
the holding of the proposed one-fifth of the English reserve in silver
would prove too slight to raise the market price of the metal. The
value of silver would climb on the exchanges only so long as England
accepted it in the intemational market at an inflated value. Times,
July 25, 1897; September 17, 1897; September 12, 1897. In the long run,
however, Britain might conceivably have been brought to the silver
standard had India's mints remained open to silver, and the British-
Indian trade flourished.
r......_------------
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The failure of the American commission's efforts in behalf of
silver came as no surprise to the Populist Senator William. Allen, who
remained, as he said" Italways satisfied that international bimetallism
WB.S a dream. It To Allen's Populist colleagues the intemational dicker-
ing over silver served only the useful purpose of determining "where
HcKinley stands in the financial question." Allegedly to the detriment
of agriculturalists throughout the nation, the Republican. Administra-
tion t s conduct already foreshadowed plans to Itret~tin greenbacks and
substitute bank paper." Populists hardly expected that an international
commission representing "the marts of trade" would now seek either "the
money of the constitution" or "a fair chance in the markets of the
world for all our industries. It Thus, while they agreed not to press
for the commission's final report to Congress, the apparent failure of
the Republicans to provide for a goverrunent managed currency led
Populist legislators to advocate silver coinage by the United States,
independent of any other international agreements. lO
The silver coinage legislation which Populists continued to
support was always blocked. House and Senate Finance Conunittees simply
refused to report such measares.Populists and silverites attempted to
circumvent the committees to which their bills were reported by
l°Speaker of the House ThOMas B. Reed refused to appoint new
congressional committees, preferring to leave the direction of legis-
lation in the hands of gold standard advocates, who continued in their
previous congressional appointments. Reed's power of appointment
doubtless helped to keep recalcitrant party members in line when a
party vote was deemed desirable.
often erupted in the clash over monetar,r policy, the agrarian legisla-
bounty proposals, the Cannon Bill~ a "result of a conference of Silver
appropriation bills. The opposition of ensconsed interests~ the
agrarians alleged, made normal procedures imposSible.ll
For all their professed hatred of special privileges, which so
" ,
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attaching the free coinage proposals as riders to general and consular
tobacco. Senator Allen, doubtless hoping to make the bounty provision
bounties to the exporters of rye, wheat, barley, corn, flour, and
HepUblicans~ Populists, and some Democrats" provided for payment of
tors turned, in the course of framing tariff legislation, to a plan for
governmenta1 aid to agriculture. Populist opposition to the Dingley
Act crystallised after a bitter struggle to secure a direct bounty to
the producer of American agricultural products. The first of~
attractive to advocates of American naval expansion, supported the
such as grain shipped in American vessels should be eligible to col-
additional provision that only those enumerated agricultural staples
lect the award. But Marion Butler, as well as Allen, early voiced
r ' concern that the bill~ as drawn, would benefit shippers rather than
agriculture. The agrarians advocated payments direct to the farmers.
Yet even Butler supported proposals for a wheat bounty of $.13,000,000
as a "good investmentU although his constituents stood to gain little
f-
"
1
1
l
11:For examples of the riders attached to legislat:ton by the
free silver advocates, see Cong. Rec., 29:1:370, ibid., 30:1:306 for
amendments proposed by Senators Allen and John Ben::-
!1IIrnn _
Senator Kyle felt bound to support his colleagues because it became
from the measure. Thus while he opposed bounties "on general principles, If
"necessary to benefit the farmer somehow. II The bounty might promote
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diversified farming in the Mississippi Valley wheat belt, the Senator
noted, and thus give relief to the hard pressed agrarians. But, in
spite of Populist support of the bounty provision, Congress dallied with
the proposals to aid agriculture only long enough to secure passage of
other schedules in the Dingley Bill. Senator Allen's final attempt to
i I
.. ~
J
secure a one-fourth cent bounty for domestic beet sugar "was pocketed"
indefinitely.12
The framing of tariff legislation exerted a direct effect upon
'; , Populist attitudes toward American foreign policy. As the sugar
schedules of the proposed tariff came under the scrutiny of the Foreign
Relations Committee of the Senate, it became evident that a close connec-
tion existed between the agriculturalists' desires for a bounty upon
beet sugar and their sentiments respecting the annexation of Hawaii.
12Cong • Rec., 30:2:1631, 1241; Times, June 7, June 10, June 11,
1897; Cong. Rec., 29:2:1193, 94, ibid., 29:Index:111, ibid., 30:3:2392-
93, ibid., 30:3:2255.
-Californians, by then engaged in expanding their beet su.gar pro-
duction, exerted considerable effort to secure the proposed bounties.
David Lubin worked through the Central Labor Union there to obtain
grange and labor petitions favoring the bounty. A group of California
clergymen also propagandized for the measure. Times, May 25, July 23,
1893. But 14arion Butler's objections to bounties for the exporters of
agricultural products foreshadowed similar objections of another
maverick Republican, Senator William Borah, to the Fordney-McCumber
measure of the 1920 t s. For BorahIS objections to shippers' bounties,
see Claudius O. Johnson, Borah of Idaho (New York, 1936), 223.
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After an intensive propaganda campaign by such notable figures
as Senator William E. Frye, John \<1. Foster, and Hawaiian President
Sanford B. Dole, President McKinley announced his wish to annex the
Islands Ifin accord with the established policy of the country. It Hawaiian
sugars previously enjoyed free entry into the United States, under a
treaty of reciprocity with this country which would expire without a
renewal of the reciprocity provision in the new tariff legislation.
The rapidly expanding domestic beet sugar industry might then enjoy
the natural advantages afforded by their proximity to home refineries
and markets. This would tend to offset the competition afforded by
both domestic and Cuban cane sugars. Such a renewal might antagonize
American-owned sugar interests in Cuba, but was more than offset, in
the eyes of Ways and Means COlI1.1'flittee members, by the need to maintain
strong commercial and economic ties with Hawaii, lest annexationist
influences there be hampered. And had not the Spanish government once
before, in 1890, capitulated to American demands for special tariff
concessions in Cuba when threatened with the loss of markets for its
sugars? True, Cuban insurgents had worked with good effect to destroy
much of the normal crop in Cuba. Yet the effect of their destructivity
further incited American sugar investors on the island against Spanish
failure to afford adequate protection. Thus the tariff operated a s an
effective instrument of American diplomacy. Before presentation to the
Senate, it was therefore carefully reviewed by the Foreign Relations
'Z
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Committee of the Senate.13
When the sugar schedules of the new tariff came under the scru-
tiny ot the Conunittee, that body obtained the elimination of the
reciprocity provision enj oyed by Hawaii and Cuba under the old Wilson
tariff, in order, it was stated, to benefit domestic cane sugars and
to reserve the American market to the American producers. But mean-
while Japan protested against the American annexation of Hawaii, and
Congress deferred its plans to annex the islands while the State
Department negotiated settlements with both Japan and Russia. Then,
as a move to insure continued American predominance in HawaiiJ the
House of Representatives insisted upon the retention of Hawaiian
reciprocity provision in the Dingley Bill. A compromise provision
between the House and Senate adjusted the sugar schedule by providing
for tariff changes looking to an "increase on the higher grades" of
sugar, which would "benefit producers incidentally," the primary pur-
pose being to retain the reciprocity clause for Hawaii. But nothing
could be done for domestic beet sugars under such an arrangement. Any
hopes that the exclusion of Hawaiian sugars would enlarge the market
for beet sugars disappeared.1.4
Populists adjusted their policies to the changing circumstances.
Early in 1891, before the expiration of Hawaiian reciprocity became an
important issue, the agrarians were "pretty generally supposed to be in
l3~, April 30, 1891, June 17, 1891, Stevens, Hawaii, 284-85.
14Times, April 2, 1891; ibid., May 5, 1891, June ll, 1891.
conversion to annexation after rumors of Japanese interference in the
Yet something JUllst be done for beet SIlgar. Senator Allen, who
at first favored the abolition of the Hawaiian reciprocity clause because
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islands, could be tenned a IIzealous advocate It of amexation. Indeed,
favor" of annexation. Senator James J. Kyle, having suffered a SIldden
of an alleged agreement between Claus Sprekles and William Havermeyer
Republicans hoped to obtain the vote of the entire Populist congres-
sional delegation for the annexation treaty.l'
to divide the American sugar market between their respective cane
fields, now rallied his colleagues to the cause of the agricultural
bounty. They joined him in vigorous efforts to secure a bounty for the
production of beet sugar.16
These efforts failed. When John W. Foster reported that agree-
ments had been reached with Japan and Russia respecting the formal
American control of Hawaii, Populist legislators deferred to the
sectional interests which opposed annexation of the islands. But by
early January of 1898 an informal Senate poll on Hawaiian annexation
found Senator Allen opposed annexation because allegedly he feared the
assimilation of the colored races into Anglo-saxon America. Jerry
l'Times, June 15, 1897, January 2, 1897. Senator Kyle consulted
naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan upon the values of the Hawaiian
Islands to the United States•. Mahen replied affiming their value. And
the Senator thereafter urged the acquisition of Hawaii upon grounds of
national defense. William E. Livezy, Mahan on Sea Power (New York, 1947),
172-73.
l6Times, July 20, 1897; see also Cong. Rec., 28:Index:ln, for a
similar measure sponsored by Representative Maxwell of Nebraska.
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Simpson twitted Republicans whom he charged would Stlbstitute "bananas
for beefsteak" so recently promised to the voters of the Republican
ticket. Fears of racial amalgamation and of the competition of a
cheap labor supply explained JJ1U.ch of the failure to amex Hawaii before
the Spanish-American War. But another, and no less important, reason
for the failure to secure the unanimous support of the Populist agrarians
became the refusal of Congress to include some provision for an agricul-
tural bounty in the Dingley tariff .11
Populists abandoned their pleas for moderate tariff legislation
in 1891. In fonner years they assailed the proposals to "give the
American market to the American producer" as of little benefit to con-
swners, and identified their protests with consumer interest. Now, by
contrast, party legislators emphasized the function of agriculture as
one of production, and stressed the need to protect all American pro-
ducers. But the new emphasis did not absolve the framers of the Dingley
Act from responsibilitY' for agricultural prosperity any more than the
preVious tariff stood absolved from the blame for the high cost of
l7Times, July 1, 1891, Bailey, Japan's Protest Over Annexation,
Times, June 19, July 12, July 18, 1897. New York Times, July 18, 1891.
Times, June 11, 1891. Cong. Rec., 30:3:2430, 2411. TimeS, January 15,
I8'9B":" For annexation were Senators Harris, Kyle, and Turner, opposed,
Allen and Butler. See also Times, January 13, 15, 1898.
Russian acquiescence to American control of Hawaii may well have
been prompted by fear of Japanese expansion, and a desire to see Hawaii
permanently removed from the ever-widening sphere of Japanese influences.
The United States, still relatively weak in the Pacific, thus offered an
ideal counterbalance to Japanese expansion•
living. Populists insisted that the proposed Dingley legislation could
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not be regarded as "national" in its scope since it ignored southern
and western interests. True, the agricultural schedules of the Dingley
Act remained identical with those of the McKinley tariff of 1890, but
if the farmers' interest in the tariff must remain that of the consumer,
tariff legislation simply provided "no remedies for the real issues, 't
agrarian legislators contended.18
To Populists bent on securing some advantage from current legis-
lation, it seemed that raw materials such as lumber, coal, and gypswu,
articles which the farmer must purchase, bore the burdens of revenue
which might with more justice have fallen on manufactured products had
not the prohibitive level of the tariff rates discouraged foreign
imports of these articles. But the reverse argument seemed no less
true. On the raw materials of industry which the farmer produced, hides,
for example, a tariff could be rightfully demanded, since the agricul-
tural interests IllUst not ~e left out in the cold." And, finally, the
agrarians advocated so much free trade as would secure the free entry of
manufactured products widely used in agricultural production.19
Their increased emphasis upon production and exports as the
keys to prosperity became evident as southern Populists John Skinner and
l~elsonW. Aldrich, quoted in Times, May 26, 1897, Cong. Rec.,
30:1:308, Stanwood, .American Tariff ContrOVersies, 380-81; Cong. Rec.,
30:1:101-
19Ibid., 28:7:1542, ibid., 30:2:1202, ibid., 30:3:2664, 2868,
~., 30:2:1873.
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Marion Butler pleaded for the development of southern mineral resources.
Senator Butler blandly asserted that import duties on one of these
minerals, mica, "must be higher than if in competition with European
countries" because the competition of the South came "from silver using
countries" of the Orient, which held an advantage on the international
exchange. In still another instance, the Senator accepted the logic of
the opposition to prove his point. The existence of ltfree trade and
cheap silver," the Senator insisted, could explain agricultural pros-
perity abroad. The rapid revival and concentration of foreign agricul-
ture threatened American markets. But not even the remonetization of
silver could put the United States abreast of those foreign nations
which competed against this country with the advantages of cheap land
and labor. 20
The one choice which remained to the United States, 1£ it were
to revive agricultural prosperity, appeared to be the abolition of the
protective system or institution of an adequate system of protection for
all agricultural staples. Protection could best be effected through
government bounties. Thus Butler advocated the restoration of high
duties on broken rice because protection would ''benefit the rice
planters of North Carolina, It who lost markets when lower duties were
established. But the Senator also worked to effect the free entry of
gypswm used in agricultural fertilizers because for the South it
20Ibid., 30:2:1498, 1629.
inadequacy of the home market to absorb agricultural products. He ran
Westemers complimented the arguments of their southern
the risk, Allen knew, of alienating Middle Western Populists if he
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colleagues. As spokesman for the West, Senator Allen stressed the
of their own party, would doubtless look askance upon any plans to
advocated bounties for agriculture. The "middle of the road Populists lt
constituted a southern agricultural ,tnecessity.tt2l
whose conservative views led them to oppose the liberal credit proposals
foster government paternalism. But the Senator felt compelled, "because
of the failure of the government to relieve the people financially," to
insist upon the bounties. In 1894, with the promise of an income tax
, I
to aid in the more equitable distribution of wealth, had he not, the
Senator queried, voted against just such bounty proposals? The income
tax having been declared invalid, govermnent intervention must now in
some new way provide the benefits which the farmers could not otherwise
expect. 22
Certainly no help could be expected from the new tariff,
Populists maintained. The schedules of 1890 and 1897 looked like
"Tweedle Dum. and Tweedle Dee lt to the agrarians. Both tariffs protected
industry at the expense of agriculture. Further, Populists contended
that tariff legislation provided no guarantee of the economic relief
promised to agriculture by the Republican Administration. Agricultural
2lIbid., 30 : 2:2117, ibid., 30:3:2446-47.
22Cong • Rec., 30:3:2394.
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pursuits accounted for the occupation of forty per cent of the country's
laboring class, but these people were denied the benefits of Republican
legislation. Nor was it probable that benefits would accrue to the
farmers under the proposed tariff rates. "A correct principle" of
tariff construction would assess duties equal to the difference between
American and foreign labor, thus protecting both labor and agriculture.
The eXBlIlples of Russia, Austria, Germany and France proved to the detri-
ment of those countries, that high tariffs such as those proposed by the
Republicans might be compatible with 'Ithe lowest wages in the world. ,,23
23Th.e agrarians protested that drawback allowances for finished
and re-exported raw materials constituted an unfair rebate to manufac-
turers who thus escaped payment of their fair share of the revenue.
Some evidence does exist that American cotton manufacturers sought to
move their plants directly to China in order to escape American taxation
and doubtless also to tap the cheap labor supply. Bee U. S. For. ReI.,
1897, 91-92. Secretary Olney stressed the introduction of American
manufactures there rather than of raw materials.
Populists often attempted to amend the new rates by moving to
insert the schedules of the old Wilson Bill into pertinent sections of
the new tariff scheduleso They maintained that the \>llison Bill would
be adequate "with the few changes, II and these changes frequently moved
in the direction of high tariffs. See, for example, the comments of
John MacDowell, who contrasted the wool schedules of the Dingley Bill
with what he desired for the Ohio farmers. MacDowell's desire for a
protective duty on raw wool in no way contradicted Populist attacks upon
the protection afforded to manufactured and semi-refined woolens. Bee
Cong. Ree., 30:Appendix:15-l6. See also Times, July 20, 1897, Cong.
Rec., 30:2:1793-94 for a similar argument in favor of duties on cotton
cloth. See also Cong. Rec., 30:3:2410-41.
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In reality, American diplomacy was put to considerable strain by
the passage of the Dingley tariff. Despite nmch adverse publicity given
to European nations against this country's products, the general tariff
level had risen to a maximum of less than twenty cents on the dollar in
1894, an increase of less than ten cents in ten years. Nor did this
country refuse to employ the methods of indirect discrilllination which
advocates of American retaliation offered as justification of United
States policy. Competent analysts condemned the American policy in the
face of the slow rise of the general customs tariff in Europe. The
acrimonious debates on tariff policy indicated plainly that Populists
remained critical of it as an example of class and sectional
legislation. 24
The agrarians still emphasized their contention that the tariff
remained a secondary issue and presented no remedy for their problems.
Although Populist legislators in their condemnation of tariff policy
employed their usual arguments against special privilege, they now
openly demanded a share in the high-tariff stakes. Anticipating the
Populist failure to obtain any substantial concessions, Representative
Vincent of Kansas summed up the position of his party. He desired
passage of the Dingley tariff because he hoped it would "prove embarras-
sing to the administration, II but "wouldn I t be caught voting for the
measure" in its final form. And, indeed, no Populist voted in favor of
24See , for example, Worthington C. Ford, IIA Menace to Trade,"
Nation, LXIV (June 24, 1897), 466, 67; Times, July 7, 1897.
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the final tariff conference report. 25
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25Senators Allen, Kyle, and Harris voted against the final tariff
report, while Senator Butler refused to cast his vote "since the tariff
is a political football of two parties." For examples.of this policy
see COng. Rec., 30:2:1592, ibid., 30:Append1x:98, ibid., 30:2:1590-91;
ibid., 29:1:252-53, ibid., 30:Appendix;202, ibid., 30:3:2733-34; ibid.,
3Q:3:2462-63, ibid.,~l:lOl, Times, July 20, 1897. ----
Seldom could any conflicts of interest be attributed to the
Populists, for those who might be expected to disagree simply abstained
from voting. But for the examples of sectional disagreement over the
tariff on rice, see Cong. Rec., 30:2:1589, ~., 30:2:1590-91. Such
disagreements were usually prefaced by the statement that the tariff
remained a minor issue and constituted no remedy to the farmers'
prob~ms.
In early April Consul John G. Monaghan reported Germans livery
much excited about the proposed new tariff in the United States. • ~ •
Her hopes to extend and increase her exports have been built on other
rates than reported. • •• She has greater fear of us in the future
than anyone else. If United States Congress, 55 Cong., 1 Sess. Consular
Reports. House Document 11, pt. 3 (Washington, 1897), 394.
In addition to the protests of Germany and France, Austria and
Japan entered objections to rates which adversely affected their exports
to the United States. Japanese protests over the discrimination of the
United States against Japanese silks were repelled by Under Secretary
of State William R. Day, who anticipated that the Japanese bounties
would prove a violation of the treaty of amity and commerce with this
country. The treaty would not, however, become effective until 1899.
Meanwhile, according to Section 30 of the tariff, an additional duty
equal to the amount of the Japanese bounty was added to all Japanese
silks imported here. Day charged that the object of the Japanese bounty
was to consolidate Japan's twelve million dollar silk manufactures in
the hands of Japanese middlemen. Since these. middlemen were largely
exporters, the inference plainly indicated Japanese desires to control
the market. For. ReI., 1898, 449. Fears were also expressed in this
country that Japan would turn to Russia for oil supplies if American
discri..m:Ulation against Japanese silk imports should continue. Times,
July 13, July 15, 1897. For conflict with Germany over the rates, see
For. ReI., 1897, 175-76, ibid., 179, Times, June 7, 1897.
Among domestic critics of the tariff, a connnittee of New York
merchants including Gustav H. Schwab and Lewis Windmueller protested
against the "high rates" established for raw materials, and urged ·'not
free trade, but revision." Times, April 2, 1897. American lumber, too,
met new restrictions in Germany, and Germans admittedly encouraged
Russian oil imports to counteract the growing market of the Standard Oil
Company. Times, June 7, 1897; For. ReI., 1897, 241, 248; Times, May 4,
Though, in the course of debates upon tariff policy, Populist
legislators became enthusiastic over the Cuban rebellion, they refused
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Canada attempted retaliation by raising the rates for towing
charges on the Canadian side of the Great Lakes. The Canadian govern-
ment also attempted to obtain tariff concessions in return for an exten-
sion of the modus vivendi which the United States desired in the Bering
Sea. While this country agreed to IItreat reciprocity with the seals, II
adm:ittedly the arrangement held "little promise of satisfactory results fl
for Canada. For. ReI., 1897, 324. Even had Canadian attempts to pre-
vent the higher duties proved successful, Canada would probably have
continued to suffer a net loss in its trade balance with this country.
The export balance in favor of the United States grew after 1885 until
by 1892 it favored this country by over 26 million dollars. Times,
March 1, 1897. --
South American delegates attending an international commercial
conference in New York at the :time of the Dingley Bill's passage went
on record as opposed to any "Monroe Doctrine in trade. tI The Brazilian
economic minister became particularly critical of the legislation.
The high rates established for low grade sugars which Brazil exported
to the United States presumably explained the strength of Brazilian
opposition to the tariff. Times, June 4, July 19, 1897.
Hand in hand with the'"'Weapon of reciprocity upon which the
Republicans relied so heavily to promote trade, there developed an
interpretation of the "most favored nations" doctrine which sought to
aSSIlre to the American export market equal trading rights with any
other nation which held special favors with a United States treaty
nation. The "most favored nation" clause, as interpreted by both
the Harrison and McKinley Administrations, required the lowering of
tariff barriers against the United States to the extent that any-
third party received special considerations not yet accorded to this
country. But the interpretation placed upon the doctrine by the
United States became a novel one. It emphasized the conditional nature
of contracts between nations. The premises it asserted permitted a
later withdrawal of the favors to others by the assertion that "a
concession to a third country in exchange for value is not a favor,
but bought and paid for." Thus similar concessions need not be
granted as a right to sister countries holding "most favored nation!1
status. Thus the interpretation moved to control the concession which
might be granted, and retain them as levers of bargaining power for the
United States. Benjamin H. Williams, Economic Forei@ Policy of the
United States (New York, 1929), 290-91.
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to believe that the policy of reciprocity advocated by Republicans
would coerce Spain into a more liberal trade policy for Cuba. But they
also failed to appreciate the Republican strategy of setting high rates
for low-grade sugars. The hopes of the Republicans became obvious when
Senators Thomas Platt and Nelson Aldrich defended such proposals.
Senator Aldrich CBJ.mly admitted that ltthe legitimate result of the
protective tax is to give the JlJnerican market to the American producer.
vllien this result is largely accomplished, the protective features of
the tariff disappear." But agrarians who favored the development of
the domestic beet sugar industry refused to support the reciprocity
stratagem, which would admit refined Hawaiian sugars into the American
domestic market. 26
In a sense, Populists who railed against the special favors
granted the sugar trust defeated their own purposes. Over one-third
of the anticipated ninety million dollar revenue would be derived from
the duties on sugar. Representative Dingley announced the twofold
purpose of the tariff to be the encouragement of American industry and
the accumulation of such a treasury reserve fund as would banish the
spectre of silver coinage. But Populists continued to clamor against
the high rates which would reduce imports and revenue even while they
begged for free coinage. Thus the often blind and unreasoning distrust
of special privilege, which even the more astute Populists made the core
26Times , April 4, May 14, 1897, Cong. Rec., 30:2:1691-92, 1696-
97, ibid., 30:3:2384, 86.
of their protest movement, led them to support an inconsistent and
short-sighted policy.27
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For their own purposes, the agrarians proposed American inter-
vention in Cuba to restore peace to the island. Stressing the American
heritage of democracy and personal freedom, Populists attributed their
Olm demands for social justice to the Cubans who struggled against
Spanish rule. Even after the Spanish government authorized the forma-
tion of a locally autonomous government for Cuba, Populists continued
to regard the Cuban rebellion as essentially a battle for govermnental
self-determination. Thus Populist legislators identified the rebellion
against Spanish rule in Cuba with their own contest to modify the pre-
vailing direction of American life from its course of centralized
industrial capitalism. Spanish military rule in Cuba was interpreted
as evidence that economic domination led to militarism. The unhappy
fEtte of Cuba would overtake this country, Populists charged, unless the
domestic reforms which the party advocated should be speedily effected. 28
This close personal identification with Cuban rebels re-inforced
the crusading zeal of Populists who continued their demands for the
enactment of specific domestic legislation designed to relieve agrarian
discontents. In Congress, Senator Allen again, in 1897, spearheaded
27Times, April 17, 22, 1897.
28Cong. Rec., 30:1 :306. See for example Allen, Cong. Rec.,
31:1:39-40. A more complete discussion of the question of political
independence for Cuba is given in Chapter VI of this thesis.
his party's attack on Spanish rule in Cuba. He and his fellow Populist
legislators, emboldened, possibly, by the increase in their number
despite the loss of the silver crusade of 1896, advocated both American
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recognition and immediate political independence for the island. The
]epublican Administration must support such a measure, Allen contended,
recalling that the Republican platform of 1896 favored Cuban
independence. The Senator brushed aside all fears that international
law might not sanction American intervention to secure Cuban freedom.
J.merican aid to Cuba became a moral duty to be undertaken for the
relief of humanity as well as the fulfillment of a pledge to voters
who cast their lot with the Republican Party on the faith that cam-
paign commitments would be fulfilled. The energetic defense which
Allen t S case for intervention aroused in the Republican camp revealed
that the double-edged thrust which called to public account the differ-
ence between the RepUblican theory and practice of politics, as well as
their alleged moral hesitancy, found its mark among Republicans. Con-
servatives attempted to defeat the attack by extending the case made
for Cuba by the agrarians to Greece, where American intervention in
defense of that kingdom against Turkish aggression would doubtless
have proved both profitless and impolitic. When baited with the issue
of intervention in Greece, Allen held himself willing to extend the
moral suasj_on of the United States throughout the world, but tactfully
restrained his passion to export American liberties, limiting himself
to the introduction of a motion formally expressing American sympathy
for Greece. Thus the agrarians justified their support of American
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intervention in Cuba by professing an allegiance to democra.cy, and a
concern for humanity. Meanwhile, their desires to participate more
fully in the determination of national policy and to become economic-
ally secure led them to support many of the measures they once
condemned. 29
While the tariff battle lines took form in Congress during May
of 1897, the Cuban belligerency resolutions reappeared, offering
Populist members of the Senate a more definite means of expressing
their choice of policies for Cuba. Populist Senators Butler, Turner,
Harris, and Heitfield favored the resolution which coupled American
recognition of Cuban belligerency with the continued neutrality of the
United States, but Senators Allen and Kyle abstained from voting. All
Populist Senators, Allen excepted, voted against submitting the
29populist sympathy for the world's poor excluded the starving
in India. The agrarians continued to oppose the shipment of relief
wheat to India in American vessels throughout 1897, though shipments
of Kansas wheat were contemplated, and later actually made. Attempts
to liberalize American ship registry laws lurked behind the congres-
sional battle over the relief shipments. The position taken by the
Populists strengthened the,hand of American naval expansionists, who
insisted that an increase in the American merchant marine was prefer-
able to extending permits for the coastal trade to vessels registered
under foreign flags. Cong. ~., 30:1:568, 69, Times, May 26, 1897,
ibid., April 22, 1897, April 17, 1897; Cong. Rec., 30:1:794. Senator
Allen saw the struggle between Greece and Turkey as one between the
forces of Christianity and paganism, but Bradstreet's reported an
increased demand for wheat in Greece and Turkey as a result of the war.
The American State Department seized this moment of struggle to exert
new pressures on the ottoman Empire in order to obtain cOl'lmlercial con-
cessions, and to secure indemnity for the massacre of American
missionaries in Harpoot•
"I.
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Congressional resolutions to the Foreign Relations Committee for
consideration. Again with the exception of Senator Allen, the Populists
voted for report to Congress on Cuban affairs by the President, should
diplomacy fail to secure the independence of Cuba "within a reasonable
time. II Allen's failure to register his vote upon the important resolu-
tions seemed strange, in the light of his previous activities, but not
so puzzling in the broader frame of Hawaiian annexation and agricultural
bounties, two problems with which his constituency was greatly con-
cerned. For the purposes of domestic politics, the Senator may well have
wished to keep the good opinion of former Republican colleagues. 30
The Populist brief for intervention in Cuba, an argument which
sought to justify intervention in the face of steadfast' Spanish refusal
to accept American interference, in effect urged upon the Congress an
act of overt hostility which would plunge this government and Spain
into a war of last resort, this at a time when the financial structure
of the government could hardly remain stable under the pressure of
inflationary wartime spending. The premises of the agrarian case
rested an several claims of doubtful validity. Populist legislators
insisted that American citizens in Cuba who were allegedly persecuted
by the Spanish government must be protected at all costs, lest national
30Cong. Rec., 30:2:1252-53.
Jerry Simpson earlier indicated his willingness to vote for
the legislation, and it would seem from the tenor of his remarks that
the agrarians no longer feared the depressing effect of India's silver
upon American wheat prices. In the Senate, Allen, Butler, Turner and
Kyle abstained from voting, while Harris and Heitfield opposed the
measure.
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honor suffer. The knowledge that many of the rebels held only nominal
""~ ",'
allegiance to the United States did not mitigate the passion of these
demands)l
Further, the violation of American treaty rights provided
adequate basis for American intervention in Cuban affairs, agrarian
legislators maintained. According to the interpretation placed upon
insurgent activities by Populists, the arrests and summar,y trials of
any and all American citizens became a violation of the Spanish-P~rican
protocol of 1877 which guaranteed to all citizens of the United States
the right to trial in courts of United States jurisdiction unless they
were captured, ltwith arms in hand," in the course of promoting
insurrection)2
31COng• Rec., 30:1:1201, 568, 69; Times, December 9, 1897, ~.
Rec., 30:2:1201, Times, April 1, 1897. Cong. Rec., 29: Index: 241 con-
tains a petition from the Nebraska Knights of Labor requesting the recog-
nition of the Cuban belligerents. Ibid., 30:1:794-95, ibid., 30:2:1178,
80, ibid., 30:2:1186. -- --
32Cong. Rec., 28:4:3078, 79, 80, ibid., Index:423 for the
petition of Kansas citizens to recognize Cuban belligerency, ibid., 30:
1:134, ibid., 28:4:3012, ibid., 30:2:1201-202; For. Rel., 1897, 751.
Cong. Re'C:"'; 30:2:l20l-02.~e period of the eighteen nineties has as:;yet,
to this writer's knowledge, escaped close scrutiny of administrative-
congressional relations, most historians being content to note the influ-
ence of the Lodge expansionists in Congress. Closer examination reveals
that one of the principal sources of the jealousy over prerogatives was
a rivalry between land expansionists over the geographical direction of
American land expansion. still another issue was the form and degree of
expansion deemed most desirable. The obvious example of· such congressional-
administrative disagreements was the difference of opinion between the
Cleveland Administration and congressional land expansionists over the
recognition of the Cuban belligerents, and Cleveland's subsequent financial
as well as commercial expansion into South America. But Congressmen
themselves held no simple, polarized set of beliefs favoring economic
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Short of outright intervention, the agrarians insisted the
United States ought at least to risk the recognition of Cuban patriots
as belligerents. Congressional appropriations for Cuban relief could
not atone for the failure of the administration to lend its moral sup-
port to the Cubans. Thus# when the Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, who was known to be in close contact with the
insurgent forces in Cuba, pleaded lack of information as the reason
for the Committee's failure to recommend Congressional legislation for
the relief of Cuba, and refused to report any of the several bills
expansion, industrial or agrarian, against land expansion, hemispheric
or global. Rather, the concept of' land expansion complimented that of
commercial and financial growth.
Much confusion appears to have ensued from the mistaken assump-
tion that a denial of expansion in one geographical direction consti-
tuted denial of the principle of' expansion (or specifically, of land
expansion) in some other direction. The history of the principle of'
expansion# as it worked from 1890 through 1898 is most clearly under-
stood as one of growth, industrial and financial, which climaxed in
land expansion. Land expansionists demanded growth in many geographi-
cal directions--South America and the Orient--and sought the support of'
those advocating naval expansion in the Caribbean and Pacific Oceans
to add a strength to their demands. Thus Henry Cabot Lodge propagan-
dized the work of'Alfred Thayer Mahan. Just as in the politics of
sectionalism, there of'ten arose conflict as to the vital importance
of expansion in, one direction at the price of' temporary stalemate
in another.
Equally important is the almost complete change in emphasis on
immediate issues of f'oreign policy between 1895 and 1898 taken by
Populist legislators. Groups which began the period as avowed domestic
economic expansionists turned, in the course of tilne# to land expansion.
Thus Populists found themselves by 1898 in the camp of the global
industrial expansionists, and more immediate'ly of' the Pacific, rather
than the Caribbean, interests. Such a view does much to explain the
growth of sentiments f'avorable to naval expansion (in the Pacific) and
the obliteration of'many of the earlier terrors of financial diplomacy
which haunted the agrarians. Indeed, their very willingness to risk
devaluation after 1896 constituted a more sophisticated consideration
of self-interest than had before been shown by members of the Populist
Party.
Ij.
,
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before the Senate which proposed American intervention, Populist legis-
lators readily supplied information and analysis to suit their conveni-
.ence. To the legal defense of the Committee that no de facto insurgent
government existed in Cuba, the agrarians replied by citing the
precedent of French recognition of the Confederate States of America,
which recognition was granted long before any perfected machinery of
government existed in the Colonies.33
After the passage of the Dingley tariff, American intervention
in Cuba became the dominant theme of Populist congressional orators.
Demands for intervention accelerated after Germaqy seized Kaichow in
November of 1897 and precipitated an open race for empire in the Orient.
The appreciative laughter of his Senate colleagues greeted the remarks
of Senator Allen when, in the first week of the new 65th Congress, he
took occasion to depart from an analysis of the economic effects of a
"porkbarrel!l soldier's pension bill to comment on foreign affairs.
"Fair prices, rt rather than currency contraction and spendthrift appro-
priations which smacked of public bribery would relieve the "crippled
33Cong• Rec., 28:4:3078-79-80, ibid., 31:1:763-64. Senator
Allen exhibited thorough familiarity with the Cameron Report, and
often paraphrased its arguments to bolster his own contentions. The
report, a study of precedence by which the United States might justify
recognition of the Cuban insurgents as belligerents, came from the pen
of Henry Adams. Adams considered it not an expression of jingoism, but
an overture for peace, designed to avert the possibilities of war with
Spain. Populists who appealed for American intervention in Cuban
affairs thus misconstrued the spirit of the document when they cited
it favorably, for Adams hoped to satisfy the war hawks with recognition
rather than military intervention in Cuba.
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condition of the country,11 Allen averred. Thus, he continued, Itwhatever
may have been our feelings on the Cuban question, however we have felt
toward Spain and the Sagasta government, it is allover with us now, and
it must be down with Spain and freedom for Cuba. I am in a hot rebellion
against Spain. 1I Thereafter the Populists pressed in a determined
fashion for intervention. Words of "hot rebellion" against the military
inactivity of the United States became frequent as agrarian legislators
saw their European agricultural competitors work rapidly to effeat the
partition of the Chinese empire)4 "I cannot conceive of aIW other
result like~ to be accomplished should our diplomacy progress backward
as rapidly in the future as it has in the past, It reflected Populist
Senator Turner of Washington. "It was without shape and form ••• a
void." The void must be filled, the Senator urged, with prompt recog-
nition of Cuban independence, before the United States entered the
conflict with Spain.
Throughout 1897 many public-spirited citizens continued to
advocate naval expansion in the Caribbean and Pacific Oceans as the
compliment to territorial expansion in Cuba, both to benefit the general
economic recovery of the united States. To accomplish their purpose,
expansion-minded legislators sought not o~ to enlarge the naval build-
ing program, but to convert the navy from its use of pure~ defensive
vessels into a modern, two-ocean, battleship force. The uncertainties
34Cong• Rec., 31:1:93, 95; ibid., 31:5:4069, 4098, ibid., 31:3:
2615, ~., 31:4:3827, 28, 29.
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of international relations and the need for adequate defensive forces
were readily advanced as justification for the enlarged naval program.
The Cleveland Administration accepted the concept of hemispheric defense
fully; and now the eager friends of naval expansion sought again to
extend the boundaries of American interests, this time into the Pacific.
In a closed world, the enlarging of any perimeter of defense necessarily
requires expansion, often into another's perimeter. Populist opposition
to schemes of the expansionists might well have centered around this
obvious relationship between defense and aggression. But the farmers
did not protest.3'
Even the initial distrust of the estimated budget for the naval
building program exhibited by Populist legislators might have been over-
come in the excitement of patriotic fervor aroused by events in Cuba,
had not the flagrant violations and abuses of govermnental contracts
by the armor plate industry aroused the ire of the agrarians against
industrial interests. It was, however, the d.esire to ease the economic
burden of their constituents by maintaining a rigid economy in govern-
ment, rather than any deep-seated aversion to naval expansion, which
hindered Populists from giving their inunediate and unqualified support
3'Recent scholarship provides evidence that naval expansion
was, however, not solely the product of jingoism, through naval expan-
sionists certainly used the war scare to facilitate the construction
of new ships. For a record of the early appeals of the expansionists,
see Robert Seager, "Ten Years Before Mahan, the Unofficial Case for
the New Navy, II Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXIX (December,
1953), 491-512.
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to the program of naval expansion sponsored by the Republican Administra-
tion. Many agrarians regarded the technological changes which so altered
the position of agriculture within the structure of the world economy
with wonder, if not respect. They remained understandably diffident,
hesitating to enlarge a naval force which might, in the near future, be
rendered obsolete, just as "the application of steam power to naviga-
tion" had revolutionized naval warfare for an earlier generation. Even
such diehard advocates of economic retrenchment as Jerry Simpson showed
an appreciation of the role of naval strength. Before the passage of
the Dingley tariff, when Republicans tried to keep military appropria-
tions at a minimum, Simpson interested himself in providing a naval
coaling station at Pearl Harbor. He chided his Republican colleagues
for their hesitation to advance along the course of naval expansion
which they plotted so assiduously. The time had come, Simpson urged,
I'to move in that direction. It At a later date Marion Butler agreed:
l'If we are to go into the land grabbing business, if we are to grab
territory and to hold it, we must have a fleet as good and better than
that of any country in the world."
Clearly, the temporizing of the agrarians resulted from their
opposition to other special interests. The price paid by the American
taxpayer for the new navy should be a reasonable one, Populists main-
tained. Until the Carnegie and Bethlehem Steel Companies supplied armor
36cong• Rec., 29:2:1202; Times, December 9, 1897, April 7, 1896,
Cong. Rec., 29:1:93-95, ibid., 30:1:1205-206; ibid., 30:):2557, ~.,
)0:): 2651-52.
I '~
legislators insisted. It seemed unreasonable to the farmers that the
American navy must pay more for the armor than foreign governments paid
plate at lower prices, Congress ought not to purchase plate, agrarian
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to the same companies. It seemed unreasonable, too, that the United
States should be expected to guarantee to the companies a profit margin
sufficient to insure construction of the manufacturing plants, in addi-
tion to normal profits. Instead of guaranteeing and paying for the
manufacturers' plants, the government might, at less expense, build its
own plants, manufacture the armor, and break the monopoly of the armor
trust. But if the price of armor plate remained exorbitantly high, then
the United States did not require "a very large Navy, II which some party
members still suspected might became the tool of domestic oppressors.
Even such a limited acceptance served as a prologue to advocacy. So the
President, while he reassured Theodore Roosevelt of his intention to
ngo on building up the navy with battleships and torpedo boats, II used
the fleet-in-being to implement American expansion: counteracting
German influence in Haiti and English pressures in the Bluefields, and,
when Germany occupied Kaichow, dispatching an American cruiser there
for the protection of the "large and growing interest" of the United
States. The crisis of 1898 would find the agrarians among the friends
of naval expansion.37
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37Ibid., 30:3:2525; Theodore Roosevelt to Henry C. Lodge,
september ~1897, in Henry C~ Lodge (ed.), Selections from the
Correspondence of lbeodore Roosevelt and Heur Cabot 10 e 1884-1915
New York, 19 , 277. Times, November 1 , December 23, 1 97. The
Department of Agriculture circular for July 19, 1898, set forth lithe
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Democrat politicians worked inroads on Republican control of
Expansion, moreover, posed an alternative to continued domestic
and national life." National policy must comprehend class and sectional
rivalries.38
he observed. "If we could quicken and increase appreciation of this
triumphs at the polls of New York, Iowa and Virginia, and further
of Nebraska, Democrats and Populist fusionists, flushed with their
the national government in 1897. Pleased with the political victory
Indeed, American intervention in Cuba became the focal point
unrest.
about which not only Populists but the major economic, political, and
rural America, bespoke a craving for participation in government which
for Populists the Jacksonian Democracy, which remained the ideology of
responsibility • • • it would go far toward improving our political
military factions of the country could be brought into harmony. And
military service would satisfy. The President, already embarked upon a
"Responsible citizenship comes from direct participation in government,"
policy of intervention in Cuba, understood how to satisfy his countrymen.
encouraged by the narrow margin of Republican success in Ohio and
remarkable manner in which American exports of wheat lt to China and
Japan has increased "in the last decade, II compensating for American
losses in the European market. Times, July 20, 1897; ibid., November 5,
1897, January 9, 1898. William Jennings Bryan flitted from the question
of silver coinage to the contraction of greenbacks, as his political
future seemed to warrant expedient.
38McKinley, Speeches and Addresses, 52. Remarks to the Commercial
Club of Cincinnati, Ohio, October 30, 1897.
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Massachusetts, William Jennings Bryan and other powerful Democratic
leaders now hailed silver coinage "as the issue of 1900." In such an
uncertain domestic political climate, the Republican Administration
could hardly feel secure. But the prospect of new markets and war-
time spending would do much to revive the Junerican economy and alleviate
discontent. Thus subsequent events soon led to the Spanish-.American
War)9
39National economic recovery from the depression was far from
complete in the fall of 1897. Though industrial production boomed, and
large grain shipments went abroad, the lack of new investments kept the
stock exchange low. Alexander E. Orr reminded his colleagues of the
l'lew York exchange that "it is certainly not s.t all fair to claim that
the prosperity of America is dependent upon prices for staples." Times,
September 8, 1897, May 9, 1897, May 15, 1897, Ju~y 6, 1897. Investment
declined steadily through 1891, reaching its low point in that year.
See the excellent article by ~arles Hoffman, ItThe Depression of the
Nineties," Journal of Economic History, XVI (June, 1956), 140-56.
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CHAPTER V
THE ADVENT OF WAR
"In civilian life the newspapers would have called it a
grand, popular movement. It will never be forgotten as
long as America has a military history. It
Stephen Crane
The Battle of San Juan
Two central themes characterize the work of American historians
who review the causes of the Spanish-American War. The first of these
elnphasizes the role of abstract forces in American culture, and con-
cludes that intellectual and emotional compulsions were largely respons-
ible for the conflict between the United States and Spain. These
historians present as crucial the individuals whom Sidney Hook calls
Uevent making, It men lito whom we can justifiably attribute preponderent
influences in determining an issue or event whose consequences would
have been preponderently different lt had they, the possessors of "out-
standing capacities of intelligence, will, and character, II not "acted
as they did. It Thus America' s entry into the race for empire in the
last years of the nineteenth century is understood as the result of the
Itself assertive egoism and altruistic idealism" of the American people,
who Itwanted war and got itt! after a "popular clamour for war. 1t
This concept of the "Martial Spirit" is complimented by another
theme, which suggests that the influenoe of Ita little group of young
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Republicans lt guided the country at one of its "TurningpointS." These
bold planners, who wove the grand design of American expansion, sought
"national power for its own s~e." The "original imperialists, It they
were motivated solely by the "political possibilities of imperialism. 11
Or, at any rate, so say some historians. The weakness of a key
decision maker, President McKinley, who evidenced "no interest in inter-
national politics,1t and possessed "no policy of imperialism on which
to stand or fall, II played into the hands of more aggressive men. The
strength of humanitarian sentiments, coupled with evidence of Spanish
bad faith disgusted Americans, and the sinking of the Maine exhausted
their patience according to oft-repeated accounts. l
The resulting implication that economic factors assumed little
importance in the sequence of events which led to the Spanish-American
War has been partially fonnalized by the thesis "American business did
not favor the Spanish-American War." Such a thesis doe s not, however,
invalidate the interpretation of H. U. Faulkner who stresses the prooli-
nence of economic causes for the war. The questions at issue between
such prominent historians as Faulkner and Julius K. Pratt are two:
lSidney Hook, The Hero in History (Boston, 1955), 53, 54; Robert
E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in American Forei n Polio (Chicago,
1953), 27, 3; John D. Hicks, The American Nation New Yor , 1949), 312;
Bemis, Diplomatic History, 4h3, 50; Walter Millf.s, The Martial Spirit
(Boston, 1931); Oscar Handlin, Chance or Destin: furnin oints in
American History (Boston, 1954), 121- 2; Foster R. Dulles, America's
Rise to World Power (New York, 1954), 39; Julius K. Pratt, Expansionists
of 1898 (Baltimore, 1936), 230-316.
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whether an economic basis for the Spanish-American War did, in fact,
exist; and whether its strength was such as to accord it first rank
among the causes which led to war. In connection with the latter
point, the immediate motives of the business comnmnity become important
to Professor Prattls thesis-that the bUSiness community did not favor
the war. 2
It must be acknowledged that, in the multiplicity of thoughts,
motives, and desires which influenced the actiVities, purposes, and
decisions, that ultimately resulted in war, the chain of causes might
be pursued to infinity. Yet governments of men dealt with the problems
and policies which led this country into armed conflict against Spain.
And an inquiry into the attitudes and activities of agrarian Populist
Party legislators in the United States suggests that economic considera-
tions had much more to do with the coming of the war than is generally
acknowledged by American historians.
At the center of a re-assessment of the importance of economic
factors which led to war lies the major change in the pattern and the
effects of recovery from business depression in the year 1897. Produc-
tion in basic raw materials and machine tool industries revived much
more quickly than did secondary and service industries, or the financial
2Harold U. Faulkner, .American Economic History (Sixth edition,
New York, 1949), 568; Hicks, The American Nation, 11.3; Richard W.
Van Alstyne, American Diplomacy in Action (Stanford, 1947), 628, Henry
S. Commager (ed.), Documents of American History (New York, 19.34), .345;
Julius K. Pratt, ".American Business and the Spanish War," Hispanic
American Historical Review (Durham), XIV (May, 19.34), 163.
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sector of economy. Strong doubts were entertained as to whether the well
publicized rise in agricultural prices which marked the pre-election
crop season of 1896 would, or ought, to be maintained. And agricultural
recovery, in terms of prices paid to agriculturalists for quantities
sold, lagged, until the stimulus of industrial exports relieved the
strain put upon agricultural credit in foreign trade. Early in 1897
American foreign trade began to show ltphenomenal exports, It and by the
end of the year the flood of goods to foreign markets could be termed
an "American invasion" of the overseas trade. Long jealous of
England's productive capacity, spokesmen for American manufacturers
became exuberant as this country's industrial output advanced. Produc-
tion received a further stimulus through the passage of the Dingley
Tariff, with the result that producers, now relieved of the dangers of
foreign competition in American home markets, turned their chief atten-
tion to the expansion of international trade. The United States,
editorialized trade publications, found itself engaged in a "war of
extermination" with England for no less stake than control of the
world's commerce.3
To be sure, industrial interests recognized that ltwe shall be
obliged to compete for a proportionate share of the foreign trade of
3Times, June 16 1897, Alfred D. Noyes, Forty Years of American
Finance (New York, 1909), 213, Engineering News (Chicago), LXIV
(September 3, 1897), 618. See the bibliography of this thesis for
trade journals consulted.
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the world. If we are to be successful in the competition it must be
carried out on scientific lines and on a liberal scale. No half meaSlres
will suffice; and it may as well be written down at once" that if we are
ever to create and control markets on the vast scale that marks the
opposition of Great Britain, we shall have to adopt her methods." But
the hopes of even the most cautious were buoyed by the conviction that
the ingenuity and native superiority of the American people could
successfully overcome all opposition.4
But always there lurked in the minds of economic expansionists
the fear that foreign buyers would prefer the development of their own
colonial areas to the purchase of American goods. This very fear,
therefore, prompted acclamations of delight when England brought "money
to the United States, instead of to Spain or Africa, If for the purchase
of iron ore. Such transactions were interpreted as a conclusive
r
4Scientific American (New York), LXXVII (July 24, 1897), 50.
J. Stephen Jeans was a typical evangelist of the new overseas economic
expansion. In lengthy and facile statements of faith, he assured
readers of the Engineering Magazine that the United States might count
upon its own 'tFuture Supremacy in the Iron Markets of the \..rorld. '1
England could not effectively maintain that leadership because, accord-
ing to Jeans, "the insular prejudices and complacent self-sufficiency of
the average Britain have long hindered him from understanding, or even
admitting, the possibility of other nations ultimately occupying fields
of industrial activity that he has for generations been accustomed to
look upon as entirely his own. It If proof of such contentions seemed
necessary, one had but to point to the market price of steel, set by
an American firm at a figure below that of British rivals in the very
month Jeans' first article appeared. Engineering Magazine (New York),
XIV (November, 1897)" 196; Brooks Adams, The New Empire (New York,
1903), 199.
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demonstration that the United States might successfully leap its
geographic boundaries "into :foreign markets after buying American stock."
TIle results of the new productivity vindicated the hopes of the most
optimistic. Dunn &Bradstreet reported that from August, 1897, to
Janu~, 1898, three hundred twenty million dollars in deferred credits
accrued to New York banks alone.'
Thus it proved expedient for the American State Department to
alert exporters as to the nature and extent of foreign markets for
American products. The Department undertook to help producers ":find
markets for surplus productivity by getting and spreading information
concerning them. It The collection of a special series of Consular
Reports on money and prices underscored the new overseas economic
orientation of the United States.6
Yet this pattern forecast the tri1Ul1ph of the administration over
its agrarian critics. For no new demands were presented by the Populists,
whose principle concern now became to prevent retrenchment, rather than
to demand further concessions. The agrarians were concerned lest the
polic,y o:f gold redemption for greenbacks should further contract their
money supply, and an inflationary issue of bank paper then completely
entrap agriculturalists. These economic groups most heavily dependent
upon the money supply would be forced, the agrarians insisted, to pay"
~ew York Times, January 1, 1898, Bradstreet' 5 quoted in Times,
January 1, 1898. -
6 .
Times, November 18, 1897. See for example United States
Congress, §eecial Report •
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interest upon credit in order to meet their needs. To the distinction
made by the administration between credit, to which was charged the
function of maintaining financial elasticity, and the supply of money,
which would serve as an independent and stable fund for transfer
payments, Populists replied, as was their wont, that an insufficient
money supply drove them to purchase money through credit, upon which
interest was charged. Hence J they reasoned, banks could still charge
for the use of money. 7
It is significant that the final report of the Indianapolis
Monetary Conference, submitted by J. Lawrence Laughlin, revealed sharp
disagreement among the members of the Commission as to the wisdom of
permitting the government to augment at will the available money supply
by the purchase of bonds in return for United States Notes. This pro-
vision, section 14 of the Report, placed power in the hands of the
secretary of the Treasury to meet the demands of western and southern
interests for relief from exorbitant interest charges. But the power
remained permissive, not mandatory. And it was left to succeeding
administrations to grant the wishes of the agrarians. Not until
l,oloodrow Wilson established the Federal Reserve System were Populists
rewarded in their attempts to secure the decentralization of govern-
mental treasury deposits so as to provide more immediate government
7Cong• Rec., 31:5:5751-52; 31:2:1167; ~., 31:7:6747-48.
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Meanwhile, the shift in emphasis from consumption to production
entailed a further problem of distribution. Someone must purchase iron
and steel and consumer goods. The home markets, which a combination of
depression and the Dingley Tariff finally assured to American producers,
threatened to prove an empty prize; an assured market barren of pur-
chasers, or at least devoid of sufficient business to support with
profit the, newly rationalized industry which survived the period of
depression. '!'he Iron Age neatly summarized the thesis: ltBold as the
assertion seems, the matter of declining prices is one that need not
give us concern, since it is comprehended in that of satisfactory
distribution. It Likewise" agricultural exports agreed that the solution
to overproductivity must come in cheaper prices and increased exports:
l~eat has got to go lower. It must sell at a price where exporters
will take it, no matter what that price may be, n concluded a leading
grain speculator. And the large-scale returns from the purchase of
American breadstUffs by England, which might have been realized in
increased domestic farm prices, were instead reinvested Ilin paying off
old debts and acquiring productive securities. 1t The Populist Kansas
City Star observed of the new expansion that "it is worth while to pay
some attention to other than home markets ••• if' energy was directed
toward cultivating instead of restricting foreign trade" there would,
8James L. Laughlin, Relort of the Indianapolis Monetary
Commission (Indianapolis, 1900 , Preface, iii.
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Meanwhile, the financial interest welcomed the pa.ssage of the
Dingley Tariff, which it hoped would stimulate new investment. But in
spite of their hopes, Wall Street Itremained blue." An accelerated trans-
fer rate in securities reflected the growth of commercial and industrial,
rather than new financial, activity. Throughout 1897 and into February
of 1898, money remained cheap, bonds commanded average interest rates of
only 2! per cent, and "1ittle other investment" took place. Already the
new corporations were assuming an importance paramount to the financial
power which spawned them. lO
Moreover, the administration's estimate of increased government
revenues in consequence of the new tariff legislation was also proved
wrong. The prediction of a substantial increase had been based on the
assumption that the level o:f Ilimports by article II would remain relatively
constant to the level for the fiscal year prior to the passage of the
tariff. If the error of this assumption was not obvious to the majority
of the House Committee on Ways and Means which frBllled the legislation,
it became apparent shortly after the passage of the Dingley bill. The
Treasury deficit continued, and the import level on high tariff
9Iron Age (New York), LXXVII (December 23, 1897), 20; Henry D.
l'1cCord, President of the New York Produce Exchange, quoted in New York
Times, April 10, 1897. Kansas City Star, quoted in Iron Age.
10Times, November 28, December 26, 1897; January 3, January 14,
February 3, 1898.
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commodities declined relative to the ever increasing American trade. 11
The additional stockpiling of goods by importers before the
passage of the new tariff law still further discouraged imports. And
the situation became further aggravated. ~ December, 1897, even the
Bulletin of the American Iron and Steel Association reported that
l'prices for most manufactured goods have fallen so low in this oountry
that a moderate tariff would protect" basic industries from the threat
of foreign competition. Thus tariff rates originally pegged at non-
prohibitive levels for the purpose of revenue collection became, in
effect, prohibitive to foreign imports. But the administration in late
August removed all immediate danger of further depletion of the Treasury
reserve by its receivorship sale of the Union Pacifio railway.12
Not until the end of the Congressional session did an oppor-
tunity present itself for debate upon the projected railway sale. No
l~cKinley, Speeches and Addresses, 29, remarks to the
Philadelphia l'fuse'Wlls and Manufacturers' Clubs, June 2, 1897; United
States Congress, Pro osed Revision of the Tariff--Revenue and Protec-
tion. House .Report 1. Cong., 1 Sess. Washington, 1 97 , 1- •
12Bulletin, quoted in the Nation (New York), LXV (December 6,
1897), 465, Times, September 1, 1897. The accumulation of a treasury
surplus must""""'iiiVe proved a relief to Speaker of the House Thomas B.
Reed, who held jingo legislation in abeyance throughout 1897. Reed,
who regarded the Cuban belligerency resolutions in the light of "a man
who cannot get the Dingley appropriation through If noticeably relaxed
his efforts to prevent debate upon the administration I s conduct of
foreign affairs. But the speaker still refused to permit any amend-
ments to current legislation which might involve the United States
militarily in Cuba. See also Times, May 21, 1897.
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special place on the agenda appears to have been reserved for discussion
of railway affairs, and it is notable tha.t the Populists, long time
critics of railway policies, abstained from the introduction of any
legislation designed to prevent the sale, or to restrain the executive
from disposing of Railway properties. Even the usual bills calling for
Government ownership of railways failed to materialize, the usual
dilatory tactics of the agrarians being all but abandoned. But in a
last feeble protest against the Republicans, Senators Allen and Butler
rallied to protest the sale upon grounds of public policy.13
Sale of the railways would divest the Federal government of its
lien upon one of the major communications systems of the United Stateso
The Senators protested that their party's insistence on settlement of
the railway debt had never included such governmental relinquishment of
claim to the lines. Populists instead envisioned governmental operation
of the roads. Confident that governmental operation would prove more
economical than private enterprise in this field of public utility, the
agrarians proposed to use the economic administration of the Federal
government to force down the rates of competing lines, as well as to
provide the government with a steady and reliable source of income
which would "in time fl discharge the debt owing to the United States by
the railway company. Government operation of the lines would thus
"settle the question" of the practicability of Federal operation "by a
fair test.!! And the procedure by which the Federal government advanced
13 • 6 8Cong. Rec., 30.3:2 1 •
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its prosecution of the railways drew further criticism upon legal
grounds. By ordering the Attorney General to enter the United States as
a party seeking legal redress against the railroad, the President placed
the Federal government in the jurisdiction of a Federal court, which, it
was intimated, would hardly refuse to permit bankruptcy proceedings when
such a decision was clearly desired by the railways as well as by
Congress.14
The agrarians presented no outright demands for a change of venue
or of jurisdiction in the court action. But they did protest the valua-
tion placed upon the road by the Federal Court, which accepted the
figures of the reorganization committee. Figured on its original
investment and interest accrued therefrom, the United States lost nothing.
Calculated on the basis of contemporary capitalized values, the Populist
Senators estimated that the United States would lose approximately fifty
million dollars. The Senators deplored the unseemly haste with which the
administration reduced the inflated valuation upon which private owners
had for so long assessed profit. lS
But revenues provided from the railroad sale became a necessary
link in the financial stability of the McKinley Administration, and
without this link, the embryonic policies of the administration could
not mature. Contrary to the President 1 s forecast that "with the passage
of the tariff we will have business confidence and industrial prosperity"
the tariff revenues of the Dingley Act proved insufficient to
l4Ibid., 30:3:2618, 2630.
lSIbid.
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governmental needs. Caution, therefore, remained the byword of
American policy with respect to military expansion into Cuba. !tIt may
not reasonably be expected that a policy of mere inaction may be safely
prolonged," commented the Secretary. "There lies the larger problem of
intervention, which the President does not now discuss. It But with a
bankrupt railroad providing revenue for the Goverrunent, American policy
makers moved quickly to drive Spain from the island. The United states
delivered a verbal ultimatum to Spain demanding that she pacify the
islands of Cuba upon .American terms, and shortly thereafter, informed
the major European powers of its intentions to effect the pacification
with United States forces, should Spain fail to meet American demands.16
These demands precipitated the resignation of the Conservative
ministry of Spain, and were in turn succeeded by the rise to power of
the Spanish Liberal Party. The successors, in a desperate effort to
forestall the intervention of the United states in Spanish affairs, pre-
sented a scheme of limited self-government to the Cuban rebels. All
Spanish plans, however, called for Madrid to direct Cuban commercial
policy. As part of the Spanish attempt to retain control in the
island, and in order to halt the seemingly uncontrollable inflation in
Cuba wlrl.ch resulted from the circulation of depreciating silver coin
and silver-backed paper specie, the Spanish government at the same
time entered into an arrangement with the quasi-governmental Bank of
16For• ReI., 1898, 599, ibid., 568. See correspondence of
July 16, 1897, and September 20,1897; Dawes, Journal, 123.
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Spain for the issue of one hundred million dollars in gold backed notes.
The branch bank of Havana demanded and received in payment for
these services the management of the Cuban treasury and all public
lotteries, including franchise for "other public concessionsu in mining
and transportation. In return, the bank undertook to withdraw from
circulation silver-backed currency equal to the amount of gold notes
issued. Such a measure would presumably stabilise Spanish exchange
rates, and further assure control of Cuban commerce to Spain, counter-
balancing the disequilibrium between American and Spanish currencies.11
Spanish attempts to stop inflation in Cuba met final defeat
in early January, 1898, when the House of Rothchild, long time finan-
ciers of Spain, refused to extend further credit. The defection of
the Rothchild allegiance was hardly surprising in view of an earlier
intimate connection established between American representatives of
the banking house and the Cuban revolutionaries. Rumors adrift in 1896
that Ita group of New York bankers" had successful17 effected the pur-
chase of Cuban public utilities and trade concessions took added mean-
ing when August Belmont and Company, Rothchild representatives, under-
wrote a special bond issue in the United States for the revolutionary
l7Times, November 13, 11, 1897, Nation, III (December 2, 1891),
429; Times, November 4, 1897. The extent of foreign trade channeled
thrOl1gh Cuba may be judged from the following figures: During the fis-
cal year of 1897 the National Bank of Spain sent to Cuba];. 4,800,000 in
coin, and );, 1,600,000 in bills on Havana. But this amount includes sums
used in maintenance of Spanish troops in the islands. Times, March 22,
1898.
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Though these bonds commanded an extremely poor market because of
the uncertain financial conditions of the period, and sold at a price
greatly below par, Be]mont and Company compounded its risk by assuming
the obligation for the unsubscribed balance of the issue. Thus in a
period of poor investment opportunities, diplomacy and finance could
well be served in Cuba by the American bankers, who held important
rank within the Democratic Party. Benjamin Guerra, pro-autonomist
18According to the provisions of the trade treaty proposed by
Spain for Cuba, a re-export tax of 30 per cent would be assessed on all
non-Spanish goods transshipped via Cuba, as well as upon all products
Ilin which Cuba is discriminated against." Spain rejected the most
favored nation policy of the United States in favor of the application
of maximum. and minimum tariff rates to all imported products. The
Spanish government proposed to apply maximum rates to the products of
all countries whose policies it classed as discriminatory. Thus the
Spanish Minister's authoriz.ation to ltmake all concessions possible" to
the United States proved a barren power. Retention by the United States
of the reciprocity provision in favor of Hawaii would have placed the
United States in the classification of a discriminating power. And
additional proposed export tax upon Cuban tobacco aimed at curtailing
the Cuban tobacco trade with the United States. There are indications
that the Spanish embargo on the Cuban tobacco crop was an effort to
cripple the insurgents financially. The bulk of the Cuban tobacco
crop was absorbed by east coast cigar makers, whose trade suffered in
consequence of the Spanish 1896 embargo on leaf tobacco. Cigar makers,
many of whom were Cuban expatrates, worked diligently for the interven-
tion of the United States in Cuba, and many Cuban employees in the
industry rendered financial aid to the insurgents. New York Times,
September 23, 1897, John C. Appel, ltThe Unionization of the Florida
Cigar l'1akers and the Coming of the War with Spain, I' Hispanic American
Historical Review, XXXVI (February, 1956), 38-49; Times, May 25, 1896,
March 21, 1898. -----
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leader of the Cuban Junta, alleged these ItAmerican financiers lt so
anxious to help Cubans that they were IIwilling to pay $2,000,000 for
$10,000 'Worth of bonds." The refusal to grant Spanish credit became
the logical extension of an understandable desire to promote Cuban
autonomy by financial coercion rather than war so long as there remained
any possibility that the correlary to armed intervention might be the
monetization of silver. 19
While Spain struggled to hold Cuba, the sequence of events
in the Orient worked to crystallize American policy. German efforts
to carve a permanent sphere of influence in China through the occupation
of the strategically located and commercially valuable port of Kaichow
stimulated the activities of those Americans who hoped to generate a
corresponding policy for the United states. Furthermore, in early 1897,
Japan laid plans to abandon silver specie and return to the gold
standard. This financial about-face 'Would do much to consolidate
Japanese domestic industries, albeit at the expense of an immediate
19Times, November 13, 1897, January 3, 1898. For example,
four million dollars in silver coin were exported by Spain to Cuba
"for war purposes. It Among the recipients of these funds were Texas
cattlemen who found markets for an average of five hundred head of
cattle per 'Week in December of 1897, with "more and larger orders
expectedll from the Spanish army. Times, December 26, 1897. Signifi-
cantly, the United States representative of the Rothchilds was August
Belmont and Co., the firm which earlier carried the Junta bond issue
to successful conclusion, and with whose senior partners Edward Atkins
remained on intimate terms. Leland H. Jenks, Our Cuban Colony (New
York, 1928), 56, 138, 319, note 12, Times, April 19, 1896; For. Re1.,
1897, 268, 69, United States Congress, special Report, 323, 25.
contraction in Japanese trade and conmerce with China. American State
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Department reports concluded that "no change in the value of silver has
had an appreciable effect ••• it is noticeable that when silver has
depreciated abroad, its purchasing power in China for articles of
domestic production and its value for the payment of wages have not
diminished. This is particularly noticeable in the cotton goods. II It
became obvious that the United States might profitably step into the
void created by the temporary release of Japanese markets in China. 20
2°Germany 's domestic consolidation as well as her foreign expan-
sion caused alarm in the United States. Agents of the New York Life
Insurance Company, which dealt extensively in northern Germ~, sug-
gested, in March of 1898, after an unsuccessful diplomatic bout with
the German government in the course of which the American company and
several of its associates were excluded from Germany, that all German
shipping be banned from American ports as a retaliatory measure. Tin~s,
March 13, 1898. The exclusion seems to have been a part of German
government policy which sought to linlit the influence of all foreign
interests as a complement to Germany's industrial boom.
American diplomats William V. Allen and Charles Denby differed
radically in their opinions as to what strategy would best advance the
interests of the United States in Asia. But both men exerted strenuous
efforts to establish an American sphere of influence in China and Korea.
As IVJ:inister to China, Denby skillfully reinforced the long established
policy of the United States which favored a weak China on the theory
that commercial concessions might be more easily coerced from a weak
nation than from a major power. The United States, therefore, supported
Japan against China, even while this country backed China against the
European powers who would dismember the Empire. Allen sought to defeat
Japanese designs on Korea, however, and to establish American supremacy
there. Therefore, he proposed to lend the support of the United States
to an autonomous Korean government, in spite of Chinese claims of sover-
eignty over Korea. To this end he attempted cooperation with Russia in
order to limit Japanese power in Korea, but he succeeded only in provok-
ing an official reprimand for his conduct. But for the efforts of both
Allen and Denby to gain advantages from the internal turmoil of the
Chinese Empire, see For. ReI.,' 1897, 75, ibid., 1898, 88. See also Fred
H. Harrington, God Mammon and the Ja anese:" Dr. Horace N. Allen and
Korean-American Relations, 1 -190 l'1adison, 19 Consular Reports,
January, 1896, 82, 83. Russia too resumed gold specie payments in
January of 1898. Times, January 7, 11, 1898.
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But the ascent of German influence there posed a threat to
American ambitions. German trade with China expanded rapidly after
the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War, and continued to develop in
Ita far more favorable manner" than her trade with other colonial areas.
Germany's bid for a sphere of influence in China was obviously
strengthened by this notable increase in the German-Chinese trade. No
less eager than Germany to expand her strategic and economic position,
Russia, too, sought the prospective wealth of the Chinese trade, brav-
ing even the I1pi tfalls of financial diplomacyll to win the prize. 2l
In accord with traditional American policy, American diplomats
in eastern Asia counteracted the threatened partitions of Asian markets
among the European powers with Vigorous efforts to facilitate American
commercial expansion. Chinese markets became increasingly attractive
to the United States as the productivity of this country mounted.
Indeed, the reserve of natural resources in the Mongol Empire might
supply requisite raw materials for the American productive plant under
a plan which called for the proposal of exchanging American lloverproduc-
tion l1 in trade, flif not in absolute sales." In an early report sub-
mitted to the MCKinley Administration, researchers of the American State
Department listed the apparent exhaustion of "certain raw products lt
available in the Orient as one of the principle causes of the business
2lCharles Vevier, The United States and China, 1906-1913
(New Brunswick, 1955), viii.
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contraction of the nineties. Certainly free access to available sources
of raw materials was vital to an:! production-geared economy. Thus the
United States continued to assert a vital interest in the future of
China. 22
It is necessary, at this point, to correlate American activity
in Asia with the crisis over Cuba. For American policy makers, business-
men, and politicians alike were viewing both regions as vital to the
drive for increased exports. For proponents of hemispheric economic
expansion, for naval expansionists; for agrarians desirous of an
isthmian canal, and ,for exporters covetous of the Pacific trade; for
manufacturers in search of raw materials; for humanitarians bent upon
the alleviation of misery; for politicians in search of the issue which
might divert constituents from discontent with the representatives of
democratic government, for all of these Cuba loomed suddenly as an
important answer to their difficulties, and the President, upon the
assumption of his office, promised to secure the island. A scheme of
financial refonn which would permit financial expenditure without dis-
astrous inflation was almost perfected. The activities of foreign
powers in Asia threatened American interests. All these factors worked
to focus American interest on Cuba.
As the last weeks of 1897 passed the speed-up orders for naval
armaments and surveys of Cuban fortifications and topograph3" by the
22United States Congress, Special Report, 211, ibid., Consular
~rts, June, 1896, 9,.
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United States Navy constituted tacit admission that the McKinley
Administration geared its policy to intervention in Cuba as soon as
it became feasible. On November 5, a group of New York merchants
petitioned Spanish officials in Cuba, demanding "improved trade rela-
tiona" between the United States and Cuba. But three weeks later such
petitions were unnecessary. The Produce Exchange of New York then
abandoned plans to compile ltthe views of fifty New York merchants" on
Cuban affairs for the ex-Spanish J.'Iinister of Finance. Andrew D.
White openly justified American intervention in Cuba as requirements
of "humanity and commercial interests. It Christmas drew near. But in
this traditional season of peace toward all men, even the American
pleas for peace carried ominous overtones. A petition of the New York
Chamber of Commerce called for the enlistment of four thousand addi-
tional artillery men in order to preserve national "defenses. 1t
Chauncey De Pew might perhaps have employed this additional defensive
force in his search for "peace that may capture the markets of the
world, peace that this country may find the places where its surplus
products, not only of food, but of labor, may meet with a profitable
return. tI From his vantage point within the IllfcKinley cabinet, Charles
Dawes found Itthe President t s position on the currency and Cuba" widely
endorsed by the press. 23
23Times , November 3, 9, 10, 1897; ibid., November 5, 7, ll,
1897, December 6, 24, 1897, Dawes, Journal, 138, 46.
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'While the President and Congress bickered and dickered over the
terms of monetary legislation, a new burst of activity in Asia resulted
in the lease of Kaichow to Germany by China, and a tripartate agreement
between Britain, Germany and Japan to apportion the authority over
Chinese customs among the three powers. What seemed even more dangerous
to the interests of the United States in the Orient, Britain appeared to
abandon her policy of the Open Door after unsuccessful efforts to obtain
an American alliance in Asia when British troops landed there to protect
English interests. The United States countered this threat to partition
eastern Asia by dispatching the Battleship 14ai.ne to Cuba. Subsequent
events gave English diplomats ample opportunity to assert that they,
like George Canning, called upon the new world to redress the balance of
the old. The intervention of the United states in Asia became the high
point of an informal alliance consummated at a time when the conflicting
aims of American and British diplomacy could be reconciled to mutual
advantage. Then the United States paralleled British imperialism with
a claim to the Caribbean, and poised itself for war with Spain. 24
The sinking of the Maine three weeks after it was dispatched
to Havana harbor forced an amplification of American policy which the
administration, because of the stalemate in its domestic financial
legislation, remained loath to undertake. In favor of military action
24John Hay reported that the IIhigh point" of British-American
friendship climaxed in May of 1898. The fluctuations in the British
reaction to the .American-Spanish War are chronicled in J. Fred Rippy,
"European Powers and the Spanish American vlar, It James Sprunt Historical
Studies (Raleigh), XIX (1927), 22-52.·
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against Spain the administration bought time with the plea that war
would be justifiable only when a complete report on the circumstances
of the disaster should be obtained. A naval board of inquiry promptly
commenced hearings to determine the nature of these tlcauses. lt The
administration thus forestalled any immediate congressional declaxations.
The spur to domestic economic recovery provided by the appropriation,
at the President's request, of fifty million dollars for defense pur-
poses, to be "expended at the discretion of the President" offered
temporar.r respite from congressional criticism. But far from distract-
ing the congressional war hawks from their immediate objective of inter-
vention in Cuba, the appropriation served instead to point up the corre-
lation between domestic prosperity and milit~ expenditures. Even
Populists approved. The appropriations passed unanimously in the House
of P£presentatives. 25
Congressional activities during the month of January doubtless
contributed to the anxieties of conservatives and expansionists alike.
The last day scheduled for congressional debate over the recognition
of Cuban belligerency, January 21, was the same day that the Congres-
sional Cormnittee ended its hearings on currency reform. But debate and
Committee hearings were proving fruitless, for the stalemate in the
House Committee on Banking and Currency which followed the President's
second financial message again underscored the strength of the silver
forces in Congress. Therefore to break the deadlock Senator Wolcott
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at long last scheduled an official statement to Congress on the work of
his late committee in its efforts to secure an international silver
standard. 26
From the inception of their efforts, the members of the
President's special committee realized, Wolcott asserted, that "true
bimetallism" would probably a:bJays remain lIout of the question lf for
England. The group therefore had directed its efforts to the arrange-
ment of a supplementary system of silver coinage paralleling that of
the Latin Union. The Union, an international economic organization
which after 1868 included the states of France, Belgium, Italy,
Switzerland, and Greece, and whose policies attracted the informal
adherence of "several South American states lf as well, had, in spite of
the decline in the bullion price of silver after 1873, maintained with
considerable success the use of fractional silver currency. 27
Treaty arrangement specified the ratio of silver bullion to be
coined and honored among the member nations, while France, the most
powerful financial nation of Union, lent her prestige to the stabiliza-
tion of this intra-Union commercial currency by holding a specified
fraction of the reserves of the Bank of France in silver bullion.
Questions of policy had plagued the functioning of the Union, even as
they plagued non-member nations. Debtor nations naturally preferred an
inflationary currency, while creditors fought to keep currency dear.
26Times, January 4, 1898, January 18, 1898, January 21, 1898.
27Times, January 8, 18, 1898; ·H. Parker Willis, A History of the
Latin Monetar'YUnion (Chicago, 1901), 228.
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Adjustments were of necessity made from time to time with France, the
creditor nation of the Union. Even so, member nations retained the use
of commercial and fractional silver currency, and were for the most part
relieved of the commercial paralysis which heretofore accompanied spas-
modic contractions of the currency whenever the market relationship of
gold and silver shifted significantly, or for any appreciable period of
time. 28
Certainly the United States proved a persistent advocate of an
inflated currency. \'\folcott: and his committee sought in 1897 to persuade
England, the recognized center of international finance, to prime world
trade by funding a part of her reserves with silver, as had France, and
then to enter into an agreement to honor the circulation of a specified
amount of silver coin for commercial purposes. But still fearful lest
devaluation of her gold reserves accompany such adulteration, England
rejected all inflationary schemes. Considering the relative tendencies
of American manufacturers to expand at a greater rate than those of
Great Britain and the stimulus to American manufacturing which would
result from such measures, the British refusal to pursue bimetallism
in 1896 was hardly surprising. But Wolcott charged the defeat of his
committee 's purposes to the assurances offered abroad by Secretary Gage
and other American financiers that, domestic ownership of this country's
industries now being secured, tfformer sentiments" in favor of
28Times January 8, 1898, January 9, 1898.
-'
".
\
bimetallism no longer existed. 29
In an evaluation of United States policies since 1892, the
Senator cited the British closure of India's mints to silver coinage,
and the antagonism to American commercial activity occasioned by the
passage of the Dingley tariff as major deterrents to international
cooperation. Wolcott roundly condemned current proposals for a new
issue of gold-redeemable government bonds, as an easy victory for
monometallists, "not reconcilable with the administration's policies. u
But clearly the message was intended to write a final, if bitter end-
ing to the program of silver monetization, and to pave the way for
new compromise legislation.30
lvIeanwhile, Populists countered the gold bond legislation with
demands for free silver coinage "supplemented by a safe national paper
money." Their measure received prompt endorsement from Republican
silverites, many of whom now vociferously echoed Senator Wolcott's
condemnation of monometallism, and conveniently ignored the direction
of the Senator's remarks. To less enlightened partisans, Jerry Simpson,
for example, the President's promise that the public credit would be
upheld "in the dearest money in the worldlt smacked of ltdresscoat
anarchy. tI Much more to the taste of all silverites and Populists were
clearly drawn statements of purpose such as the Teller Resolution,
which called for the payment of all interest on government bonds in
29Ibid•
30Ibid., January 9, 1898.
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"coin l! as the sponsors o.f the bill deemed necessary. In spite of the
unanimous advocacy of the latter proposal by congressional Populists,
the bill met de.feat in the House of Representatives through the refusal
of that body even to consider its passage.31
But in the Senate, where the measure originated, the votes of
Populist Senators helped to effect passage of the bond legislation over
the opposition of conservatives. To defeat this purpose all Populists
opposed the amendment that one dollar in gold be established as the
equivalent to one dollar in silver. Though this amendment passed" the
agrarians rallied to oppose the scheme of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge"
which would have permitted the payment of interest on bonds "in gold
coin or its equivalent." They also voted to table the proposal of
Senators Matthew Quay and George Hoar" who submitted to a test vote of
confidence the Presidentts determination that payment be assured to
bond holders in money at lithe highest point in the world. It Nor could
a seeming compromise be effected by Senator Spooner" who sought a
guarantee of gold redemption until an international silver agreement
should come into operation. .Yet all Populist senators consistently
agreed to accept an issue of government bonds which would permit the
administration to proceed with the measure it deemed necessary for the
stabilization of national monetary policies if the limited commercial
3lTimes" January 29" 30" February 1, 1898.
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use of silver were accepted.32
Secretary Gage replied promptly to the critics of the Republican
Administration. Speaking to the Chamber of Connnerce of Cleveland, Ohio,
shortly after Wolcott's message, Gage rejected the compromise bond bill.
The adoption of a bimetallist policy by the United States, the Treasury
Secretary insisted, would prove "dangerous in world tradeI' since any
change in monetary values must cause a derangement of prices "not to
our advantage" in the export trade. Gage further stressed the need for
growth of the "South as a manufacturing agent lt in order that a rational
economic system for the country might be deve10ped. 33
Gage repelled the criticism of those southerners, who, offered
the choice between northern industrial carpetbaggery and Bourbon rule,
preferred the local tyrannies. The economic consequences of the invest-
ment of northern capital after the Civil War stood proof of the superior
economic rewards of an industrial society, while the South now enjoyed,
thanks to northern capital, a "greater prosperity than at any time since
1873," according to the Secretary. Thus it became clear that from the
administration point of view the future of the South called for the
development of a mixed economy in which the interest of northern indus-
trial capital would wield predominant power. White House conferences
32Times, January 29, 1898. It may be inferred that the stimulus
of government bimetallism under the "limping standard" would offset the
contraction of greenbacks and national bank notes under the program. for
reform favored by the administration.
33Times, March 19, 20, 1898. The rise, growth, and effects of
southern industrialization are brilliantly chronicled in 1oJi1bur J. Cash,
The Mind of the South (Anchor Edition, New York, 1954), 180-221.
the President's plea for time that Senator .Redfield Proctor betook
I inquired in regard to autonomy of men of wealth,• •
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with congressional leaders of the Foreign Relations and Finance
Conmittees followed closely upon Gage's address, and within three
days an administration-sponsored currency bill providing for the
redemption of National Bank Notes along lines earlier suggested by the
President was reported to the House.34
It was during the lull in congressional activity occasioned by
legislation had been introduced to the Congress did Senator Proctor
make his report to that body on Cuban conditions. Of the responses to
34Times, March 23, 22, 24, 1898.
several of them known autonomists, and several of them telling me they
leaders on the future of the island. But not until "sound'! currency
himself to Cuba in order to ascertain the opinions of influential Cuban
and men as prominent in business as any in the cities of Havana,
some of them born in Spain but Cuban bred, one prominent Englishman,
they replied that it was 'too late' for that. It Proctor's carefully
his inquiries, Proctor then noted that "most of my informants were
businessmen. •
were still believers in autonany if practicable, but without exception
prepared manuscript report urged the intervention of the United states
in Cuba. In deference to the express wishes of the President, the
put the question of American intervention Iton broader grounds than the
Senator's appeals to humanitarian as well as economic consideration
l"Iatazas and Sagua, bankers, merchants, lawyers, and autonomist officials,
..
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question of responsibility for the disaster of the Maine.,,35
The intimate contact which Senator Proctor enjoyed with con-
servative Republican businessmen, and his status as ex-Secretar,r of War
for the Harrison Administration leads many historians to infer that
Proctor's public and widely heralded approval of intervention in Cuba
constituted an open reversal of the former sentiments of the business
cOl1Urrunity. And since first advanced by Julius K. Pratt, the thesis
that American business "strongly opposed action that would lead to war
with Spain," has been widely accepted. There is considerable evidence
which contradicts this view, along with Pratt's own specific statement
that "the only important- business interests which clamored for inter-
vention in Cuba were those directly or indirectly concerned in the
Cuban sugar industry. It Indeed, Pratt's maj or the sis can be and has
been used as a device with which to exonerate the entire knerican
35It seems apparent that this famous .American ship, equipped
with ladder, detonation apparatus, a volunteer crew, and the notorious
coal bunker 16 is regarded by contemporary historians as a pet project
of the United States Navy, perhaps of its equally notorious Under-
Secretary, rather than as a reflection upon Republican policy. But the
officers of the Naval Board of Inquiry on the sinking of the Maine
refused to accept the entire credit for what might connnonly have been
regarded as a patriotic service to the country. At the conclusion of
its deliberations on the physical causes of the sinking, the Board
called upon Under Secretary of State William R. Day for testimony.
The Board required of Mr. Day only the admission that the Maine was
dispatched to Havana at the Secretary's direction, while he acted in
his official capacity. For evidence of the .iV1aine' s peculiar vulnera-
bility as well as for some evidence of foreknowledge of its condition,
see United States Congress, Record of a Procee~f a Court of Inq2ir1
••• Senate Document 207. ·55 Cong., 2 Sess. (Washington, 1897), 9-93;
Times, March 8, 9, 1898. See also T.i~es, Febru~ 21, 1898, Henry B.
Russell, The Story of Two vIars (Hartford, 1899), xlV, Dawes, Journal,
146.
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business community of any responsibility for the Spanish crisis.
Professor Pratt does not go that far, but it is only a step from his
conclusions to the notion that American business did not favor, or
even actively opposed, the Spanish-American War. A. full critique of
this interpretation is beyond the scope of this essa,.., but in view
of the growing tendency among historians to lay the war at the dGor of
the Populists, it is relevant to summarize the weaknesses of Professor
Pratt's thesis.36
The first weakness which must be noted is the gap in Pratt I s
evidence. This evidence is drawn from contemporary trade publications,
banking journals, investment publications, railroad gazettes, available
biographical materials, and stock market records. But geographically
these sources represent eastern and coastal opinion much more heavily
than inland sentiments. And when industrial and manufacturing concerns
36Julius K. Pratt, "American Business and the Spanish.Mierican
War, It Hispanic American Historical Review, XIV (May, 1934), 163-201.
The article is adapted from materi81s which appear in Julius K. Pratt,
Expansionists of 1898 (Baltimore, 1936), 230-78. For an example of the
uncritical acceptance of this thesis see Hofstadter, The Age of Reform,
47, 87, 88, 90. Hofstadter's analysis of the relationships between
the silver coinage campaign, jingoism, and expansion is uncertain and
confused. For example on page 47 of his work, Hofstadter states that
IIPopulism itself had a hard side, but it became less and less important
as it changed to the silver panacea." In following chapters the author
is forced to the admission that "Popu1i5Jll and jingoism. grew together. It
Populism, he understands, Itstood .vanguard to the Spanish American War. n
Yet the author fails to explore the relationship between 8ilver coinage
and the rise of the war hawks in Congress after 1896, and ignores the
predominantly business philosophy of the McKinley Administration.
,I, .
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are cited, they represent inland views only. Secondly, the thesis takes
no account, in sequence of time, of the deliberate and repeated demands
of the United states that Spain withdraw from Cuba which were made after
the passage of the Dingley Tariff, and after the sale of the Union Pacific
Railroads had relieved the treasury crisis.37
We !mow that Edward Atkins during the latter part of 1897, urged
President McKinley to take Cuba. This directly contradicts Pratt's use
of Atkins' material. Atkins held heavy sugar interests, it is true, but
he was, in addition, a lvIorgan partner. Pratt himself referred, but only
in a footnote, to the petition of "citizens of the United States doing
business as bankers, merchants, manufacturers, steamship owners and
agents of the cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Savannah, Charleston, Jacksonville, illew Orleans, and other places, who
have for many years been engaged in the export and import trade to
Cuba. It This petition dated l'1ay 1897, called upon the President to bring
about an Ilhonorable reconciliation between the parties in conflict"--
words which can only be interpreted as a request for the intervention
of the United States in Spanish-Cuban affairs. The New York Times
reported this memorial in its issue of May 15, 1897, and quoted the
memorialists as requesting John Sherman to "use his influence as
President to have the United states interfere" to stop the war in Ouba--
another clear call for intervention. Copies of the petition circulated
as far West as Saint LouiS, where signatures were obtained. The Times
37Pratt, Expansionists, 230-78.
«
t I
,
!.
~1 i
~.
J.'
; l
1:
149
commented editorially that t~a11 Street does not appear so much opposed
to this action as was at first believed. ,,38
Pratt interprets the petition as one local in character, and
particularistic in its demands. But prominent among the signers appears
the name of August Belmont and Company, a firm clearly not dependent upon
the local trade between the coast and Cuba for its prosperity. Several
other groups of merchants from New York and Boston, holding interest in
railways and mining, as well as sugar, also petitioned the president for
flpeace at once II because 1180 per cent of trade depends upon the sugar
crops" which were fast being destroyed in Cuba. Professor Pratt chooses
to dismiss the relationship between the loss of trade and the loss of
Cuba which the petitioners so clearly emphasized, in order to argue the
legalist position inclusio unis, exclusio alternis, a proposition hardly
contemplated by the petitioners, nor in this case borne out by much bu.t
Pratt's own theory.39
Analysis becomes redundant if, upon the examination of interests
which engaged in manufacturing, shipping, and all manner of commercial
activity, one concludes that those who favored intervention favored it
because it was to their interest to do so. That much is usually granted
in any study of pressure groups and their activities. Yet this is what
Pratt concludes. A more thorough analysis might specify that the
38pratt, IIAmerican Business and the Spanish War, II 175, 76, 77,
Atkins, Sixty Years in Cuba, 281, Times, l':Tay 15, 1897.
39Ibid., 175, 18.
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sugar-geared economy of C,'uba became of primary importance to American
producers. And even the latter thesis must be supplemented with the
admission that other pressure groups, the Florida cigar makers, for
example, favored intervention in Cuba for economic reasons of their own. 4o
Moreover, Pratt's conclusion that Republican party leader Mark
Hanna's aversion to war suffered no qualification ignores the Ohio
President-maker's consistent support of those congressional resolutions
designed to effect American intervention in Cuba without recognition of
an independent Cuban government. And a review of the biographies upon
which Professor Pratt's thesis is based indicates that neither the pass-
age of time, nor a necessary discrimination between recognition of a
Cuban autonomy and American control of Cuba entered into the analyses
which Pratt has abstracted for his own purposes. Indeed, the absence
of information is cited to verify the contention which Professor Pratt
wishes to advance. By way of contrast, Thomas Beer in his researches
found the IIsolidarity ll of Wall Street Ilimperfect" in lVlarch of 1898.
Yet his evidence is outweighed by Pratt 1 s acceptance of equally imper-
fect biographical data.4l
The erratic behavior of the stock market is used as evidence to
verify the contention that speculators generally opposed the war. But
40John C. Appell, "The Unionization of the Florida Cigar-Makers,
and the Coming of the 1-J'ar with Spain, II Hispanic American Historical Review,
XXXVI (February, 1956), 38-49.
4lcong• Rae., 31:4:3992-93, 3988-89, 4018-19, ibid., 31:5:4041;
Thomas Beer, Hanna (New York, 1929), 199-200, Pratt, Expansionists, 234,
note 12•
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evidence exists to disprove any necessarily valid relationship between
the evidence and the conclusion drawn from it. Prominent merchants
polled on the eve of the war forecast only a temporary sloughing of the
market, which they predicted would be followed by a sharp increase in
demand. Thus Evan Thomas, President of the newly organized New York
Produce Exchange, averred that "the effect on American commerce wouldn I t
amount to a row of pins. lt Rather, a war might prove beneficial, "since
demand would pick up. II Similarly C. E. Wilmot of the Produce Exchange
could foresee tlno serious interference" with the market. Frank H. Cohn
of the New York Stock Exchange agreed in the forecast that a decline in
the market would prove only temporary, should war occur. 42
The American Cotton Growers Association, organized to stimulate
the cotton market when it continued "depressed despite McKinley pros-
perity,1I must have delighted in the prediction of F. H. Price of
McCormack and Company, who heralded the possibility of war with the
prediction that I'cotton will boom, then settle. 1t Two months earlier,
in an effort to widen markets by cutting production costs and prices,
the New Jersey and New Bedford cotton mills announced wage cuts of ten
and eleven per cent respectively. These reductions, which put to
idleness 30,000 mill workers, soon resulted in strikes and labor unrest
which for a time closed most leading New England cotton mills. The
agreement finally reached between the mill owners and their employees
made full restoration of former wage scales contingent upon increased
42pratt, ibid., 234, ~J March 8, 13, 1898.
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profits III the cotton textile industry.43
By early 1898 Itbusinessmen connected with the cotton industry,
with the American-China Development Company, and with certain other
enterprises, had become convinced of the need, if the Chinese market
was to be kept open, of fundamental changes in United States policy. It
Assisted by such prominent business organs as the Journal of Commerce,
representatives of the cotton, oil, and steel industries organized "for
the express purpose of effecting a change in Far Eastern policy. II
Before the war at least ten resolutions sprang from the work of the
committee into the hands of the State Department, all of them demanding
that the administration Irmaintain and promote n their export trade.44
As the administration continued to press Spain and Cuba, other
resolutions and petitions evidenced a strong split in business opinion.
v1b.ile New Yorkers continued to complain of poor foreign trade recovery
in their city, the New York Merchants' and Manufacturers l Board of
Trade split upon the nature of a resolution it wished to pass.
President C. C. Shayne upheld the McKinley policies, while a competing
group, led by J. A. Heckman, desired recognition of the Cuban insurgents,
but opposed "any continuance of diplomatic negotiations with Spain."
The New York and New Jersey Boards of Trade called for continued support
"of the executive policy in Cuba, 'I but that bulwark of conservatism,
the Union League, pledged its "active and unwavering support of the
43Times, January 1, 17, March 13, 1898.
44Campbell, Special Business Interests, 12, 25, 26, 30.
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President, in war, if need be. lf A resolution of the New York Chamber
of Commerce applauded lithe pacific policy so widely, nobly, and patrioti-
cally adopted by President }1cKin1ey. tI It demanded that Congress "sustain
and aid the President in his patriotic endeavors. 1I Yet New Jersey
business groups were at the same time demanding the independence of
Cuba "by peace, if possible, by war, if necessary." And instigators
of a "peace" rally in Pittsburgh found their efforts stymied by the
clamor for war. The exception proved the rule. From Boston, one time
center of the now depleted Cuban trade, and home of Henry Cabot Lodge,
the Bost,on Associated Boards of Trade "representing five thousand
business finns, 1\ demanded the "President be upheld in his endeavors to
settle peaceably the relations of this country with Spain" along prior
lines of po1icy.45
Professor Pratt documents with repeated emphasis what he con-
eludes to be these peaceful sentiments of the business community. But
he lacks appreciation of the meaning of the lIargument for peace,1\ in
the context of the repeated demands that peace be secured by interven-
tion. The underlying asswnption that the United states worked for
peace in late 1897 and early 1898 attributes to the citations (as well
as to Dr. Pratt I s own conclusion) the supposition that the policies of
the United States were calculated to bring about peace. No critique of,
45Times , April 5, 10, 16, 1898; April 1, 6, 3, 1898. In a
desperate search for markets to replace the loss of Cuban trade, the
Boston Merchants Association even petitioned for renewal of Canadian
reciprocity privileges. Times, November 17, 1898.
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or departure from, this assumption is made by Pratt or the references
which he cites. But since the policies of the United States resolved
in the simple demand that Spain withdraw from Cuba, the fomal plea
for peace, in its most altruistic form, became support for the demands
made by the President. Moreover, the citations offered to defend
Pratt's thesis fall within a time when the uncertain financial legisla-
tion of the country made "peace" the byword of conservatives. Thi.s
much the author admits. Yet he does not develop the policies of the
business community except in relation to the alternatives of peace and
war.46
Evidence exists that support for the Presidential policy was not
lacking among Republicans or Democrats of inland states. In a carefully
documented survey of middlewestern opinions, George W. Auxier concludes
that editors of a representative cross section of the middlewest, though
they divided in their attitudes regarding Cuban belligerency, "seemed
primarily interested in assisting the President in bringing back
domestic prosperity." Were they merely llengaged in the Cuban trade?,,47
After the congressional appropriations for war purposes were
made, trade joumals candidly admitted that "certain limited industries, II
principally those engaged in the manufacturing of machine tools and
46pratt, "American Business and the Spanish War, II 173, ibid.,
Expansionists, 229, 237, 241. ----
47George W. Auxier, The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the
Editorial Columns of Middle Western News apers, 1895-1898 (Unpublished
Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 193 ,21, 209; Pratt,
lIAmerican Business and the Spanish War,," 163-64.
-the war. The completion of the Manchurian extension of the new
Pratt, that "railroads would lose more than they would gain lt through
Russian Trans-Siberian Railway, warned the Engineering News, would
shorten the distance to Vladivostock by nearly five hundred miles, leav-
electrical appliance industry, long depressed, received "great stimulus II
from the "rush of orders" which preceded the war. The General Electric
ing nChina free to Russia." Concrete evidence of the concern of
Company, which in January of 1898 "began with fewer orders than all past
to come of the rtnew Russian grain rate" to Manchuria and China which
dependent upon grain freight rates, the Gazette apprehended no good
electrical equipment, would benefit from the war. Among these, the
Furthermore, it seems inaccurate to conclude, as does Professor
than ever before." Boilerworks, engine manufacturers, and pump
companies boomed, as American industry assumed a "belligerent basis. 1148
years" found itself in possession of a nlarger list of unfilled orders
155
and carriers in the countryn who would now compete with the Russian
and the export trade. Viewing American carriers as being highly
grain market in Asia.
must shortly prove "of considerable importance to a good many farmers
American carriers was further provided by journals such as the Railway
Gazette which editorialized from October, 1897 through January of 1898,
48Railroad Gazette (Chicago), XXX (April 1, 1898), 237; ibid.,
XXX (May 7, 1898), %1, Electrical World (New York), XL (April 1'4;1898),
282.
upon the close relationship between profitable railway transportation
----~------------------_.. -----_.
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Chauncey De Pew estimated that the one-fifth of United States
ca.pital invested in railroads suffered a steady decrease in gross and
net earnings per mile since 1880. Certainly, then, it is equally easy
to believe that James J. Hill, who "did nm.ch to bring American attention
to the possibility of Pacific trade, II and to whom "an empty car was a
thief," cast longing eyes at new markets. There is positive evidence
that at least one railway magnate, Charles Francis Adams, worked to
effect the intervention of the United States in Cuba.49
The rationale of another group of .American merchants for their
sentiments was expressed by Gustav H. Schwab, who introduced, early in
Febraary, 1898, before the New York Trade Division of the Chamber of
Commerce the following resolutions "That there are important changes
now going on in the relations of the European powers to the Empire of
China, affecting the territo17 of that Empire, and to that extent
affecting the priVileges enjoyed under existing treaty rights by
American citizens trading in and with China." After assarances of the
sponsoring group's acceptance of the gold standard, this petition noted
the growth of American trade in Hong Kong, and begged President McKinley
"that in view of the changes. threatening to future trade development of
the United States in China, the Chamber of Commerce of the State of
New York respectfully and earnestly urge that such steps be taken as will
49See for examples, Engineering News (Chicago), XXXVIII
(November ll, 1897), 308, Times, April 9, 1898, Vevier, The United States
and China, 19, Railroad Gazette, mx (October 22, 1897), 748. Signifi-
cantly, Pratt's asswnption as to railroad losses is omitted from
Expansionists. See also "American Business and the Spanish War."
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commend themselves to your wisdom for the prompt and energetic defense
of existing treaty rights of our citizens in China, and for the preserva-
tion and protection of their important commercial interest in that
Empire. r,50
On March 21, 1898, Russia announced its formal ninety-nine year
lease of Ta Lien Wan from China in return for abrogation of Russian
demands for Port Arthur. 1b1ssia also obtained commercial concessions
in Manchuria at this time. Dr. Pratt is forced to the significant con-
elusion that "by the middle of MarchI' many organs of business opinion
in the United States admitted war IImight bring no serious disaster, and
was inevitable. II Th~gh Theodore Roosevelt informed J. C. Morgan
associate Bob Bacon that he considered intervention in Cuba without
recognition of Cuban autonolllY' to be "a mistake, If the die had been cast.
In January of 1898, "while Lodge and White were considering with Balfour
the possibility of America joining Britain to enforce the Open Door in
China," Henry cabot Lodge concluded, in a letter to his colleague, Henry
White, that llaome of our large mercantile bodies are also beginning to
move in the same direction." Dr. Pratt' 5 conclusions that rtbusiness
sentiments, especially in the East, continued strongly anti-war at the
close of 1897 and in the opening months of 1898 11 is qualified by the
nature of the proposed war revenue measures under consideration by
Congress. Again Pratt's conclusion undercuts the basic thesis he
50Times, Februar;r 4, 1898, Engineering Magazine (New York), VII
(Febru.ary, 1898), 382.
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advances elsewhere, even though he never makes a fonnal revision of his
original formulation. 5l
As long as it seemed possible to obtain Cuba without recourse
to force there continued to be good reason for a decline in securities
whenever war appeared imminent. But as a matter of record, the "break'·
in the market occasioned by the declaration of war was slight. The
downturn occasioned by the threat of war seems much more readily
explained by the nature of legislation pending in Congress for the
financing of the conflict, than by any fear of the adverse effects of
war. As an alternative to the silver funding proposals, an administra-
tion backed measure called for special taxes on commercial paper and
legal instruments. Offered such an unprofitable choice of programs for
the display of patriotism, it remains little wonder that stocks
reflected the concern of commercial interests. But there was no panic.
The market proved buoyant as averages quickly. resumed prewar levels,
maintaining and exceeding these levels throughout the conflict.52
5lBeale , Theodore Roosevelt, 60, 178, Times, March 21, 1898,
Pratt, 234. The commercial press followed the State Department line
closely with regard to Cuba. An exeeption appears to have been the
Mail and Express, which favored the recognition of Cuban belligerency
as early as 1895. Meanwhile, organs such as the Railroad Gazette
feared "Railroad Earnings in a Silver Country," but admitted that
"broadly speaking, supply of transportation is, in excess of demand. It
Railroad Gazette, XXX (May 27, 1898), 552, ibid. (May 13, 1898), 513,
Wisan, The Cuban Crisis, 129. -
52Times, April 9, 1898. The war tax assessed beer and tobacco
as well, and legalized an increase in postal rates. United States
Bureau of the Census, Historical statistics of the United States, 1789-
1945 (Washington, 1949), 345. Instrumental in framing the revenue
iiie'iSure were Senators Allison and Dingley, as well as Secretary Gage.
Times, April 3, 1898.
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Further, the access by foreign powers to the raw materials of
China aroused the concern of many trade publications. Among these the
Engineering Magazine pledged itself, in February of 1898, to publish
news of "present European attempts to dismember Ohma ll because lithe
mineral wealth of the country becomes of interest to American mining
as offering a new source of supplies to our E.'uropean competitors.,,53
It is further contended by Professor Pratt that "American
business had been either opposed or indifferent to the expansionist
philosophy which had arisen since 1890. 11 The term. Ilexpansionist tl is
an elastic one embracing :many forms of growth, as the study of American
history shows. Certainly the business community's extension of its
controls and interests from the time of the panic of 1893 illustrates
its active expansion. It is true that extension did not formalize in
i.mmediate demands for the annexation of new markets. But it may be
observed that power exercised without responsibility tends to become
as insidious to liberty as any dictatorship may be. As a matter of
record industrial and commercial interests demanded new bases of opera-
tion. And they did so while they offered in exchange the newly
rationalized productive system of the United States as the instrument
for American economic recovery.54
An appreciation of the predicament of American producers
prompted cautious warning from the administration that a declaration
53Engineering Magazine, VII (February, 1898), 384-85.
540ampbell, Special Business -Interests, 1-37, Pratt,
E;pansionists, 223.
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of war by the United States would necessitate an issue of government
notes in the absence of fi..n.ancial reforms. But vrhat seemed to be a
heaven-sent opportunity for Populists, greenbackers, and silverites to
advance their interests by espousing war with Spain became only a
remote possibility under the legislative program advanced by congres-
sional leaders. Neither the administration plan for currency reform,
introduced into Congress on April 5, nor the proposed war revenue
measure introduced on April 9 contained loopholes through which
inflationists might advance their hearts' desire. It mattered little
that the war revenue bill made provision for popular loans of 300 to
500 million dollars "payable in coin" so long as the announced policy
of the government remained gold redemption. The provision for coin
payment was permissiva, not, mandatory and, in point of fact, would be
used by the President to offset the popular hatred of bond holders.
The administration authorized under the act an issue of "public"
bonds to finance the war. But this blow to the hopes of inflationists
was softened by the dispersal of the 50 billion dollar defense appro-
priation. By April 10, a scant four weeks after the appropriation was
made, the fund was almost exhausted. \rJhen the coffers of the national
treasury emptied, a committee of Republican leaders of the House of
Representatives called upon the President once again to demand t1prompt
j
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and aggressive action in Cuba. It Once again war seemed inrminent. 55
55preswnably these payments were made from funds made available
to the Govern.11lent by the railroad sale. On April 10, it was reported
that the United States Treasury had at its demand 177 million dollars
in gold derived from the sale. Additional work on contracts awarded by
the army and navy, including the construction of several battleships,
were authorized. See Times, April 1, 3, 6, 9, 1898; April 2, 1898. For
Populist reaction to naval expansion see Chapter VI of this thesis.
CHAPTER VI
CONGRESSIONAL BATTLES
Ed
The expansionists were ready
\Vhile the British occupied Waiheiwai, and so apparently com-
"Expansion seems to be regulated ••• by our own internal
constitution. II
William H. Seward
The Funeral Oration of Henry Clay
the message, that an American naval task force would proceed to the
to assure the United States a favorable strategic position in the
Cabot Lodge once more placed upon the agenda a bill calling for the
Caroline Islands, adjacent to the Philippines, twenty-four hours in
Cuban affairs for the first week in April, 1898. Press reports acknOloT-
powers along the China coast, the McKinley Administration moved hastily
scramble for colonial possessions. Appraised of the approval of
pleted the allocation of spheres of influence among the major European
ledged that JvIcKinley favored the intervention of the United States to
drive Spain from Cuba. And it was further reported, well in advance of
European powers, the President scheduled his messa.ge to Congress upon
likewise resubmitted for consideration.
purchase of Santo Thomas. And the treaty for annexation for Hawaii was
American intervention in Cuba by the majority of the interested
advance of the message to Congress. In the Senate, meanwhile, Henry
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1to make their big push.
In the interval, Spain purchased the peace of native Philippine
rebels and attempted to buy the Guban patriots as well. But Spanish
conservatives in Cuba worried over. the obvious failure of the Spanish
army to control the native population, and well-to-do Spanish citizens
began to look to the United states for the protection which Spanish
troops could no longer provide. Cuban patriots thereupon attempted to
hasten the intervention of the United States in Cuba. Early in December
of 1897, Berkeley Balch, Secretary of the Cuban League of New York City,
petitioned the President Itin behalf of the insurgents rt for aid against
Spain. ItAutonomy is a foolish dream, II ran the petition in part.· lilt is
evident that neither side understand it, wishes it, nor can administer
it. 11 Conservative Spaniards in Cuba considered the advisability of ask-
ing for Ita United States protectorate over Cuba within six months ll of
their mid-December meetings in 1897. Two weeks later the split of
opinion within insurgent ranks was well known, for the insurgent leader
Gomez contented himself with the rejection of Spanish offers for
autonomy while the Garcia rebels continued to demand complete political
independence. Worried about the fate of the Cuban patriots, Horatio
Reubens, counsel to the Cuban Junta, insisted that the failure of the
United States to allmr political autonomy in Cuba would only substitute
an anti-American uprising for the civil war against Spain being waged
ITimes, April 1, 5, 6, 9, 1898. Sanford P. Dole thereupon
hurried to Washington to again urge the annexation of Hawaii.
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on the island. 2
Thus, though the President contented himself with a request for
the forcible intervention of the United States in Spanish affairs, the
issue of annexation versus autonomy for the islands could not be ignored.
But the President moved on toward war, withholding from public knowledge
the notice given by the Spanish Government that it would accept United
states demands for Cub211 autonomy. ~lorking the other side of the street,
the State Department released, in the week following the presidential
message, consular reports emphB.sizing the horrors of the Cuban war.
These were well calculated to inflame public opinion against Spain and,
for that reason had previously been withheld from pub1ication.3
In Congress, meanwhile, Populist legislators urged with increas-
ing vehemence the intervention of the United States against Spain. They
tied their demands for intervention to what they charged was a failure
of the Republican Party to restore prosperity to the nation. Jerry
Simpson, admitting hirllself to be "more concerned about the condition and
prosperity of our own people" than about Cuba, concluded that "if an
opportunity was offered, I, for one, would vote with the Republicans to
help them fulfill their pledges in regard to Cuba." Simpson opposed,
though, the annexation of the island, and resisted the idea of war to
annex Cuba, since he regarded the natives as lIundesirab1e citizens. 1I
For a short period early in 1898, Simpson opposed even the recognition
2Times , October 19, 1897; November 16, 1897, November 28, 29,
1897; December 3, 14, 17, 30, 31, 1897.
3Times, April 12, 1898.
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of the Cubans as belligerents, fearing as he did, that recognition would
lead to war. llich more to the point, the Senator insisted, was the
failure of the Republican Dingley Tariff to restore domestic prosperity.
Current reports from the State of l'1a.ine indicated to the Senator that
Republicans had failed lito buy prosperity," and apparently Simpson
refused to be convinced that the Republican program would satisfy
domestic requirements. 4
Representative Castle joined in the attack upon Republican
policies. Though he favored the recognition of belligerency, and decried
the necessity for going "round Robin Hood I s barn to talk Cuba under cover
of an appropriation resolution," he agreed with Simpson that powerful
bond holders directed the foreign policy of the United States to the
detriment of this country. Cleveland Democrats refused to recognize
the rebels in 1895 in order to save the gold standard, Simpson asserted,
and Castle elaborated this indictment of the money power. "Belmont,
Morgan and Company hold twenty million in Spanish bonds," insisted
Castle. Should the Cuban patriots achieve their independence the market
value of these bonds would depreciate. Hence the bond holders worked to
prevent recognition of the rebels, he.concluded}
Castle and his Populist colleagues continued to urge silver
coinage, and they sided with silverites of both parties in a common
effort to obtain favorable silver legislation. They still insisted
4Cong • Bec., 31:1:803, 804.
5Cong• F£c., 31:1:763, 764; -ibid., 31:3:2099; ibid., 31:1:93.
·11l
I
\
;\
. ,
'.';.
166
that prosperity would be most easily obtained by stimulating prices
through an increased money supply. Representative Ridgley attempted,
in his turn, to append amendments providing for the issue of small
denomination legal tender to naval appropriation bills. His colleague,
Representative Bell, urged that if another bond issue became unavoidable
all government bonds be made payable in "coin." Bell cited again, as a
successful example of this technique, the financial arrangements of the
Bank of France. Reserving to itself the option of redemption in gold or
silver, the Bank "never depreciated the credit of the French Government,
or militated against the credit of any nation," according to the eager
advocates of silver funding. He further called for the geographic dis-
tribution of United States mints to keep specie !lin the area where
needed ll by domestic cormnerce.6
Since the fifty million dollar congressional appropriation for
national defense promised to stimulate the domestic economy, it drew a
chorus of approval from Populist legislatorso Representative Bell
expressed his willingness to give the President the !Iwidest discretion ll
for use of the funds; and in an effort to direct some of the money to
his constituents he stressed, in several lengthy speeches, the patriot-
ism exhibited by all political factions who supported the measure. 7
Progress likewise sanctioned intervention. "I should oppose
with all my powers any attempt to create a warlike spirit in our nation,
6Cong • Rec., 31:2:1284, 85, ibid., 31:1:360, 61.
7Ibid•
for the whole western world. II
Nebraska to tender the services of the Nebraska state Militia to the
I believe Almighty God planted our infant• • •most serious character.
Vincent of Kansas, llbut Sir, the conditions now confronting us are of a
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the committee would be weighted against a decision in favor of Cuban
the I'Peerless Leader": "Yes, the time for intervention has arrived.
the standard of civilization and progress ••• " The "God given
into the Congressional Record the acknowledgment by William Jennings
Bryan that defense appropriations would facilitate peace (since Ilprompt
Senator Allen offered a different analysis. Though Allen read
Republic on the shores of the western seas to carry forward and upward
mission l ! of the country, Vincent believed, made it "defender of liberty
or to extend our dominion by force of arms, II proclaimed Representative
liberality would lessen the danger of war and therefore prove wise
economyll), the Senator followed this with another statement given by
sionwhich would face Congress he fought the proposed waiver by the
conference connnittee on Cuba. If the appointments were left in the
hands of "Czar Reed" of the House of Representatives, Allen feared that
Cuba lies within sight of our shores. War is the final arbiter between
independence. Allen, too, favored war. After the Presidential message
on Cuban affairs, the Senator advised Populist Governor Holcomb of
nations. 11 1\.nd because Allen clearly understood the nature of the deci-
Senate of its right to appoint from the floor members of the special
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President "without delay.,,8
Senator Butler saw gloomy prospects ahead for the Cuban
patriots. The presidential message expressed "bondholders greed, not
freedom," Butler alleged. He argued that the defeat of the resolution
calling for Spanish withdrawal from Cuba boded no good for the future
of free Cuba. Allen agreed. Clearly, the presidential message was not
IIhonorable," since HcKinley bypassed a IIchance to put war on the level
of humanity and liberty. II For his part, Senator Turner of Washington
meanwhile emphasized the power of Congress to declare war. And
Senator Harris justified the conflict by assert:ing that "a just war ll
would promote "all that is highest and best :in national life. II
: i,
Senator Butler declared his support of a Itfirm and vigorous policy,"
but he rema:ined suspicious of Republican strategy, and he refused to
agree to the proposed delegation of the war power to the President. 9
All Populist senators voted in favor of the Foraker-Turpie
Amendment which called for the recognition of Cuban independence.
Senator Butler vehemently denied that the influence of William Jennings
Bryan had produced this unanimity. Butler insisted that "not a single
Populist • • • not a single one, so far as I know, had any conference 11
with Bryan about Cuban affairs, even though Bryan was in Washington at
the time. Butler's denial left Allen free to continue advocating the
8Cong• Rac., 30:1:2615; ibid., 31:4:4023, Times, April 1, 1898.
9con~. Rec., 31:5:4069, ibid., 31:4:3013, 3132, 33; Times,
April 6, 189. Representative Harris sponsored a resolution from Kansas
citizens who called for the annexation of Hawaii in 1898. See Cong. Ree.,
31: Index: 269.
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recognition of the insurgents despite a reminder from one senatorial
colleague and fellow-silverite, Morgan of Alabama, that belligerency
f1nowlf meant war.10
10Times, April 20, 1898, Cong. Rec., 31:2:2073-75.
Senator Allen submitted again on February 24, 1898, a resolu-
tion, similar to an amendment to appropriation bill which he offered on
February 9, 1898, calling for the recognition of Cuban belligerency.
But the second resolution, being unattached to an appropriation measure,
amounted to little more than a hostile gesture against Spain. The simple
recognition of belligerency would never have provided much more than
moral support for the Cubans.
It is to be doubted that William Allen, an astute member of
the legal profession and later a Federal judge, remained entirely ignor-
ant of the significant variations of his two amendments, particularly
when his colleague, Senator Morgan, acknowledged that the recognition of
belligerency could mean war only if appended to a diplomatic and consular
appropriations measure. Before Proctor's trip to Cuba, Horgan himself
advocated temporary postponement of any legislation which might prove
offensive enough to Spain to involve the United States in war. New
York Times, April 1, 1898, February 9, 1898, February 24, 1898; John B.
1'10ore , IlI1aritime Law and the Spanish War, II Political Science Quarterly,
xv (September, 1900), 399-425. The modification of Allen's views
occurred during a time when the strategy of Republican interventionists
in refusing recognition to Cuban rebels was assuming new importance for
many congressmen. It is doubtful, considering the financialll1,easures
supported by the Senator, that his failure to introduce a stronger
measure reflected any sudden conversion to the financial policies of
the administration. By Cleveland's declaration of neutrality, the
United States was already barred from assisting either belligerent. The
interpretation of neutrality espoused by the United States during its
own Civil War proscribed sale of enumerated articles, "contraband of
war, II as well as the raising of funds and armies on foreign soil. This
interpretation was ignored. Recognition of the belligerent status of
the Cuban rebels would hardly have provided any additional advantages to
their military conduct of the war, since the Junta solicited funds
openly. The bazaars held by the Cuban-American league of New York City
met no official opposition, though it was well mown that the funds so
gathered. purchased ammunition for the rebels. One may infer that the
lack of formal protest on the part of Spain was due, at least in part,
to Spanish reliance upon American foodstuffs for the support of Spanish
troops in Cuba.
insisted that the motion was debatable. It was his privilege to respect
offered in mid-April to avoid voting upon recognition, the Senator
"but disagree'. with the President. Thus he reiterated his demands and
Allen asserted that not even the sinking of the "Maine ll would affect
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expressed irritation at the interference of European powers with the
formation of United States foreign policy. 11
Demanding a vote to recognize the independence of the island,
Senator withdrew his own motion to recognize the Cuban rebels late in
of womanhood, freedom, flag, and national honor ranked in order when he
of the sinking of the "Haine" only to withdraw it at the request, he
Allen introduced a resolution calling for a Senate investigation
February, he roused the Senate with jingo speech in which the sacredness
the position of the United States with regard to Cuba. Although the
resumed his efforts in Narch. In answer to a motion for adj ourrunent,
and the secrecy of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which continued
coercion. 'I But the Senator made it clear that he distrusted the motives
noted, of Senate colleagues who felt that such a move I·smacked of
Populist representatives also favored the Foraker-Turpie resolution.
to operate as a closed and tightly knit group, an appendage to adminis-
tration policy rather than as senatorial delegates.12
With the exception of Jerry Simpson, who voted against it,
llCong. Bee., 31:2:2579, ibid., 31: 2:2ll8, ibid., 31:4:3410-18;
~., 31:4:3847, ibid., 3:4:3945;497
12cong • Rec., 31:2:1819, 1879.
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And during the lengthy debates upon American policy in regard to Spain,
all Populist legislators showed an increasing inclination to support
expenditures for military purposes. Jerry Simpson urged the purchase
by the Army of Kansas livestock as an economy measure. Marion Butler
again offered an amendment to limit the price paid by the Government for
armour plate while his Populist colleagues still favored the construction
of an armour plant by the Government.13
The agrarians held few illusions as to the purpose of these
expenditures. Representative Vincent bemoaned the failure to obtain
fifty thousand dollars for improvements to Fort Riley, in his own
state. It seemed "hardly fair," he murmered, "to draw the line on so
small an amount" when of the fifty million dollars allotted to defense
the congressnen who opposed Vincent gained three million for their own
constituents. Senator Kyle's earlier request for a new army barracks
in Kansas, estimated cost of seven hundred fifty thousand dollars,
seemed much bolder. Contrasted with these sums the new agricultural
appropriation bill provision for the distribution of free seed to
impoverished farmers appeared of minor benefit, though Senator Allen
voiced his pleasure with the act.14
Giving up on other approaches to recovery, Populists became
reconciled to military expenditures, and grew increasingly enthusiastic
13'l'imes, April 14, 1898, Conga Rec., 31:1:702.
14Ibid., 31:1:902, 1522; ibid., 31:3:2146; ibid., 31:2:1245, 46;
Times, February 4, 1898.
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over American naval expansion. The closed market bounty advocates, who
had resisted the growth of American naval power in their free trade days
(before the panic of 1893), now asked for assurances that American naval
power would expand. War threatened abroad, and the agrarians who
believed in "retributive justice where the welfare of the human family
is concerned, II felt themselves justified in war preparation. A battle-
ship, if built, must be a IIgood fighting machine." But the construction
of three new battleships for which the Republicans sought authorization
was a long term measure.15
Because they desired the immediate strengthening of American
naval power, Populists inclined to support demands for an increase in
the number of small coastal vessels. This is not to say they remained
small navy men. Jerry Simpson voiced the agreement of Populist legis-
lators to "go on with the construction of these three battleships. That
is all right. • •• I think we ought to double the number of torpedo
boats and torpedo boat destroyers." Populist legislators went on record
in favor of the appropriation measure which provided for the construc-
tion of both types of vessels.16
Although Populist legislators inclined toward Republican plans
for naval expansion, they continued to obstruct the administration 1 s
plan for currency reform. The Republican proposal, introduced into the
House of Representatives on April 6, 1898, was designed to prevent
l5cong • Rec., 31:4:3211, ibid., 31:2:4237.
l6Ibid., 31:4:3466, 67.
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further depletion of the treasury gold re serve. Under the proposed act
a separate reserve fund would be set up for the purpose of ~edeeming
silver certificates. Notes so redeemed were to be cancelled. No sudden
rush upon the treasury for gold payments of silver certificates, such as
had occurred in 1893, could endanger the reserve fund. As a sop to the
silverites, the temporary circulation of silver would be encouraged by
a provision which permitted redemption of these silver certificates in
silver. The silver might then be exchanged for gold, if gold were
desired by the holder. l ?
Silver was thus still valued in terms of gold. Hence Populists
opposed the plan, although the Republican measure provided for a pos-
sible future note issue to increase the money supply. The value of
money, they steadfastly maintained, must be a function of circulation
and exchange, not of the current demand for gold. In preference to the
Though Populist legislators differed from the Republican
legitimate governmental function, Populists insisted, therefore no
January 7, 1898, April 6, 1898, Cong. Rec., 31:1:417.
31:2:1172, ibid., 31:2:1284; ibid., 31:1:1037, ibid.,
coin silver llat parity with gold." The power to coin money remained a
proposed gold standard legislation, Populists supported a resolution to
question of lIcheaper moneyl\ payments to creditors was involved in their
preference for silver monetization.18
President in their methods of achieving the "broad American policyll of
11m.:_~
_J..l.1_llC_S,
18Ibid.,
31: 1: 11.58,"""397
"
:Ii
Tb _
i I
I-
i
I
"
,
t
!
i
I,
L
174
commercial expansion, the agrarians became increasingly sympathetic with
a.dministration efforts to drive Spain from Cuba. "The American in the
"Ihite House commands our unqualified sympathy, confidence, and approval, It
John Skinner asserted, -as the crisis with Spain drew near. "Divided as
we may be politically, racially, sectionally ••• his policy shall be
our policy. II Cuban intervention offered these Populists an immediate
opportunity to gain the objective for which they so long had struggled.
It was not that the island would prove a source of natural wealth to
the agrarians: on the contrary, its acquisition might prove a distinct
disadvantage to western and 30uthern sugar beet growers whose greatly
expanded crops would again face the competition of Cuban sugars. And
Populists deplored admitting to citizenship members of the colored
races, whom they considered inferior to Anglo-Saxons. But intervention
in Cuba entailed probable war. The administration itself acknowledged
that war would necessitate an increase in circulating specie. Thus the
policy of intervention in Cuba remained linked to Populist hopes for
an inflated currency. And this, in turn, was their chosen vehicle to
reach prosperity.19
Thus Populist legislators favored intervention against Spain
in Cuba. Like his colleagues, John Skinner rationalized the shift in
Populist tactics: liThe policy we are sure will be humane. II Nore than
six years earlier, Ignatius Donnely and Thomas vlatson had affirmed
19Ibid., 31:4:3212.
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their belief in the inevitability of human progress toward a time when
"the old, rude way of trial by combat" would give way to a flhigher and
better development fl ; but these hopes appeared doomed when the congres-
sional debates over the manner by which Cuban intervention was to be
effected became so partisan that Democrats and Republicans in the House
of Representatives resorted to fisticuffs to settle their differences. 20
Excepting Jerr,v Simpson, Populist legislators in the House of
Representatives voted in favor of the intervention of the United States
in Cuba. Recognition of the Cuban patriots as belligerents no longer
satisfied them, for they desired the direct participation of this country
in the struggle against Spain. But when the Senate shortly thereafter
expressed its preference for intervention without the recognition of
Cuban autono~, Populists recoiled, fearing that the annexation of Cuba
would follow. Populist senators unanimously supported the minority
resolution of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee to recognize the
autonomist Cuban government as well as the independence of Cuba. To
this bill Senator Davis promptly appended an amendment disclaiming any
intention of the United States to exercise sovereignty over the
island. But when Republican Senator William Frye countered with a move
to strike out the clause acknowledging the right of Cubans to freedO:IIl
and independence, Populists voted to table the entire motion in order to
avoid its passage in the form presented. Senator Davis then proposed
to substitute the Senate resolution for that submitted by the House of
20Donnelly, Caesar's Col~ 132; Times, April 16, 1898.
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Representatives, and all five Populist Senators favored this action.
Along with the majority of other senators, they appeared deaf to the
protests of Republican leaders Hanna, Aldrich, Hoar and Platt, who
insisted that recognition of the Cuban autonomists ran ltcontrary to the
Presidential message, II and encroached upon -the President's constitu-
tional leadership in foreign affairs. 21
Ii vote upon the Turpie amendment, which called for the recog-
nition of the Cuban Republic by Congress, received Senate approval.
All Populist Senators voted in favor of its passage. SL~ilarly, they
voted unanimously against accepting the first House resolution which
called for intervention without recognition of the belligerents. And
Populists voted in a body against the appointment of the Conference
Committee after Senator Allen's motion to elect committee members from
the floor was rejected. 22
Far into the night of April 19 the Senate and House debated the
relative merits of the resolutions presented, and awaited the report of
the second meeting of the Conference Committee. In the interim,
silverites among the Republicans clarified the reasons for theirinsis-
tence upon diplomatic recognition of the Cuban government. It was not
that they desired to avert an armed conflict with Spain, or even that
they considered sovereignty an inherent right of the islanders. Rather,
as their spokesman, Senator Teller insisted, the silverites desired to
I:
'i
, .~
21Times
--'
22 Ib "d2...,
April 14, 17, 19, 1898.
!JPril 19, 1898.
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escape responsibility for the bonded debt which hung like a weighty
albatross about the necks of the islanders. Neanwhile, in the House of
Representatives, Republican strategists Reed and Dingley conferred with
other House Republicans as to the methods by which they might effect
the passage of the House version of the intervention resolutions through
the Senate as well. 23
The agreement to hold a joint session to adjust the differences
between the House and Senate bills marked defeat for the Republican
pro-autonomists who sided with Populist legislators in opposing inter-
vention without recognition of the Cubans. But the Senators stubbornly
rejected a proposal to recede from their position on Cuba. When the
House of Representatives in similar fashion refused to budge, a joint
Conference Committee again undertook negotiations to settle the dispute.
Sensing that the appointees would have power to frame legislation not
to the liking of himself and his colleagues, Senator Allen again pro-
posed that the Senate elect its conferees, instead of allowing them to
be appointed by the committee chairman. Though Allen's Populist col-
leagues supported his efforts, the resolution was defeated. 24
In the tug-of-war between the Republican-controlled House and
Democrat organized Senate, each body refused to accede to the wishes of
the other. But Populists voting in both houses were remarkably consis-
tent. Populist legislators in the House of Representatives who voted
23Ibid., April 19, 1898.
24Ibid., April 19, 1898.
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with the minority of the Foreign Relations Committee for recognition of
the Cuban govern.l\lent 8,lso refused, save for Representative H01tlard of
Alabama, to support the first Senate bill for recognition of the bel-
ligerents, since this motion did not include any provision for the
direct intervention of the United States in Cuba. 25
Populists insisted that Presidential efforts to influence con-
gressional legislation in effect deprived Congress of its constitutional
power to declare war. But victory seemed no closer when another motion
of the Senate to insist upon its own resolution carried that body. The
second section of the resolution which authorized Senate participation
in the Conference Committee also passed the Senate by a margin of one
vote, although all Populist Senators opposed the measure. Populist
legislators in the House meanwhile favored the motion of Representative
Bromwell to recede from their stand, and agree to the Senate resolution,
but Bromwell's test vote revealed that a majority of thirty-three repre-
sentatives opposed recognition. On the final vote in the Senate, which
carried that body to agreement with the House of Representatives,
Senator Kyle went along with the administration against his five Populist
colleagues, who voted for the last time against intervention without
Cuban autonomy.26
Having agreed to recognize their agreement on the issue of war
with Spain, Congress turned its attention to the passage of a war revenue
25Ibid., April 18, 19, 1898.
26cong • Rec., 31:2:1031, Times, April 18, 19, 1898.
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measure. It was here, rather than in the fight over Cuban autonomy, that
the struggle with the Republican Administration became crucial to the
future of Populism. For final disposition of the Spanish possessions
must await the cessation of hostilities with Spain, but the nature of the
revenue bill passed by Congress might revive, or permanently kill, the
monetary reforms demanded by Populist legislators.
By April 19, the date on which Congress finally passed the inter-
vention resolutions, Republican members of the Ways and Means Connnittee
of the House of Representatives declared themselves I1practically agreed lt
on a revenue measure to finance the war. The preliminary draft of the
revenue bill combined a special stamp tax with "long term bonds l1 to
raise an estimated 113 million dollars in additional revenue. Populists
immediately voiced strenuous objections to the entire bill. They con-
d~nned the proposal to raise six hundred thousand dollars of the esti-
mated requirements through another government bond issue. They further
questioned the constitutionality of assessing particular articles of
consumer goods, beer and hard liquors made from grain, to derive the
balance of the revenue. Consequently, when the revenue measure was
introduced into the House of Representatives, Populist legislators
united to prevent its passage. 27
The Populists objected strenuously to Republican charge that
opponents of the revenue bill lacked patriotism. They fought back by
asserting that the war with Spain was "being used as a pretext for
27Cong. Rec., 31:5:4460, ibid., 31:6:5541; ibid., 31:5:4308,
4395, 4408.
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carrying out a policy that has been slumbering II in the breasts of
American financiers to revive lithe national banking systemll and the
attendant evils of currency contraction to which agrarians since the
days of John Taylor of Carolina had objected. The entire procedure was
little more than a llscheme to destroy silver and substitute national
bank notes for greenbacks. 1I It appeared obvious to Populist legislators
that a revenue to finance the war for an estimated two and one-half
years became unnecessary when the conflict could be terminated in six
months nif properly conducted. II And the agrarian legislators further
denied that a govermaent issue of greenbacks or silver would result in
an uncontrollable spiral of inflation. Greenbacks and silver coin
might be llpulled back into the treasuryll if the threat of overexpansion
arose, by Ifleveling upon those best able to paylf the Itproper taxation tl
of their incomes. 28
Thus the income tax would become the method of controlling
currency distribution under the Populist counter-proposal. The silver
seignorage of the Federal Treasury must be coined, silver certificates
issued upon the value established for the metal, and the lever of
internal taxation used to insure the flexibility of the system. In
addition to the advantage of ready paper and silver currency, Populist
legislators insisted that the high interest charges accruing upon the
bonded debt would be eliminated, and domestic interest rates lowered
28Ibid., 31:5:4395, ibid., 4434, 35, 36; ibid., 31:5:4388,
~., 31:5:4395.
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when currency became available. 29
This last major effort of the Populist legislators to afford
relief to their constituents failed, even more miserably than had the
crusade of 1896. A few Populist legislators, apparently worried by
the aspersions cast upon their patriotism, found it safer to abstain
rather than to cast their votes against the war revenue measure.
Senator Turner of Washington, as well as Representatives Todd and
Meekson, refused to cast their votes on the Republican revenue bill.
All other Populists voted against the act.30
From two Senators and nine Representatives, Populists increased
their congressional bloc to five Senators and twenty Representatives of
the party in the Fifty-fifth Congress. But the six year term of office
accounted in great part for the cumulative number of Populist legisla-
tors, and the strength of public sentiment in favor of the Populists in
1896 may be attributed largely to the popular desire for silver coinage.
Consequently the election of pro-silver Populist legislators for a two
year term proved no measure of success at the polls.31
Moreover, Populists fell prey to the Spanish-;:Jllerican War. The
surge of patriotism. which swept the United States in 1898 took its toll
29Ibid., 31:5:4395.
30cong. Rec., 31:5:4460,
31United States Congress, ~O~f~f~i~c=i~a~l_C~o~n~g~r~e~s~s~i~o;n~a~l~D~i~r~e~c~t;o~rfn~of~t~h~e
55 Congress. Senate Document 2. Cong., 2 Sess. Washington, 1 97 ,
323-30.
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among the agrarians once bent upon exercising vengeance against the
controlling politica.l alliances of the country. And factional quarrels
split what remained of the national Populist organization. Though
fifteen states still claimed Populist organizations, Spain gradually
replaced the goldbugs as the foe of Populist patriots. The Populist
Party of Kansas promised volunteer soldiers a Ithigh appreciation of
their patriotic duty to the country, II and demanded that they be allowed
to vote in the coming election. IVIichigan Middle-of-the-Road Populists
favored the issue of full legal-tender paper money to pay the expenses
of the Spanish-American tvar. True Populists still insisted lIthe money
for carrying on the war with Spain should be obtained by the coinage of
silver. II The intra-party tariff feud also took its toll. Arkansas
Populists favored tariff protection against Ilforeign pauper labor. 11 In
California, the Populist platform declared that the war with Spain
llshould be prosecuted with overwhelming vigor until the ends for
which it was undertaken should be fully and satisfactorily achieved. 1t
The Colorado organization favored the "retention of all islands taken
from Spain. ll Idaho Populists recognized "with pride ll the achievements
of the army and navy while Iowa members saw little use for Cuba, but
pushed the construction of the Nicaraguan Canal. In Virginia, the
advent of war "made farmers sure ll of the return of prosperity, with
the result that the Populist minority 'convention of 1897-98 became the
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smallest political convention o£ Virginia annals.32
Upon three issues o£ foreign policy Populists based their hopes
for future prosperity--the isthmian canal, control o£ Cuba, and linger-
ing hopes of international bimetallism. Thus little dit'ference existed
between Populists and the two major parties after 1897 over the methods
of achie'ring the ultimate objective, national prosperity. Democratic
and Republican policies thus frustrated the efforts of the agrarians to
build and Maintain a political party. But the untiring efforts of
Populist legislators to impress upon an industrial nation the need for
a stable agricultural population helped agriculture assume a new status
in the United States. The influence of Populist legislators upon
American foreign policy contributed to this revival. Tariff adjustments,
subsidies, and monetary reforms coincided with the emergence of agricul-
ture as still another vested interest. This was the primar;r accomplish-
ment of Populist legislators.33
32Tribune Almanac (1899), 52, 55, 60, 63, 64, 65, Sheldon,
PopuliSlll in the Old Dominion, 139, 43.
33Tribune Almanac, ,0-65.
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